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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation examines the intellectual debate over the concept of laissez faire 
in American political thought, which took place between 1880 and 1914. It presents an 
account of how the concept of laissez faire rose to prominence in American political 
thought during the Gilded Age as well as an account of how critics responded. The 
Gilded Age was a period of revolutionary economic change which prompted a renewed 
debate over the proper role of government. Much of the existing scholarship devoted to 
this period takes the form of historical overview or extensive focus on a particular 
thinker. My own analysis focuses on the specific arguments of three particular thinkers: 
Henry Demarest Lloyd, Thorstein Veblen, and Herbert Croly. 
 In order to explain the various features of this intellectual debate, I present a 
conceptual analysis of laissez faire and identify its key components. I also provide a 
critical comparison of the competing economic visions of Thomas Jefferson and 
Alexander Hamilton to illustrate the relationship between laissez faire thinking and the 
American Founding. I then present the laissez faire arguments of nineteenth-century 
thinkers, particularly the Social Darwinists. Finally, I critically appraise the arguments 
presented by Lloyd, Veblen, and Croly in order to show how the prevailing notions about 
the proper role of government were changing. 
 In this research, I show that the debate over laissez faire was about more than 
identifying the appropriate economic policy for the United States. It centered upon 
competing theories of society, human nature, and economic progress. In criticizing 
laissez faire, Lloyd, Veblen, and Croly also challenged the traditional American 
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commitment to individualism, and in so doing, they laid the intellectual groundwork for a 
more affirmative government and the emergence of the welfare state in the twentieth 
century.   
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CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION 
 
Laissez-faire, instead of being what it appears to be in most of the current 
discussions, cuts to the very bottom of the morals, the politics, and the political 
economy of the most important public questions of our time.  
— William Graham Sumner, “Democracy and Plutocracy” 
 
 
 In the latter half of the nineteenth century the United States economy underwent a 
revolutionary change. The country experienced rapid economic expansion, but the 
expansion was uneven, inequitable, unpredictable, and largely uncontrollable. Enormous 
concentrations of wealth, widespread poverty, and violent clashes between the forces of 
labor and capital were all exacerbated by an economy that grew in fits and starts. This 
drastic economic change presented a host of new problems that prompted social 
scientists, popular writers, and public officials to reconsider the proper role of 
government. As thinkers debated the responsibilities of the government in relation to the 
economy, the concept of laissez faire1 became a central feature of that debate. 
 Advocates for a policy of hands-off government, such as Herbert Spencer, 
William Graham Sumner, and Andrew Carnegie, argued that the government should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The thinkers included in this dissertation the term “laissez faire” in a number of 
different ways. Some italicize it, some hyphenate it, and some do both. For the sake of 
consistency, I will use the non-italicized and non-hyphenated version, unless I am 
directly quoting from the source. 
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interfere as little as possible with the economic decisions of private individuals and 
corporations. These thinkers adopted the tradition of laissez faire, which dated back to 
eighteenth-century France and the writings of the Physiocrats. However, they presented a 
modernized vision of laissez faire that was suited to an industrial society, and they used 
this laissez faire doctrine to portray the competitive economic order as a motor of 
progress.  When one examines the writing of these modern proponents of laissez faire, it 
is clear that they deployed the doctrine reactively rather than proactively. These thinkers 
were defending a policy of laissez faire from a number of critics who had begun to 
challenge the wisdom of restricting governmental involvement in economic matters. The 
rapid industrialization antecedent to the Civil War effectively galvanized the opposing 
viewpoints about the proper role of government, and this occasioned a lively debate over 
the wisdom and relevance of laissez faire. 
 Reform-minded thinkers also seized upon the doctrine of laissez faire, and many 
came to view the tradition of laissez faire thinking as the primary obstacle to a more 
democratic and equitable society. Critics of laissez faire, such as Henry Demarest Lloyd, 
Thorstein Veblen, and Herbert Croly, considered this policy to be untenable in the face of 
the new economic realities of industrial production and economic inequality. The 
question for these thinkers was not whether the government should play an active role in 
the market economy, but what role it should play and on what basis. 
 After the dawn of the twentieth century, the shift away from laissez faire was 
readily apparent. In 1907, Irving Fisher delivered his vice-presidential address to the 
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meeting of the American Association for the advancement of Science in New York.2 His 
address presents two crucial observations about the doctrine of laissez faire—that it had 
been influential in the latter half of the nineteenth century and that its influence had 
waned by the beginning of the twentieth century. 
 Perhaps the most remarkable change which economic opinion has undergone  
during the last fifty years has been the change from the extreme laissez faire 
doctrines of the classical economists to the modern doctrines of governmental 
regulation and social control.3 
 
At the time of Fisher’s speech, these “modern doctrines,” which would come to support 
the development of the welfare state, were still in their developmental stages even though 
they had begun to take shape two decades before.  
 
TOPIC AND PURPOSE 
 In this dissertation, I focus on how the doctrine of laissez faire came to occupy 
such an influential position in American thought and how critics responded to this 
influence. I examine the manner in which laissez faire thinking fits into the tradition of 
American political thought, but my primary focus is upon how critics challenged laissez 
faire thinking in pursuit of political and economic reform. Critics of laissez faire 
abounded during the “age of reform,” especially the period between 1880 and 1914.4 I 
have chosen three of these critics to illustrate some of the important ways in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Fisher, “Why Has the Doctrine of Laissez Faire Been Abandoned?”  
3 Ibid., 18. 
4 Hostadter identifies the “age of reform” as the period between 1890 and 1944. It 
was preceded by a period of “political conservatism” that lasted roughly from the Civil 
War until 1890. The Age of Reform, 3. 
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reformers reconceptualized the proper role of the government in supervising and 
regulating economic activity. Henry Demarest Lloyd, Thorstein Veblen, and Herbert 
Croly each took a unique approach in criticizing the doctrine of laissez faire. By 
examining these criticisms, I hope to provide some insight into how the popular 
conceptions about the proper role of government changed during this tumultuous period.  
Why should we be concerned with this decline in laissez faire and the 
development of alternative theories of governmental responsibilities? Simply stated, this 
period witnessed a profound crisis in the United States in regards to political and 
economic thinking. Economic changes revived the century-old debate between Alexander 
Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson concerning the proper role of government in economic 
matters. It also forced economists, political thinkers and public officials to consider new 
ideas for a new type of economy. This intellectual current in American political thought 
is a site of interplay between concepts and policies or between ideas and actions.  Such a 
relationship between ideas and practice represent what Sheldon Wolin has called “the 
subtle, complex interplay between political experience and thought.”5  “Political 
understanding,” he continues, is dependent upon an appreciation for the “complexities” 
of politics and the theoretical responses that political thinkers have mounted in order to 
deal with political “predicaments.”6  The complex interplay of ideas and practice as it 
relates to my research is driven by the focus on a certain problem—the inability of laissez 
faire to address massive poverty and the social consequences of such inequity.  The 
collapse of laissez faire and the intellectual vacuum that resulted represents a case study 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” 1077. 
6 Ibid. 
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in the interplay of ideas and practice.  Furthermore, it is a clear case in which political 
thinkers and other writers addressed an “immediate problem.”7  This time of historical 
and theoretical flux was in part an ideological battle within liberalism concerning equality 
of opportunity and limited government.  Such concepts were undergoing revision at the 
turn of the century.  This indicates that some of the “core concepts” of liberalism were 
being contested from many quarters.8  The definitive concepts of liberalism had become 
“sore concepts”—those which lead to “ideological debates” and “conceptual change.”9   
The criticisms of and alternatives to laissez faire that were becoming increasingly 
salient in American politics were themselves an intellectual effort to solve political 
problems. Criticism itself is a form of political action, and like all political actions, it has 
consequences.10 One such consequence is a fundamental change in the meaning and 
usage of important concepts. In one sense, conceptual change is the “imaginative 
consequence of actors attempting to solve their problems and to resolve the 
contradictions they criticize.”11 Given the significant problem posed by the inadequacy of 
laissez faire in American thought, the “imaginative consequences” of this criticism are 
themselves part of a new political language that was emerging to solve real problems and 
address changing circumstances. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Vincent, "Ideology and the community of politics," 405-6. 
8 Ball, "From 'core' to 'sore' concepts: Ideological innovation and conceptual 
change," 391-2. 
9 Ibid, 394. 
10 Farr, “Understanding Conceptual Change Politically,” 35. 
11 Ibid, 38. 
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 There are a number of reasons that the period between 1880 and 1914 is an 
appropriate site for an examination of conceptual change. First, it was a period of 
political change, social upheaval, and economic dislocation. Changing political and 
economic circumstances created new problems that a policy of laissez faire could not 
address. Second, it is a period when the economics discipline was in flux. Young, 
German-educated economists founded the American Economic Association (AEA) 
specifically to challenge the doctrine of laissez faire.12 This challenge left the economics 
discipline divided until after the turn of the century.13 Finally, this  period spans the lead-
up to and arrival of the Progressive era. There is considerable debate as to the coherence 
of Progressive political thought, but it was clearly a period of “particular political 
fluidity” in which political and economic reform were of central importance.14 For my 
purposes, I am more concerned with the ways in which a few specific thinkers were 
attempting to reform political and economic concepts than with trying to identify a 
characteristic political and economic philosophy of Progressivism.  
An understanding of this theoretical realignment is valuable because political 
theorists have not provided a systematic account of how American thinkers 
reconceptualized the relations between the state and the market during the progressive 
era. Much of the research concerning political and economic ideas formulated during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Bateman, “Bringing in the State? The Life and Times of Laissez-Faire in the 
Nineteenth-Century United States,” 176.  
13 Ibid., 194-5. 
14 Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism,” 117. 
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Progressive era has centered upon particular thinkers.15  My research, on the other hand, 
will include a range of thinkers with specific attention paid to their critiques of laissez 
faire. By examining these thinkers in detail, I hope to provide a better understanding of 
how political and economic ideas and concepts were changing from the doctrines of 
laissez faire to a more positive conception of government responsibility.  
 The focus on political and economic change during the progressive era is not a 
new enterprise by any means, but most previous writing on the subject has come from 
historians.16  While there are some excellent historical analyses of the progressive era that 
are indispensible for anyone examining the period, historians tend to focus on events and 
ideas in general rather than a specific conceptual or theoretical change.17  I wish to focus 
on the intellectual response to the changing historical circumstances that historians study.  
There is indeed a disjunction between what historians do and what political theorists do.  
According to Wolin, the aim of the political theorist is “the cultivation of political 
understanding” and “an appreciation of the historical dimension of politics.”18 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See, for example, Stettner, Shaping Modern Liberalism: Herbert Croly and 
Progressive Thought; O'Leary, "Herbert Croly and Progressive Democracy;" Destler, 
Henry Demarest Lloyd and the Empire of Reform; Spindler, Veblen and Modern 
America. 
16 See, for example, Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.; 
Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920; Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of 
Modern America, 1877-1920; Rodgers, "In Search of Progressivism."  
17 The competing studies of the progressive era by Richard Hofstadter and Robert 
H. Wiebe provide an excellent example of this.  Both attempt to provide an historical 
account of the origins of progressivism and the form that progressive reforms took in 
practice.  Hofstadter does incorporate the change in intellectual ideas into his study, but 
he mostly focuses on the effect these ideas had on progressive political movements. See 
The Age of Reform, 105-8, 141-2, 148-55, 186-98, 200-2, and 246-8.   
18 Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," 1077.
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political theorist seeks to build “historical knowledge” about political ideas by 
highlighting the “complex interplay between political experience and thought” and “the 
agonizing efforts of intellect to restate the possibilities and threats posed by political 
dilemmas of the past.”19  The “mode of understanding” for political theorists is historical, 
but the historical focus is upon how theoreticians have dealt with political problems.20  In 
this research, I am seeking a better understanding of how theorists dealt with the crisis of 
laissez faire and how this changed the intellectual discussion over the proper role of 
government in terms of economic policy. 
 This period in American history has been written about extensively, but none of 
the existing works provide a detailed account of how Lloyd, Veblen, and Croly treated 
the subject of laissez faire. Morton White’s highly influential Social Thought in America 
presents an excellent account of how Veblen, John Dewey, Charles Beard, and others 
contributed to the changing intellectual and moral attitudes during this period. White’s 
work is insightful but much broader and more ambitious than what I propose here. 
Richard Hofstadter’s Social Darwinism in American Thought is a classic treatment of 
how the influence of Darwin in the United States occasioned the rise of Social 
Darwinism. His analysis of Spencer and Sumner is invaluable, but he does not offer 
detailed analysis of the thinkers that I propose to examine. The most important source on 
the topic of laissez faire during this period is Sydney Fine’s Laissez Faire and the 
General-Welfare State. His approach is mostly historical in nature, but he does an 
excellent job of describing how laissez faire fits into the tradition of American political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. 
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thought. I cannot hope to match Fine’s breadth, but my research provides more depth into 
the specific criticisms presented by Lloyd, Veblen, and Croly. 
The task remains for me to explain why this research is an important contribution 
to our understanding of political theory.  The concepts and the period that I analyze 
constitute the beginning stages of an ongoing debate about the role of the government in 
economic matters.  The depression of the 1890’s exposed the dangers of an unregulated 
free market as well as the sharp “class divide” in America’s population.21  Also, during 
this  period, Americans began to see government as an entity that placed business 
interests above those of the larger public.22  The failure of laissez faire ideals represented 
a public crisis as well as an intellectual dilemma.  Such periods of public crisis provide 
fertile ground for new ideas and justifications for new action.  Without a clear 
understanding of how theorists mounted an intellectual challenge to laissez faire around 
the turn of the century we are in danger of neglecting the uniquely American response to 
economic crises.  Given the ongoing and contentious debate about the government’s role 
in the economy, I believe that it is essential to understand the early challenges to laissez 
faire in America. Contemporary supporters of a laissez faire policy echo their nineteenth 
century forebears when they cast laissez faire as a protection against “socialism” or “a 
culture of dependency.” Spencer and Sumner provided justifications of laissez faire that 
are strikingly similar to those that we hear today.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Lears, Rebirth of a Nation, 174-82. In fact, the government had been violating 
the laissez faire creed for years by subsidizing business. 167-169. 
22 Trachenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Guilded 
Age, 180-181. Trachenberg notes that the government supported monopolies and even 
provided armed guards to protect private property. 
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INTERPRETIVE METHOD AND OUTLINE 
 
The approach that I will adopt in order to examine these texts is what Terence 
Ball has called a “problem-driven” approach.23  This type of approach does not center 
upon a specific thinker, but upon a certain “puzzle or problem” that is significant or 
interesting.24  In my research, I examine the problem of competing visions of state and 
market relations that emerged near the beginning of the 20th century as a response to the 
crisis in laissez faire economics.  As Ball explains, this approach provides considerable 
leeway in choosing a problem.25  In this instance, I believe that my problem is interesting 
given the current reappraisal and fierce debate over economic regulation and the role of 
government in economic matters.  The challenge mounted against laissez faire during the 
progressive era shows that this debate is not new in American discourse and that 
economic concerns are inextricably linked to political action. 
 In terms of my interpretive approach in this problem, I will pay special attention 
to the historical context of any texts under examination.  I am not simply concerned with 
the logic of the arguments, but their rhetorical value as well.  I am in agreement with 
Skinner that political ideas are rhetorical; they are responses to particular circumstances 
and are meant to persuade.26 I will attempt to contextualize all of the arguments and texts 
that I examine, and I think this is compatible with a question that has historical 
significance at the present time.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ball, "History and the Interpretation of Texts," 28. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. 1, 80-6. 
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The investigation that I undertake in this dissertation crosses traditional 
disciplinary boundaries.  The ideas that make up the intellectual challenge to laissez faire 
come from economists, social scientists, political thinkers, and muckraking journalists.  
Perhaps this response from diverse quarters attests to the saliency of the issue at the time. 
To analyze and understand the changing concepts related to political economy, I will 
focus my investigation on the three influential thinkers previously mentioned, who all 
mounted well-developed critiques of laissez faire. However, before I analyze the 
criticism presented by these thinkers, I must define the concept of laissez faire and 
account for its emergence in American political though in the late nineteenth century.  
I will proceed in the following manner. In chapter 2, I define and clarify the 
concept of laissez faire while identifying the key features of laissez faire thinking. I also 
provide a brief overview of classical economic theory, particularly that of the Physiocrats 
and Adam Smith. This overview is meant to explain how the Physiocrats and Smith 
provided the initial economic justification of a laissez faire policy, but I also show that 
their recommendations of laissez faire presupposed the existence of a strong political 
authority. The Physiocrats, in particular, fully supported the French monarchy, which 
attests to the fact that the very first proponents of laissez faire were hardly advocates for 
small government.  
In chapter 3, I examine the relationship between laissez faire and the American  
Founders. I conduct this examination by focusing on the competing economic viewpoints 
of  Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Both thinkers presented arguments that 
were consistent with some of the main precepts of laissez faire, but both also rejected 
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some of those precepts as well. In his advocacy of an agrarian republic, Jefferson 
envisioned an economy constituted by small farmers, whom he expected to be virtuous, 
public-spirited citizens. Hamilton, on the other hand, supported a commercial economy 
that was regulated by a strong central government and that harnessed the force of private 
self-interest to advance the public good. 
In chapter 4, I continue my examination of laissez faire in American thought by 
turning my focus to the nineteenth century, particularly the late nineteenth century when 
defenses of laissez faire reached a fevered pitch. I offer a critical examination of the most 
vociferous proponents of laissez faire, the Social Darwinists Herbert Spencer and 
William Graham Sumner. Spencer and Sumner presented an updated version of laissez 
faire that leveraged the findings of evolutionary biology to justify a competitive 
economic order. I also analyze Andrew Carnegie’s “Gospel of Wealth,” which presents a 
laissez faire justification of industrial combinations by echoing many of the teachings of 
Social Darwinism. This chapter provides the intellectual context for the remaining three 
chapters by identifying the key features of laissez faire thinking during the Gilded Age. 
Chapter 5 presents Henry Demarest Lloyd’s critique of laissez faire, which he saw 
as a source of destructive selfishness and moral corruption. Lloyd challenged the tenets of 
laissez faire by drawing attention to the moral consequences of individualism and self-
interest. His preferred method was journalistic exposure in which he documented the 
ways that a laissez faire economic system results in misery and exploitation. Laissez 
faire, for Lloyd, was the primary obstacle to his vision of moral reform and the 
establishment of a cooperative commonwealth. 
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In chapter 6, I turn to Thorstein Veblen’s economic critique of laissez faire. He 
believed that the economic approach that undergirds the policy of laissez faire presents an 
inaccurate description of economic reality in a modern industrial society. He identified a 
number of concepts that inform the classical economic worldview and offered a critical 
appraisal of these concepts based on their usefulness for making sense of economic 
phenomena. His primary criticism is that economic theorists, from the Physiocrats to his 
contemporaries, favor an abstract approach that involves identifying timeless economic 
laws that hold across historical epochs and apply generally to all economic behavior. He 
rejected this approach in favor of his own institutional focus. Veblen believed that 
economic behavior is mostly dependent upon existing “institutions”—the complex 
arrangement of beliefs, habits, and practices that influence economic activity. I will 
explain how Veblen’s institutional approach challenges many of the basic tenets of 
laissez faire. He considerd the social and historical effects of these economic institutions 
to be the most important subject for economic investigation. The economist, according to 
Veblen, should try to understand and explain how these institutions evolve and change 
rather than rely upon abstract models that produce general laws. 
Chapter 7 presents Herbert Croly’s criticism of laissez faire, which he attributed 
to the American political tradition rather than classical economic theory. What 
distinguishes Croly from Lloyd and, especially, Veblen is his realization that laissez faire 
is intertwined with American history and tradition. His historical analysis reads like an 
archeology of American ideas about individualism and economic opportunity. I will 
discuss Croly’s criticism of this tradition of individualism and laissez faire as well as his 
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proposed solution.  He believed a laissez faire approach to government leaves the country 
without a definitive purpose and with no means of responsible political action. He argued 
that the Jeffersonian tradition of individualism and democracy had left the United States 
political system under the control of a rigid constitutional architecture that offers no 
avenues for public responsibility. He viewed Hamilton’s vision for a positive responsible 
government as a corrective to Jefferson’s negative view.  
I conclude with a consideration of how the debate over laissez faire is relevant 
today. The criticisms of laissez faire presented here are applicable to the ongoing debate 
over the proper role of government. Indeed, the drama of Gilded Age may be replaying 
itself as corporate profits grow while wages stagnate and economic equality is reaching 
levels not seen since the nineteenth century. The issue of laissez faire is still relevant in 
American politics today as we witness, what some call, a “new Gilded Age.”  
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CHAPTER 2  — LAISSEZ FAIRE: DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT 
 
 
 
The latter half of the nineteenth century was a period of drastic change in the 
United States. Industrialization revolutionized economic relations between increasingly 
wealthy business owners and increasingly destitute laborers. The country also endured 
numerous and frequent panics and depressions starting in 1873 and lasting well into the 
1890’s. Socialists, anarchists, populists, and later progressives represented a growing 
movement of reformers who challenged the status quo. Reform-minded thinkers such as 
Henry Demarest Lloyd, Thorstein Veblen, and Herbert Croly began to scrutinize the 
ideas that supported and defended this status quo. Those ideas were embodied in the 
thinking of laissez faire. During this same time Herbert Spencer, William Graham 
Sumner, and others sought to justify laissez faire in an effort to oppose calls for 
government regulation of economic activities. Spencer and Sumner were presenting a 
modern, purified version of laissez faire, which they applied to industrial society. 
However, critics recognized that laissez faire represented a long series of ideas dating 
back to the eighteenth century and rooted in classical political economy. If one is to fully 
appreciate the importance of these criticisms, one must first understand the origin and 
evolution of laissez faire thinking as well as how it fits into American political thought. 
Like any concept, laissez faire has changed and evolved over time. The very first 
proponents, the Physiocrats, fully supported the French absolutist monarchy; whereas 
Spencer and more recent proponents favored a much more limited political structure 
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sometimes verging on anarchy. Nonetheless, it is essential to define the concept as clearly 
as possible for the purpose of exploring its history. In this chapter, I define the concept of 
laissez faire and discuss four key features of laissez faire thinking. I then explain the 
historical origin of laissez faire in the theories of classical economics. These early 
proponents of laissez faire based their economic thinking upon the assumption that a 
strong and responsible political authority was a necessary prerequisite for a system of 
free competition. I pay special attention to the economic thought of the Physiocrats and 
Adam Smith because each developed a theoretical economic system that was based upon 
the assumption that economic prosperity would be maximized if individuals were free to 
pursue their own self-interest.  
 
THE CONCEPT OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 
 
Laissez faire is a general policy prescription that urges governments to interfere as 
little as possible in commercial activity. It is an imperative directed at executives and 
legislators commanding them to allow the market in goods and services to operate freely. 
The appropriate course of action on the part of the government in relation to the market is 
to “let it be, to leave it alone.” This imperative rests upon the belief that the community 
and individuals will be best served by an economy that is driven by the free interactions 
of self-interested individuals as opposed to an economy that is regulated, controlled, or 
actively overseen by a central political authority.   
Laissez faire is not the foundation of a tradition of thought; it is the conclusion 
drawn from a tradition of thought. Many thinkers in this tradition never actually used the 
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phrase “laissez faire,” although, they were clearly arguing for more limited activity on the 
part of the government.  The policy of laissez faire is fairly easy to understand, but the 
tradition of thinking that supported it is more complex. It is this tradition of thought that I 
will focus upon here because the matter at hand is the history of political thought rather 
than the history of economic policy.  
 Many proponents of laissez faire thinking developed elaborate systemic 
descriptions of the economy and society, and the features of these systems vary 
considerably. Despite this variation, there are four identifiable themes that are present in 
all defenses of laissez faire that were presented in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The first theme that is characteristic of laissez faire thinking is the belief in a “natural 
order” to which human communities conform. Classical political economists along with 
Social Darwinists argue that economic and social phenomena are determined by a system 
of natural laws that operate independently of political intentions. Defenders of laissez 
faire hold that the “natural order” is an unavoidable fact, and any attempts reform or 
improve the workings of that order can only be disruptive. Laissez faire proponents 
consider the natural order to produce harmonious relations between individuals if it is 
allowed to operate freely without interference from government.  
Second, defenders of laissez faire focus on the self-interested individual as the 
defining feature of the “natural order.” They consider self-interest to be a natural 
characteristic of human beings. The order of nature that they posit is based upon the 
voluntary actions of self-interested individuals; therefore,  individual self-interest is the 
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driving force of the harmonious “natural order.” This belief leads them to focus mostly 
on the interests of the individual as opposed to the interest of the community at large.  
A third common theme in the tradition of laissez faire thought is the belief that 
liberty, associated mainly with property rights, is a moral good and a guarantor of 
prosperity. Individual liberty, in the tradition of laissez faire, indicates the freedom to 
own private property and to employ it as one sees fit. This vision of liberty fits nicely into 
the “natural order” of society, which is comprised of self-interested individuals. Besides 
for being a moral good, individual liberty is a means to prosperity. Thinkers from Adam 
Smith to Andrew Carnegie argued that free completion among individuals produced an 
abundance of goods at more affordable prices. If the government were to curtail property 
rights through excessive regulation or by favoring certain enterprises at the expense of 
others, the result would be higher prices for consumers and a decrease in national output.  
Fourth, laissez faire theorists tend to depict competition as a meritocratic process 
that produces fair outcomes for individuals. They consider the distribution of wealth to be 
based upon individual initiative. Classical political economists such as Smith and the 
Physiocrats, argued that each individual is responsible for procuring the necessities of life 
in the form of property. As individuals differ in their talents and abilities, the amount of 
property they own will vary. This belief was indicative of an agrarian conception of the 
economy in which many people earned their living by laboring on the land, but it equally 
justified the property rights of the wealthy who derived most of their wealth from rents. 
Social Darwinists, writing after the dawn of industrialization in the United States, placed 
extra emphasis on this belief that wealth is distributed based upon merit. They applied the 
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logic of evolutionary biology to society and developed a justification of wealth and 
poverty based upon individual characteristics or different degrees of “fitness.” Because 
wealth is distributed according to individual skills and virtues, it is unfair for the 
government to redistribute wealth from the “fittest” individuals to the “unfittest.” Laissez 
faire proponents argue that the workings of the “natural order” produce a fair distribution 
of resources based upon individual merit. If the government interferes with this process, 
it is essentially engaging in special treatment of certain groups. Laissez faire ensures that 
the fair, natural workings of the market economy take precedence over the favoritism and 
arbitrary practices of the state.  
These four themes form an ideological defense of limited government by positing 
a “natural order” that operates on the free interactions of self-interested individuals who 
have the liberty to use their property as they see fit in a meritocratic environment. Each of 
these components of laissez faire thinking serves as an argument against government 
involvement in market processes.  
 
MERCANTILISM 
 
The concept of laissez faire, like classical political economy, originated in the 
context of a modernizing European economy. During the 16th and 17th centuries, a variety 
of thinkers became preoccupied with understanding an emerging market system that 
fundamentally changed the way goods were exchanged, and consequently, the ways in 
which nations earned and maintained their economic positions in relation to other 
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nations.1 Observers realized that the “problem of survival was henceforth to be solved 
neither by custom or command, but by the free action of profit-seeking men bound 
together only by the market itself.”2 The thinkers known as mercantilists generally 
advocated some state-based control of commerce especially in the arena of foreign trade. 
Most mercantilist thinkers were not dispassionate academics but “pamphleteers” who tied 
to influence state policy.3 They were preoccupied with the issues of national wealth and 
national defense; their writings characteristically focused on creating a favorable balance 
of trade and increasing gold reserves. Although there is no really coherent “school” of 
mercantilist thought, all mercantilists viewed politics and economics as inseparable.4 
Indeed, the term “political economy” was an invention of French mercantilists to 
distinguish it from “household economy.”5 This conception of political economy cast the 
state as a monarchical household to be managed actively in the manner of ordinary 
household management. Political economy, as originally conceived in France, was a way 
to improve the “state administration of economic affairs.”6 It was the beginning of 
economic investigation, but that investigation had a decidedly political goal and the 
means to achieve it were political as well. Thus, the first intellectual reaction to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Deanne, The Evolution of Economic Ideas, 1-2.  
2 Heilbronner, The Worldly Philosophers, 35. 
3 Deanne, The Evolution of Economic Ideas, 3. 
4 McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism, 22-3. 
5 Ibid., 69. 
6 Ibid. 
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emergence of a market economy was an attempt to establish political control over 
growing mercantile exchanges. 
 
 
PHYSIOCRACY 
 
Mercantilism was the first identifiable tradition of economic thought, and it 
formed the intellectual backdrop of classical political economy.  A very influential, albeit 
short-lived, philosophical movement in France challenged the mercantilist idea of 
economics as a form of household management writ large. Physiocracy was the first true 
“systematic formulation” of economic thinking ushering in the modern period of 
economics.7 Physiocracy—drawn from the Greek physis, literally “the rule of nature”—
was an intellectual movement closely associated with the French Enlightenment, 
claiming such adherents as Diderot, d’Alambert, and to some extent Adam Smith.8 As the 
name implies, Physiocracy was based upon the Enlightenment belief that there was a 
“natural order,” discoverable by human reason, which guided human actions and events.9 
The Physiocrats rejected the mercantilist understanding of wealth, which was based upon 
the actual gold reserves of the state. They argued that the basis of wealth is production, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., 85. Deanne locates the origin of “modern economics” in the thinking of 
the Physiocrats and Adam Smith, who unlike the mercantilists, were systematic in their 
investigations. See The Evolution of Economic Ideas, 1-5. 
8 McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism, 100. 
9 During the time of their writing in the late eighteenth century, the Physiocrats 
were known only as “économistes.” Although Quesnay is credited with inventing the 
term, it was not applied to this group of thinkers until the 19th century. See Albaum, “The 
Moral Defenses of the Physiocrats’ Laissez-Faire,” 179. 
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commerce, and consumption rather than the actual money holdings of the state coffers.10 
Physiocracy was an attempt to account for the natural laws that governed production and 
consumption, and thus, to discover the best policies for increasing national wealth. This 
new conception of wealth necessitated a new conception of the economic system that 
focused on domestic production and consumption rather than foreign trade and 
mercantile exchanges. The Physiocrats’ main contribution to economic thought was their 
“conception of the economy as a whole—as an organic totality in which production, 
exchange, expenditure, and consumption were inextricably linked.”11 Ultimately, the 
Physiocrats envisioned this “organic totality” as adhering to a “natural order” of 
economic life with individual self-interest regulating the production of wealth. 
 Although the Physiocrats are usually credited with inventing the maxim “laissez 
faire, laissez passer,” the phrase was used in many different forms before the writings of 
the Physiocrats.12 The earliest known usage of the idea comes from a French merchant, 
François Le Gendre. In a conversation dated around the year 1680, Le Gendre responded 
to a query from the French Minister of Finances Jean-Baptiste Colbert with the phrase 
“laissez nous faire.”13 The Physiocrat Vincent de Gournay, an early proponent of free 
trade, echoed Le Gendre’s preference and spread the doctrine among his fellow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism, 78-81. 
11 Ibid., 85. Emphasis in original. 
12 Fine, Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State, 5-6. 
13 “Laissez-Faire, Laissez-Passer, History of a Maxim,” in Dictionary of Political 
Economy II, edited by R.H.I. Palgrave, 534-535 (New York: Macmillan Press, 1912), 
534. 
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Physiocrats.14 It was then left to Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours, a follower of 
Quesnay, to reformulate Gournay’s preference for a trade policy beased upon “liberty” 
rather than “protection” to the imperative “laissez-faire, laissez-passer.”15 Given the 
prevalence of mercantilist practices, laissez faire was originally related specifically to 
trade policy and the issue of protection. Nevertheless, the phrase was never employed by 
Quesnay or Adam Smith in their treatises rejecting protectionism.16 It was ultimately 
Marquis d’ Argenson who gave a specific endorsement to laissez faire as a policy to 
guide public officials, but Gournay was most responsible for its widespread 
dissemination among the Physiocrats.17 
The Physiocrats were not only the first modern economic theorists; they were the 
first to provide a theoretical structure of society and politics that justified laissez faire. 
There are two interrelated theoretical aspects of Physiocratic thought that supported the 
policy of laissez faire. First, the Physiocrats based their economic theory upon a natural 
law paradigm that adopted a rationalist approach to knowledge. They thought that 
knowledge should be formulated in terms of abstract natural law. Second, they followed 
Locke in identifying the individual as the source of productivity and the basis of property. 
The Physiocratic prescription of laissez faire was based upon the assumption that the 
individual should be left to secure his or her own needs in a society that is governed by 
natural laws.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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 Physiocracy, with its reliance on abstract reasoning and natural law, was a school 
of thought that epitomized the Enlightenment. The Physiocrats followed Newton and 
other natural scientists in the pursuit of laws, inherent in nature itself, that are abstract, 
universal, and discoverable by human reason.18 Insofar as classical economics was an 
attempt to come to grips with an increasingly prevalent market, the Physiocrats framed 
the market as a natural phenomenon that would behave according to identifiable laws. In 
other words, they viewed the market as a feature of the social order, which conformed to 
natural laws. Such a naturalistic conception of the market does not necessarily entail a 
policy recommendation of laissez faire, but the Physiocrats also believed that the laws of 
the market tended to lead to a society that is well-ordered and progressive. “Thus, the 
main function of the state was to establish and preserve a framework in which natural law 
and distributive justice could be realized via the self-equilibrating mechanism of the 
market.”19 One must realize, however, that “the state” to which the Physiocrats referred 
was not a limited government, but the French absolute monarchy. Hence, the physiocrats 
advocated a highly structured laissez faire policy that presupposed a strong, 
authoritative—even authoritarian—political entity. They described the function of 
government as “legal despotism”—a far cry from the limited government that would 
come to be associated with laissez faire.20 This endorsement of a muscular political 
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19 McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism, 81. 
20 Viner, “The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire,” 59. McNally identifies a 
“paradox” in Physiocratic thinking formed by their dual commitment to a “private 
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authority shows that the Physiocrats believed that, although politics should be separated 
from the workings of the market, the state did have an essential role in supporting the 
social order. In the sphere of economics, the advisable technique for the political 
authority to maintain the social order was laissez faire. 
 The second feature of Physiocratic thought that supported a policy of laissez faire 
was their focus on the individual satisfaction as a moral good and an insistence on private 
property as a necessary condition for that satisfaction. Martin Albaum argues that the 
Physiocratic notion of a market that operates according to a “natural order” led the 
Physiocrats to characterize individual consumption as a foundation of economic policy.21 
Unlike Locke, the Physiocrats did not base the right of private property on labor, but on 
physical necessity. Locke had argued that labor was the means by which individuals 
acquire just title to the necessities of life, but the Physiocrats did not seek to justify the 
right to private property by identifying the natural laws of a pre-social state of nature. The 
Physiocrats posited an idealized agrarian social order in which individuals had to procure 
the necessities of life. They assumed that private property was the exclusive means for 
individual survival in this social order, and this assumption rested upon a vision of a 
society that was both competitive and agrarian. As Albaum observes, “the theory of 
natural order had established material satisfaction in private property as the moral basis 
of society.”22 Given the kind of ordered society depicted by the Physiocrats, an individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
social and economic development.” See Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism, 
87. 
21 Albaum, “The Moral Defenses of the Physiocrats’ Laissez Faire,”185. 
22 Ibid., 195. 
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right to private property and the corresponding right of self-preservation were ethically 
justified by the fact of the individual struggle for survival. 
 The central role for private property in the Physiocrats’ social order was 
buttressed by their “ethical individualism”—the belief that “it was the duty of the 
individual … to work effectively for his own private gain.”23 The Physiocrats rejected 
any communal or cooperative schemes of agricultural production. They insisted that 
production should be based upon individual initiative as the surest way to a harmonious 
social order.24 Indeed, the Physiocrats’ social order is dependent upon harmonious 
economic relations. A competitive economic market does not supplant the order of 
society; it supports the social order by conforming to the natural laws of society. This is 
why Albaum describes the Physiocrats as advocates, not of “social atomism,” but “social 
naturalism” in which the individual stands in a necessary and natural relationship to 
society at large.25 Such a stance illustrates that the Physiocrats were not interested in 
looking outside of society to some pre-social basis of the laws of the social order. Instead, 
the Physiocrats situated the individual in an abstract and idealized agrarian society, not a 
primitive state of nature. Of course, one prevalent feature of such a society, based upon 
property rights and free competition, is economic inequality. “For the Physiocrats, it 
followed that since private property was derived from the individual struggling to master 
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25 Albaum, 190. 
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his environment, economic inequality was both inevitable and just.”26 In a line of 
argument that would reappear numerous times in the writings of laissez faire’s 
supporters, the Physiocrats argued that government intervention meant to address this 
natural phenomenon of inequality will only disrupt the harmonious workings of the 
market while simultaneously discouraging individual initiative. 
 In developing the first systematic explanation of economic growth, the 
Physiocrats had also established a link between liberty and prosperity that would remain 
a touchstone of laissez faire. Adam Smith referred to the Physiocratic system as “the 
nearest approximation to the truth that has yet been published on the subject of political 
oeconomy.”27 The truth that Smith attributes to the Physiocrats is “in representing the 
wealth of nations as consisting, not in the unconsumable riches of money, but in the 
consumable goods annually reproduced by the labor of society; and in representing 
perfect liberty as the only effectual expedient for rendering this annual reproduction the 
greatest possible.”28 The Physiocrats explained a link between consumption and 
prosperity, and they proposed a laissez faire government policy to increase both. 
Physiocracy was rendered obsolete by an emerging industrial economy. They 
famously held that agricultural production was the only true source of economic 
productivity. This “agricultural bias” led them to conclude that manufacturing and 
commercial sectors of the economy were “sterile,” meaning that they contributed to the 
circulation of wealth and capital, but they did not create wealth as the agricultural sector 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid., 189. 
27 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, p. 396. 
28 Ibid, pp. 396-7. Emphasis added. 
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did.29 This somewhat nostalgic view of a harmonious agricultural society was in 
accordance with the republican ideas of Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, but 
even they realized that the Physiocratic insistence on the sterility of manufacturing and 
commerce was untenable. Even as sympathetic an observer of the Physiocratic economics 
as Adam Smith recognized these serious flaws. Smith showed quite clearly and 
succinctly that the Physiocrats were wrong in concluding that manufacturing and 
commerce were unproductive. He argued that labor employed in manufacturing and 
commerce clearly increased the quantity of consumable goods, and therefore, noticeably 
increased the wealth of the nation.30 It would be left to Smith to expand upon the line of 
thought initiated by the Physiocrats. He would adapt their free-market principles to a 
modernizing industrial economy.   
 
ADAM SMITH 
 
 In seeking to discover the laws that governed economic growth and wealth 
creation, Adam Smith constructed a simple and persuasive justification of laissez faire. 
He constructed an imaginary economic system that incorporated the disparate features of 
economic thinking into one coherent whole, which displayed an “order of nature”31 
Furthermore, Smith imputed a “benign” or “beneficent” character to this order so that the 
outcome of this natural process would tend to increase and enhance human happiness and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers, p. 47. 
30 Smith, Wealth of Nations, pp. 393-6. 
31 Viner, “Adam Smith and Laissez Faire,” pp. 198-201. 
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well-being.32 In short, the economy operated according to a natural and progressive 
ordering, which generally benefited the society at large. Like the Physiocrats, Smith 
argued that self-regarding individuals acting to further their own interests were the force 
behind this ordered system of wealth creation. Again, following the Physiocrats, Smith 
argued that the most effective way to maximize economic growth and productivity was to 
allow these individuals to operate freely in “perfect liberty.”33 If the government were to 
infringe upon this “perfect liberty” by unnecessarily restricting the free exchange of 
goods and services, it could only do so by diminishing the overall productivity of the 
economy. Having associated individual liberty with national prosperity, Smith restricted 
the appropriate functions of government to defense, administration of justice, and 
providing public works.  This limited scope of government activity would ensure that the 
system of “perfect liberty” would prevail. Thus, the “natural order” tended to produce the 
greatest economic productivity when the government followed a policy of laissez faire. 
 Adam Smith was first and foremost a moral philosopher, and in his seminal work, 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he posited a natural ordering of society. Smith held that 
society exhibited a “beneficent order,” perhaps divine in origin, which tended to 
progressively increase human happiness and well-being.34 In The Wealth of Nations, 
Smith applied this moral philosophy to the special case of economics, and he developed a 
more specific formulation of this natural order to relate it to economic phenomena. Smith 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid., pp. 202-3. 
33 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 397. 
34 Viner, “Adam Smith and Laissez Faire,” p. 202. See also, Deane, The Evolution 
of Economic Ideas, p. 7-8. 
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recognized that the increasing prevalence for the “division of labour” had resulted in 
dramatic improvements in “productive powers” and an increase in the quality and 
quantity of material goods.35 Smith describes the division of labor as a naturally 
occurring phenomenon, which originates in human nature. “This division of labour . . . is 
not originally the effect of human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general 
opulence for which it gives occasion. It is the necessary . . . consequence of a certain 
propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to 
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.”36 This “propensity” to engage in 
economic exchange is the organizing principle of Smith’s economic theory, and he 
identifies it as the primary economic sentiment. He writes, “It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regard to their own self-interest.”37 Self-interest is the relevant sentiment that 
accompanies economic exchange, and the prosperity occasioned by the division of labor 
has its roots in this self-interest.38 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 3-4. 
36 Ibid., p. 11.  
37 Ibid., p. 12. 
38 I must stress the point that Smith did not consider human nature to be reducible 
to wholly selfish motivations. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments he rejects Bernard 
Mandeville’s argument that the free play of selfish interests inevitably produces public 
benefits. “It is the great fallacy of Dr. Mandeville’s book [The Fable of the Bees] to 
represent every passion as wholly virtuous, which is so in any degree and in any 
direction. . . . and it is by means of this sophistry that he establishes his favorite 
conclusion, that private vices are public benefits.” See The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
part VII, section 2, chapter 4. 
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 Thus, the market of exchange for goods and services is based upon the this 
“propensity in human nature” to act in accordance with their own self-interest. Like the 
Physiocrats, Smith argued that allowing these individuals to pursue their self-interest 
would lead to a harmonious and ordered system of exchange.  
Every individual, therefore, endeavors as much as much as he can both to employ  
his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that 
its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labors to 
render the annual revenue of society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, 
neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is 
promoting it. . . . By directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may 
be of the greatest value, he intends only his gain, and he is in this, as in many 
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention.39 
 
Smith’s famous postulation of an “invisible hand” is an illustration of his tendency to find 
a beneficent order in nature. Given that self-interest is a crucial component of this 
“natural order,” Smith attempted to establish a rationale for economic policy that would 
be conducive to this beneficent “natural order.” 
 Smith concluded that the appropriate economic environment should be a system 
of “perfect liberty” where individuals are free to exchange goods and services without 
interference from governmental restrictions.40 The direct result of government intrusion 
into this system of “perfect liberty” is an increase in the costs of consumable goods, a 
phenomenon that Smith was consciously trying to counteract. However, he also provided 
a moral justification for this system of “perfect liberty” by defending property rights. 
Like the Physiocrats and future proponents of laissez faire, Smith identifies liberty with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid., p. 300. 
40 Ibid., 45-52. 
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property rights, and he mounts a vigorous moral defense of property rights.. He writes, 
“The property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all 
other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. . . . to hinder him from employing 
his strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbor, 
is a plain violation of this most sacred property.”41 For Smith, “perfect liberty,” defined 
as a market economy where individuals are free to exchange goods as they wish, was 
both an economic and a moral good.42 
 In his defense of “perfect liberty,” Smith reinforced a line of thought established 
by the Physiocrats and repeated by latter day proponents of laissez faire. Nearly all 
defenders of laissez faire equate liberty with prosperity. Furthermore, they identify liberty 
as pertaining primarily to individual property rights. Defenders of laissez faire uniformly 
argue that governments are not competent to oversee economic affairs; political 
interference can only make the market less efficient and slow the march of prosperity. 
Because a free market is conducive to prosperity, laissez faire is justified in terms of the 
greater good. But Smith argued that there is a moral issue at hand as well because the 
property of the individual is “sacred and inviolable.”43 According to Smith, government 
interference with individual property was not only unwise economically, it was wrong 
morally and contrary to the very purpose of government.44 Smith held that individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ibid., 105. 
42 See Viner, “The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire,” p. 60. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Taking a cue from David Hume, Smith argued that government originated out 
of a need to protect property. See, McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of 
Capitalism, 201. 
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liberty and economic prosperity are mutually reinforcing under his system of “perfect 
liberty.”45 
 Although Smith provided one of the most systematic, thorough, and lucid 
defenses of laissez faire, one must consider the practical realities that Smith faced when 
formulating his theory. Jacob Viner argues that Smith was convinced of the 
appropriateness of limited government interference not because of his adherence to an 
abstract notion of a “natural order,” but because of his practical experience with 
incompetent governments. “The English government of his day was in the hands of an 
aristocratic clique, the place-jobbing, corrupt cynical, and class-biased flower of the 
British gentry, who clung to the traditional mercantilism . . . because they did not know 
anything else to do.”46 The administration of the English government was indicative of 
nepotism, incompetence, and political favoritism. It is anachronistic to portray Smith as 
an opponent of “big government” defined as a bureaucracy of professionally trained 
experts, since the reality that he faced was much different.  
Smith believed that government does have a very definite role to play in society, 
but he limits that role to the areas in which he deemed it most competent and essential. 
Smith’s conception of a “system of natural liberty” is supported by his conception of the 
proper functions of government: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Deanne argues that Smith displayed an “ideological bias” for policies that 
decreased interference by the church and the state in economic matters. This bias, she 
argues, “has lasted virtually intact in some schools of thought right down to the modern 
neo-classical orthodoxy.” See, The Evolution of Economic Ideas, 14-16. 
46 Viner, “Adam Smith and Laissez Faire,” 221. 
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All systems of either preference or restraint, therefore, being thus completely 
taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself on 
its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is 
left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his 
industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of 
men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in attempting to 
perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the 
proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be 
sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of 
directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interests of society.  
According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to 
attend to … first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion 
of other independent societies; second, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, 
every member of society from the injustice or oppression of every other member 
of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the 
duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public 
institutions. 47 
 
Ironically, nineteenth century defenders of laissez faire would place far greater emphasis 
on the first two duties of government and challenge the wisdom of publically funded 
institutions. Smith himself argues that these public works facilitate commerce without 
conferring a profit to the owner.48 Because of this, the government has a duty to maintain 
them for the benefit of all. Smith understood that his “system of perfect liberty” relied 
upon a political structure to set rules and provide an infrastructure to assist commerce.  
 Many of the proponents of laissez faire that rose to the fore during the nineteenth 
century stripped Smith’s economic theory of much of its nuance. Even contemporary 
supporters of laissez faire point to Smith as prophet of limited government in service of 
free competition. However, Smith devotes the entirety of his final chapter in Wealth of 
Nations to discussing the essential duties of the government. These duties go far beyond 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 399. 
48 Ibid., 408-11. 
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the strictly negative or protective functions of national defense and enforcement of 
justice. Smith outlines positive duties for the sovereign such as maintaining public 
infrastructure, the establishment of a national bank, the collection of taxes for public 
revenue, and even a provision for public borrowing. This goes to show that Smith’s 
“system of perfect liberty” was meant to be confined within the economic sphere. Despite 
his contributions to the tradition of laissez faire, Smith ultimately thought that such a 
policy would only be beneficial if it was supported by a responsible government.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Having considered the economic theories put forward by the Physiocrats and 
Smith in their relation laissez faire, one conclusion is apparent. Both theories presuppose 
a strong political authority that is responsible for the public well-being, rather than a 
limited government that surrenders public interests to private interests. They advocate a 
limited government as it relates to individual economic activity, but they were by no 
means in favor of dismantling the central political authority. They understood that the 
government needed to supply a legal and institutional framework for economic 
competition. In this sense, their arguments in favor of laissez faire were presented as not 
only a case for limiting the role of government, but an equally powerful case in favor of a 
responsible government.  
 Nevertheless, the Physiocrats and Smith presented the earliest systematic 
justifications for a policy of laissez faire. They presented the first abstract theoretical 
models that joined various economic phenomena into one harmonious system. They also 
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posited individual self-interest as the motivating force behind that economic system. As I 
will discuss in my treatment of Veblen, this abstract approach to the subject of economics 
had a lasting impact on economic thinking. Economists in the nineteenth century adopted 
an increasingly abstract approach to economic phenomena which culminated in the 
“marginal revolution” where economists became preoccupied with sophisticated 
mathematical equilibriums and “marginal utility” analyses.49 Both Veblen and Lloyd 
would seize upon this abstract character of economic thought as a way of undermining 
laissez faire. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Deane argues that this “revolution,” ushered in by William Stanley Jevons, 
Leon Walras, and Carl Menger, led economists to neglect economic realities due to their 
preoccupation with abstract mathematical theories. “As economics became more 
professionalized and more academic, its innovating theorists tended more and more to 
focus on abstract theoretical problems and to abstract their models from the real world. 
The Evolution of Economic Ideas, 94-99. 
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CHAPTER 3 — LAISSEZ FAIRE IN THE FOUNDING PERIOD 
 
The Creator would indeed have been a bungling artist, had he intended 
man for a social animal, without planting in him social dispositions. 
      
—Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Law, June 13, 1814 
 
 
My aim in this brief chapter is to analyze how the various elements of the laissez 
faire doctrine related to the economic thinking and polices of the Framers. I will conduct 
this analysis by way of focusing on the competing economic viewpoints of Thomas 
Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. This is by no means a complete analysis of economic 
thinking during the Founding period.1 Rather, it is an overview of how the debate 
between Jefferson and Hamilton reveals a complicated relationship between American 
political thought and the doctrine of laissez faire. Many of the terms of this debate are 
still prevalent in the American political discourse today. The debate over whether the 
government should assist economic development and regulate economic activity is as old 
as the republic itself. 
 
LAISSEZ FAIRE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
 
 In the very same year that Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations, the 
United States of America declared its independence from Great Britain. Like Smith, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 There are numerous historical accounts concerning the significance of political 
economy during the Founding period. See, for example, McDonald, Novus Ordo 
Seclorum; Sklansky, The Soul’s Economy; McCoy, The Elusive Republic. 
	   38 
American revolutionaries sought both liberty and prosperity, but unlike Smith, they had 
no conception of a grand system in which liberty led inexorably to prosperity. Forrest 
McDonald helpfully points out that economic thought in America was something of a 
mystery. “The whole subject [of political economy] was a new one; indeed the whole 
mode of thought was a new one.”2 Because of this, the American Framers held widely 
divergent views on the subject of economics. John Adams held the pessimistic view that 
“economic activity was a zero-sum game” in which wealth could not be created, but only 
transferred from one agent to another.3 Others, including Jefferson and Franklin, were 
somewhat receptive to Physiocratic thinking. Smith’s Wealth of Nations also created a 
“sensation” in which “most public men in America acquired at least a passing 
acquaintance with the work.”4 Many of the Framers, such as Hamilton, agreed that 
individual self-interest could be a force for prosperity and social order.5 The republic that 
Hamilton envisioned was one that thrived on commerce and industry. However, Jefferson 
and other “agrarian republicans” viewed self-interest as an anti-social sentiment, which 
threatens to corrupt the citizenry. Jefferson though that a lasting republic would require 
an active, virtuous citizenry consisting mostly of farmers. 
 Despite the best efforts of laissez faire defenders to prove otherwise, the United 
States was not founded upon the principles of laissez faire. Frank Bourgin has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 98-9. 
3 Ibid, 99-100. 
4 Ibid, 128. 
5 Albert Hirschman argues that Hamilton follows Hume in his belief that self-
interest is a “countervailing passion,” which supplants more destructive passions such as 
love of pleasure. See The Passions and the Interest, 26-31. 
	   39 
demonstrated that the Framers were attempting to create a more affirmative state than the 
one established in the Articles of Confederation.6 There would be no full-throated 
defenses of laissez faire in the United States until the late nineteenth century. However, it 
is possible to identify a number of ideas presented during the Founding period that would 
become elements in laissez faire thinking in the United States. In his exhaustive treatment 
of laissez faire in American thought, Sydney Fine identifies three features of early 
American thinking that supported a “hostility to government.”7 One of these features is 
“the doctrine of natural rights” in which the individual is possessed of inalienable rights 
that the government cannot abridge.8 This places a limit on the legitimate use of 
government power and even casts government in a “negative” light where its main task is 
to protect these rights. The second feature of early American thinking that reinforced this 
hostility to government was “the faith of Americans in the self-sufficiency of the 
individual.”9 Their belief in self-sufficiency was in part due to “unusually favorable 
economic conditions” that created more opportunities for individual initiative than in 
Europe.10 Americans witnessed an economy where individual initiative was rewarded 
with prosperity, and this contributed to the belief that individuals could support 
themselves without help from the government. Finally, the “teachings of classical 
political economy” supported the idea of a “negative state” charged with protecting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Bourgin, The Great Challenge: The Myth of Laissez-Faire in the Early Republic. 
7 Fine, Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State, 3. 
8 Ibid., 3-4. 
9 Ibid., 5. 
10 Ibid.  
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property rights but with little to no involvement in economic matters.11 At the time of the 
Founding, classical political economy did not exert as strong an influence as the doctrine 
of natural rights or the belief in individual self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, Hamilton, 
Madison, Jefferson, and Franklin were all familiar with the writings of Adam Smith and 
the Physiocrats. None of these thinkers fully adopted the laissez faire prescriptions of the 
Physiocrats and Smith; however, they all incorporated elements of classical economic 
thinking into their visions for the new American Republic. To illustrate how the Framers 
selectively incorporated some of the disparate elements of laissez faire into their thinking, 
I will compare the competing economic visions of Jefferson and Hamilton. 
 
THOMAS JEFFERSON’S AGRARIAN REPUBLIC 
 Thomas Jefferson serves as a fount of wisdom for those who argue that the United 
States embodies a laissez faire vision of the state. Indeed, there are four identifiable 
elements in Jefferson’s thinking that allegedly lend support to a laissez faire policy: a 
belief that natural processes should be accommodated; a defense of private property; a 
belief in the self-sufficient individual, especially the yeoman farmer; and an opposition to 
“energetic government.” I will discuss these four elements below, but I would first like to 
emphasize that Jefferson was first and foremost an “agrarian republican” with practical 
goals. His support of property rights, individual initiative, and limited government were 
all in service to his goal of establishing a long-lasting republic. Jefferson, along with 
Benjamin Franklin, believed that the economy of a successful republic should be based 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid., 5-9. 
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on agriculture and an open exchange of agricultural goods.12 For this reason they were 
both amenable to the teachings of Physiocracy, especially its focus on agriculture as the 
sole productive force in the economy. This “romantic attachment to the rural life” was a 
widespread sentiment in America, and one that was sincerely held by Franklin and 
Jefferson even before they were aware of the Physiocratic system.13 Jefferson had a brief 
association with members of the Physiocratic school when he was in Paris in 1786, but by 
that time, Physiocracy had fallen out of favor, and Jefferson began to look to Adam 
Smith as an alternative to the muscular central government advocated by Hamilton.  
 Considering the similarities between Physiocratic thinking and Jefferson’s own 
views, it is unsurprising that he was initially drawn to the theory and its laissez faire 
implications. As a product of the Enlightenment, Jefferson was amenable to “natural” 
solutions and “optimistic” pronouncements.14 This naturalistic orientation is the first 
identifiable feature of Jefferson’s thinking that comports with laissez faire. Richard 
Hofstadter argues that these inclinations led Jefferson to a laissez faire stance: “Like 
other theorists of the ‘natural law’ era, Jefferson was quite ready to believe that ‘natural’ 
operations of the system of self-seeking private enterprise were intrinsically beneficent 
and should not normally be distributed by the government.”15 The Physiocratic notion of 
an “order of nature” was an idea that appealed to Jefferson, and the belief in such an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See McCoy, “Benjamin Franklin’s Vision of a Republican Political Economy 
for America,” 628. 
13 Hofstadter, “Parrington and the Jeffersonian Tradition,” 392-3. 
14 See Appleby and Ball, “Introduction,” in Jefferson: Political Writings, xxii-
xxvi. 
15 Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, p. 48. 
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order implies that economic relations should be left to private individuals without 
interference from the government. The prescription, therefore, is for the government to 
let nature take its course. As President, Jefferson did not follow this prescription.16 
 Jefferson also vigorously defended the right of property, which is a constant 
feature of laissez faire. However, he was adamantly opposed to concentration of property 
(especially landed property) in very few hands. His primary reasoning for this was his 
belief in the strong relationship between property ownership and a virtuous citizenry.17 
Property gives citizens a greater stake in the community, so ideally, the community 
would consist of a large number of small property owners engaged in agrarian pursuits. 
“The small land holders,” he writes, “are the most precious part of a state.”18  In a letter 
to Reverend James Madison, Jefferson laments the fact that property is unequally 
distributed in America, and he even offers a cautious suggestion of a progressive tax on 
property as a “means of silently lessening the inequality of property.”19 Jefferson was 
torn between his aversion to drastic governmental action and his belief that property 
ownership should be widespread. He speculates that legislative action could “subdivide” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Bourgin documents the proclivity that Jefferson had for “national planning” by 
highlighting his role in expanding national territory with the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. 
Bourgin also documents Jefferson’s push for “public improvements” during his second 
term in office. Jefferson was particularly concerned with using the government to support 
“education, science and useful knowledge, and transportation.” See The Great Challenge, 
115-156.  
17 Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, p. 36. “He believed deeply that 
rural living and rural people are the wellspring of civic virtue and individual vitality, that 
farmers are the best social base of a democratic republic.” 
18 Jefferson, “Letter to Rev. James Madison” 107. 
19 Ibid. 
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property that has been concentrated too extensively, but he cautions legislators to take 
“care to let their subdivisions go hand in hand with the natural affections of the human 
mind.”20 One can see that Jefferson had decidedly laissez faire inclinations, but he was 
willing to deviate from them in pursuit of a republic populated by virtuous land owners. 
Jefferson was confronting the realization that masses of laboring poor would result from 
an increasing unequal distribution of property. “But it is not too soon,” he writes to 
Reverend Madison, “to provide by every possible means that as few as possible shall be 
without a little portion of land.”21 
 Jefferson’s justification of the Louisiana Purchase was based upon his belief that 
an agrarian republic must have ample land to support a vast citizenry of yeoman farmers. 
I think our governments will remain virtuous for many centuries; as long as they 
are chiefly agricultural; and this will be as long as there are vacant lands in any 
part of America. When they get piled upon one another in large cities, they will 
become corrupt as in Europe.22 
 
When Jefferson’s Federalist opponents became aware of the Louisiana Purchase, they 
praised Jefferson for securing access to the Mississippi River through the purchase of 
New Orleans, but they chided him for purchasing such a “vast wilderness” with little 
apparent use.23 However, Jefferson believed that he had provided the nation with ample 
farmland that would support an agrarian citizenry and secure his vision of an agrarian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Jefferson, “To James Madison, December, 20, 1787,” 363. 
23 McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 199. 
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republic.24 As Drew McCoy has shown, Jefferson was also familiar with Malthus’s 
writing, and he shared Malthus’s worry that population growth threatened to outstrip 
available resources.25 The Louisiana Purchase, which nearly doubled the size of the 
United States territory, largely rescued the new nation from Malthus’s dire prediction. 
Along with his belief in an “order of nature” and his defense of private property, 
Jefferson had an almost boundless faith in the self-sufficient individual, especially the 
yeoman farmer. Jefferson carried on the republican belief that the farmer “was the central 
source of civic virtue.”26 The independent yeoman farmer is an asset to the republic 
because he relies only on his own abilities to earn a living. Urban laborers, by contrast, 
are dependent upon merchants and industrialists to earn their keep. The independent 
farmer is also essential to the republic because his ownership of a small amount of land 
gives him an interest in the greater community.27 The situation of the yeoman farmer led 
Jefferson and many others to consider him “the best and most reliable sort of citizen.”28 
Jefferson tended to view the central government as an obstacle to this ideal of the self-
sufficient individual, and this allowed him to cast the central government in a negative 
light as he did in his “First Inaugural Address:”  
Still one thing more, fellow citizens – a wise and frugal government, which shall  
restrain men from injuring one another, which shall leave them otherwise free to  
regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid., 200-201. 
25 Ibid., 192-195. 
26 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 24-5. 
27 Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 178-179. 
28 Ibid., 25. 
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the mouth of labor the bread it has earned.29 
He believed that individual initiative thrived in the absence of government interference.  
 A final aspect of Jefferson’s thought that comports with laissez faire is his 
opposition to “energetic government.” In a letter to Madison, he expresses his concern 
that the members of the Constitutional Convention had overreacted to Shays’s Rebellion 
in Massachusetts. “I own that I am not a friend to a very energetic government. It is 
always oppressive.”30 This passage is sometimes given as evidence for Jefferson’s laissez 
faire inclinations, but he is specifically referring to the role of the government in 
quashing revolutions. After all, the militaristic occupation of the colonies by British 
forces was one of the central “abuses and usurpations” that Jefferson pointed out in the 
Declaration of Independence. He was generally opposed to any government involvement 
in economic matters, but his opposition to energetic government was mainly about 
military oppression rather than economic regulation. 
Jefferson’s motivation for objecting to government interference was quite similar 
to Adam Smith’s. They both thought that government interference and regulation would 
benefit the wealthy and powerful at the expense of the poor farmer or entrepreneur.31 
Smith and Jefferson both equated government intervention with special treatment. Their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address,” 175. 
30 Jefferson, “To James Madison, December 20, 1787,” 362.  
31 Hofstadter adds some crucial historical context here: “Where modern liberals 
have looked to government interference as a means of helping the poor, Jefferson, in 
common with other eighteenth-century liberals, thought of it chiefly as an unfair means 
of helping the rich through interest-bearing debts, taxation, tariffs, banks, privileges, and 
bounties. He concluded that the only necessary remedy under republican government 
would be to deprive the rich of these devices and restore freedom and equality through 
‘natural’ economic forces.” The American Political Tradition, 50. 
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laissez faire inclinations were based upon a desire to create fair opportunities for small 
entrepreneurs. In this sense, Jefferson’s laissez faire orientation marched hand in hand 
with his vision of an agrarian republic because limited government was on the side of the 
yeoman farmer. Sumner would make a similar argument almost a century later, but he 
replaced the image of the yeoman farmer with that of the “forgotten man” who was the 
victim of overzealous government interference. 
 Jefferson evaluated Hamilton’s plan for government assistance and protection of 
industry in much the same way that Smith evaluated British mercantilism. He thought 
protectionist measures and a national bank would favor industry at the expense of 
agriculture. Jefferson looked at Hamilton’s prescriptions for government assistance to 
industry and saw an emerging system for helping the wealthy, urban industrialist by 
placing the poor, rural farmer at his mercy. Hamilton’s idea of an active federal 
government would seem to be the antithesis to Jefferson’s laissez faire vision of 
government, but just as Jefferson did not totally embrace laissez fare, Hamilton did not 
totally reject it.  
 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC 
 Alexander Hamilton is unique among the Framers because he is the only one to 
make an original and significant contribution to the emerging science of political 
economy. Furthermore, his insistence on a strong central government that is responsible 
for protecting domestic industry would seem to place him in opposition to both Jefferson 
and Smith. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to portray Hamilton as an unqualified 
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opponent of laissez faire. Taken as a whole, he is in favor of the type of “energetic 
government” opposed by Jefferson and the protectionist measures opposed by Smith, but 
Hamilton was also a believer in private enterprise and a competitive market economy, 
with some qualifications. He did favor protectionism, but he also laid the intellectual and 
institutional groundwork for the emergence of industrial capitalism in the United States.  
 Hamilton was very familiar with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, and he cites it 
extensively in his “Report on Manufactures.” It is clear that Hamilton considered Smith’s 
“system of perfect liberty” to be impractical: “Most general theories, however, admit of 
numerous exceptions, and there are few, if any, of the political kind, which do not blend a 
considerable portion of error, with the truths they inculcate.”32 Hamilton was not writing 
as a moral philosopher, but as a policy-maker in a newly-independent nation, and his 
practical concerns stood opposed to Smith’s abstract theories. He saw a world that was 
dramatically different from the one envisioned by Smith. Perhaps a laissez faire approach 
would be appropriate “if a system of perfect liberty to industry and commerce were the 
prevailing system among nations . . . . but the system which has been mentioned, is far 
from characterizing the general policy of nations. The prevalent one has been regulated 
by an opposite spirit.”33 Hamilton was developing an economic system that would 
support the new nation through protection of domestic industries. His goal was to 
“establish substantial and permanent order” of economic production in the newly 
independent United States.34 One of his predominant concerns in developing this system 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Hamilton, “Report on Manufactures,” 649. 
33 Ibid., 667-8. 
34 Ibid., 695. Emphasis in the original. 
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was national defense, and this preoccupation is similar to that of mercantilists. But 
Hamilton also agreed with the Physiocrats and Adam Smith that individual liberty was a 
moral good that was consistent with a competitive market economy based on private 
enterprise.35 Private enterprise and a market economy have the moral benefit of “the 
enlargement of the scope of human freedom and the enrichment of opportunities for 
human endeavor.”36  
 Hamilton thought that the wisdom of any economic policy depends upon its 
usefulness to the nation as a whole. He believed that private enterprise was useful as a 
force that improved one’s character and increased one’s chance at happiness. A society 
can “cherish and stimulate the activity of the human mind, by multiplying the objects of 
enterprise.”37 Unlike Smith, who argued that there was a natural propensity for humans to 
“truck, barter, and exchange,” Hamilton believed that economic behavior was primarily 
habitual, and this implies that government has a role to play in shaping these habits.38 He 
wanted to create more avenues for private enterprise than already existed in the United 
States. “The spirit of enterprise, useful and prolific as it is, must necessarily be contracted 
or expanded in proportion to the simplicity of variety of the occupations and productions, 
which are to be found in a Society.”39 Private enterprise, according to Hamilton, was 
useful for habituating the citizenry to productive activity, and the habits that are formed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 McDonald, Hamilton, 235.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Hamilton, “Report on Manufactures,” 663. 
38 McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 137. 
39 Hamilton, “Report on Manufactures” 664. 
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by engaging in enterprise can be fostered by government. Thus, a government can, by 
encouraging manufacturing and industry, expand the “spirit of enterprise” to a much 
greater degree than by following a laissez faire approach.  
 Hamilton understood that economic activity in the United States depended upon a 
sound economic system that made provisions for public credit and a reliable currency. 
His proposal for establishing public credit and a national bank were designed to provide 
the necessary economic infrastructure for the newly independent United States. Hamilton 
recognized that a vibrant economy and a strong national defense went hand in hand. His 
argument for establishing public credit was based upon his belief that the government had 
an active role to play in both national defense and commercial relations.  
To justify and preserve their confidence; to promote the increasing respectability 
of the American name; to answer the calls of justice; to restore landed property to 
its due value; to furnish new resources both to agriculture and commerce; to 
cement more closely the union of states; to add to security against foreign attack; 
to establish public order on the basis of an upright and liberal policy. These are 
the great and invaluable ends to be secured by a proper and adequate provision, at 
the present period, for the support of public credit.40 
 
One can see that Hamilton did not distinguish between economic and political needs, and 
he thought there were political as well as economic reasons for establishing credit. In 
order for the government to engage in active support of industry and commerce, it would 
have to be able to borrow money. 
The manner in which Hamilton sought to establish public credit gives us further  
insight into his economic thinking by way of clarifying his views on contracts. He argues 
that public credit is maintained “by good faith, by a punctual performance of contracts. 
States, like individuals, who observe their engagements, are respected and trusted: while 	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the reverse is the fate of those, who pursue an opposite conduct.”41 When Hamilton 
delivered his “Report on Public Credit,” the main “public creditors” were the “states 
individually.”42 The individual states had incurred debts during the Revolutionary War, 
and the state of public credit depended upon their ability—or, as was frequently the case, 
their inability—to repay those debts. Hamilton proposed to centralize and unify the fiscal 
powers of the United States through “an assumption of the debts of the particular states 
by the union.”43 This transference of public debt from the state to the federal government 
also came with the reassurance that the federal government would be able to reliably 
honor those debts. 
 One particularly controversial aspect of Hamilton’s plan for establishing public 
credit was the status of war bonds or public securities that were sold by the state 
governments to fund the Revolutionary War. As the financial situation of the states 
worsened after the War, many of the original purchasers sold those bonds to investors 
and speculators for considerably less than the original value. Hamilton’s plan for 
assumption of the state debts recommended that the present owners of those securities to 
be paid the full original value of those securities. Critics of this proposal raised the 
question of “whether a discrimination ought not to be made between original holders of 
public securities, and present possessors, by purchase.”44 The charge that these critics 
leveled at Hamilton’s plan was one of injustice. After all, how is it just to reward 	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speculators who capitalized on destitute bondholders who had sold their securities for 
cents on the dollar? Hamilton countered that any discrimination against the present 
owners of the securities would itself be unjust. “It is inconsistent with justice, because in 
the first place, it is a breach of contract; in violation of the rights of the fair purchaser.”45 
He recognized that credit, in its most basic sense, is based on trust, and trust is 
maintained by fulfilling contracts. It may be odious to witness a wealthy speculator earn a 
profit by buying securities cheaply from patriotic citizens who bought those securities to 
assist in the war effort, but this sale is still based on a voluntary agreement. The only way 
to ensure good public credit is for the public creditor to fully honor all debts so that future 
borrowers trust that their own debts will be honored. Once again, we see that Hamilton’s 
justification for economic arrangements is based upon what is useful. He argues for 
honoring contracts because it is a necessary practice for any credit-worthy institution, not, 
for example, because it is consistent with the natural right of property.  
Hamilton’s provision for public credit was meant to be accompanied by a  
national bank. The fundamental purpose of the national bank was “to provide a large, 
stable, but flexible national money supply for the financing of ordinary business and 
general economic development.”46 The shortage of capital in the United States after the 
Revolutionary War had left the only three commercial banks in the country with a 
shortage of actual capital, which was necessary collateral for issuing loans. Hamilton 
observed that too many American businesses were holding their money in their own 
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“chests” rather than depositing that money in banks.47 However, if people were to deposit 
that money into a trustworthy bank, which was supported by the United States 
government, the bank could then issue loans backed by those deposits. Hamilton’s belief 
was that a reliable bank would encourage more people to deposit their money and thus 
transform a great deal of the idle capital of the country into “active or productive 
capital.”48 He also proposed that the United States government make an initial deposit of 
$2 million to provide the capital necessary for the bank to begin issuing loans.49 The bank 
thus “augment[s] . . . the active capital of the country,” and in so doing, it “generates 
employment” and “animates and expands labor and industry.”50  
 Hamilton justified his proposed national bank on the grounds of public utility. 
Once again, his economic thinking is informed by his sense of what is useful to the 
nation. However, he also argued that the Bank should be run by group of private 
individuals who are pursuing private profit rather than the public good. “It shall be run 
under a private not a public Direction, under the guidance of individual interest not of 
public policy.”51 His justification for this is his belief that government officials will be 
tempted to raid the coffers of the bank in order to provide revenue for the government. 
He believes the bank will ensure greater confidence under private direction because those 
private directors will protect “the prosperity of the institution” out of “their own self-	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49 McDonald, Hamilton: A Biography, 193-4. 
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51 Ibid., 601. Emphasis in the original.  
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interest.”52 The bank, according to Hamilton, is best able to achieve its public purpose if 
it relies upon the self-interest of bankers to maintain the profitability of the bank. “Public 
utility is more truly the object of public Banks, than private profit.”53  
Hamilton was not willing to leave industrial development in the United States  
“under the direction of private interests.”54 He thought that “the independence and 
security” of the United States depended upon the “prosperity of manufactures”—a 
necessary condition for supplying a nation with “Subsistence habitation clothing and 
defense.”55 The greatest obstacle facing the underdeveloped United States manufactures 
was the protectionist measures implemented by other nations to support their own 
manufactures.  
 Hence the undertakers of a new manufacture have to contend not only with the  
natural disadvantages of a new undertaking, but with the gratuities and 
remuneration which other governments bestow. To be enabled to contend with 
success, it is evident, that the interference and aid of their own government are 
indispensible.56 
  
Hamilton was completely in favor of using private interest in the service of the public 
good, but the state of manufactures in the United States was such that public assistance 
was needed to put American manufactures on a an even footing.  It should also be noted 
that Hamilton’s stance on protectionism was not a rejection of competition as such, but 
an acknowledgement that other nations were engaged in protectionism as well. It would 	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be folly to let American industry operate at a competitive disadvantage all in the name of 
“general theories” which recommend that governments “leave industry to itself.”57 
Although he is sometimes portrayed as an advocate of autarky, Hamilton thought 
that protectionism should be a temporary expedient to assist new enterprises, especially 
those that were essential for national defense.58 His fundamental concern in supporting 
American manufactures was to establish an economic system that would support an 
independent and prosperous nation. “It is the interest of a community with a view to 
eventual and permanent oeconomy, to encourage the growth of manufactures.”59 
Hamilton’s economic system was meant to satisfy the interest of the community by 
providing public credit, a sound currency, and protection for industry. His entire system 
was based on a mixture of private motivations and the public interests, and his standard 
for justifying the various components of that system was public utility. In his efforts to 
construct a useful economic system, Hamilton provided the rationale for a positive 
central government that would promote business interests. In this sense, he was essential 
to the development of industrial capitalism in the United States.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The Framers were only partially influenced by the laissez faire political economy 
of the Physiocrats and Smith. I have shown that both Jefferson and Hamilton employed 
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some features of laissez faire thinking, but neither fully embraced a free market economy 
organized only by the natural play of self-interested individuals. Both demonstrated 
concern for the larger community, and neither held an atomistic view of society. Indeed, 
both thinkers were actively involved in shaping policies that were directly opposed to 
laissez faire, such as Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase and Hamilton’s protection of 
industry.  
I have attempted to show that many of the particular components of laissez faire 
thinking were present in the thinking of Jefferson and Hamilton. Jefferson’s opposition to 
“energetic government” and Hamilton’s belief that private enterprise and self-interest 
played a crucial role in economic prosperity are both consistent with laissez faire. 
However, each thinker also had deep-seated convictions that led him to reject certain key 
features of the laissez faire doctrine. Jefferson could never accept the argument that self-
interest should be encouraged in support of the public good.60 For his part, Hamilton was 
never willing to surrender the public good to the free play of individual interests, but was 
quite ready to take advantage of self-interest whenever it was useful, as he saw it, for the 
nation as a whole. If one were to selectively choose the particular aspects of Jefferson’s 
and Hamilton’s thinking that conform to laissez faire, it would surely be possible to 
identify most of the key components. However, such an attempt would be misguided 
because it would overlook the fact that both thinkers had firm convictions that led them 
to oppose a strict policy of laissez faire.  	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It is the sole antagonist of virtue, leading us constantly by our propensities to self-
gratification in violation of our moral duties to others. . . . Take a man from his selfish 
propensities and he can have nothing to seduce him from the practice of virtue.” 
Jefferson, “To Thomas Law, June 13, 1814,” 286-287. 
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CHAPTER 4  — LAISSEZ FAIRE AND INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 
 
 
“And, I say now, I happen to have a superfluity in my pocket, and I’ll just—” 
“—Act the part of brother to that unfortunate man?” 
“Let the unfortunate man be his own brother. What are you dragging him in for all 
the time? One would think you didn’t care to register any transfers, or dispose of 
any stock—mind running on something else. I say I will invest.”  
 
—Herman Melville, The Confidence Man  
 
 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF LAISSEZ FAIRE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
At the beginning of the 19th century, the federal government was quite active in 
promoting and regulating economic activity.1 The federal government built roads, 
surveyed land, “improved rivers and harbors,” and supported the Unites States shipping 
industry through a combination of tariffs and subsidies.2 Many of these efforts, however, 
were scaled back under the Democratic supervision of Jackson and his followers. 
Between 1820 and 1860, the Democrats reduced or eliminated tariffs and subsidies, 
curtailed “internal improvements“ by allowing the states to assume control of “the 
National Road,” and famously allowed the Second Bank of the United States to perish.3 
All of this signaled a retreat by the federal government from the Hamiltonian vision of an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Fine, Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State, 12-14. 
2 Ibid., 19. 
3 Ibid., 20. 
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active state used in support of essential industry. There was also a growing chorus of 
businessmen who emerged in the two decades before the Civil war who advocated 
“restricting the functions of the state and were beginning to challenge state actions which, 
in their view, interfered with property rights.4 Over the first half of the nineteenth 
century, the federal government largely scaled back its support of enterprise and its 
program of national improvements.  
The period between the Civil War and the beginning of the twentieth century 
witnessed the most intense and sustained defense of laissez faire in American history. 
Laissez faire thinking in America before the Civil War was a collage of scattered 
influences ranging from political economy to “cultural” beliefs in the self-sufficient 
individual and “the accepted principle of American liberty.”5 But in the decades after the 
Civil War, a group of proponents reinterpreted the laissez faire thinking of the classical 
economists and adapted it to suit the modern industrial economy that was emerging in the 
United States after the Civil War. Industrialization was accompanied by massive 
concentrations of wealth, scores of urban laboring poor, and a fear that large 
combinations in business were placing small independent entrepreneurs at a competitive 
disadvantage. One observer states “never before had wealth been so flagrant, or poverty 
so widespread and so unavoidably appalling.”6  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid., 23. 
5 Bateman, “Bringing in the State? The Life and Times of Laissez-Faire in the 
Nineteenth-Century United States,” 181; Michael Les Benedict, “Laissez-Faire and 
Liberty: A Re-evaluation of the Meaning and Origin of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 
298. 
6 Lears, Rebirth of a Nation, 71. 
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Critics of this new industrialized economy called for legislation to improve the 
conditions of labor, and to regulate the anti-competitive practices of monopolistic firms. 
It was largely due to this criticism that laissez faire thinking in the United States became 
a prominent and coherent defense of limited government.7 Laissez faire thinkers in the 
nineteenth century were facing an entirely different problem than that faced by the 
Physiocrats and Smith. Laissez faire thinkers in the eighteenth century were combatting 
mercantilism. Laissez faire was an argument against using government to favor powerful 
merchants. Nineteenth century proponents of laissez faire were combatting reformers 
who exhibited an increasing concern for the social welfare of the laboring poor. This 
growing reform movement presented a new problem as the image of the “worthy, 
working poor” began to gain traction in the consciousness of the middle class.8 
Responding to demands that the government take a role in assisting the less fortunate, 
laissez faire thinkers sought to demonstrate that poverty was yet another component of 
the “natural order.” This new generation of laissez faire adherents continued to posit a 
“natural order,” but they altered its character from the largely agrarian order described by 
classical economists to a modern industrial order.  
Laissez faire thinking really rose to prominence in the United States based upon 
the thinking of Herbert Spencer and fellow Social Darwinist William Graham Sumner. 
These thinkers reconceptualized the “natural order” of the classical economists by basing 
it on modern scientific theories and applying it to an industrial economy. Social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Spencer was, of course British, and much of his writing is directed at the British 
Parliament, but because his writing was so influential in the United States, I include him 
in the tradition of American Political Thought. 
8 Lears, Rebirth of a Nation, 71. 
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Darwinists argued that the “natural order” was akin to a biological struggle for survival 
between individuals competing for scarce resources. The “natural order” they described 
was a combination of Malthus’s law of population and the findings of evolutionary 
biology.9 To put it simply, scarce resources lead to a competition for survival in which 
the fittest individuals survive and reproduce. Social Darwinists argue that this struggle 
gives individuals an incentive to employ their talents productively, and any attempt to 
abrogate this harsh reality is an obstacle to progress. This biological view of the “natural 
order” also allowed them to portray the apparent problems posed by industrialization as 
necessary parts of the “natural order.” Social Darwinists were able to unite, under one 
system, wealth concentration, poverty, self-interest, and harsh competition.  
 It is fair to say that the early proponents of laissez faire were concerned primarily 
with the creation of wealth by increasing domestic consumption. The principle of free 
competition was a means to this end. Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner, 
along with the industrialist Andrew Carnegie, saw the competitive market economy as a 
hallmark of modern civilization, a motor of progress, and a standard for assessing the 
moral dimensions of wealth distribution. Adam Smith’s famous “system of perfect 
liberty” was no mere practical expedient; it was a singular achievement in the annals of 
human history.  
The principle of free competition provided two social forces that Social 
Darwinists praised. On the one hand, they followed classical political economists in 
affirming the competitive market as an efficient and effective force for maximizing 
economic output. On the other hand, they came to see the competitive market economy as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid., 87.  
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an essential mechanism of social selection. The free market, they argued, would 
effectively evaluate the worth of each individual by rewarding industriousness and 
punishing idleness. The competitive market presents individuals with harsh realities, and 
just like animals in a natural environment, these individuals can adapt to these hardships 
and thrive or fail to adapt and perish. Social Darwinists depicted progress as a process of 
continual adaptation to an increasingly competitive market economy. In this updated 
vision of free competition, Social Darwinists “supplied a sense of growth and collective 
improvement that progress-minded Americans had missed in Smith and his followers.”10 
The various arguments in support of laissez faire have justified individual 
property rights, and the distribution of property and wealth, as a moral issue. The real 
moral value at the heart of property distribution is one of fairness. For the Physiocrats, 
Smith, and Jefferson, the government was not justified in curtailing property rights 
because the owners of the property had, to some degree, deserved it based upon the 
talents applied to acquire that capital. In other words, the moral justification for property 
rights, and thus accumulation of wealth, was based upon talents and abilities applied in 
the past. This is a meritocratic logic, and it tragically overlooks the vast importance of 
inherited wealth in these highly agricultural societies.11 Nevertheless, the early adherents 
to laissez faire tended to accept the unequal distribution of wealth as a natural byproduct 
of a competitive economy.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920, 136. 
11 Jefferson’s own economic position nicely illustrates the cognitive dissonance 
here. A man who inherited some 600 slaves audaciously called for “a wise and frugal 
government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, which shall leave them 
otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not 
take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned.” See “First Inaugural Address.” 
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In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine three important advocates of 
laissez faire who sought to justify a competitive industrial economy in the late nineteenth 
century. Herbert Spencer, William Graham Sumner, and Andrew Carnegie all staunchly 
defended a laissez faire theory of the government, although Carnegie’s own industry 
benefited from government assistance. The modern version of laissez faire presented by 
these thinkers is the version that critics like Lloyd, Veblen, and Croly had in mind when 
they presented their own analyses of laissez faire. 
 
HERBERT SPENCER ON LAISSEZ FAIRE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 
Herbert Spencer extended the meritocratic logic of earlier laissez faire proponents 
by arguing that concentrated wealth was a force for future progress, rather than simply 
the just reward for one’s talents and abilities. Spencer argued that the wealthy were 
indeed “the fittest” members of society, and he believed progress depended upon their 
ability to employ their wealth as they saw fit.  
Spencer was one of the most original and influential defenders of laissez faire in 
American thought. He defended his vision of extremely limited government, not by 
building upon classical economic theory, but by constructing a comprehensive system 
that incorporated physics, biology, and sociology. Although he did not base his system on 
the economic doctrines of the Physiocrats and Smith, he did share their belief in a 
harmonious “order of nature.” Spencer expanded this purported order to a 
“comprehensive world-view, uniting under one generalization everything in nature from 
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protozoa to politics.”12 My purpose here is not to analyze Spencer’s grand evolutionary 
theory, but to show how such a theory relates to his defense of laissez faire. Spencer 
posited a natural process of evolution that applied to physical and biological phenomena. 
The general thrust of this evolution was a progressive transformation of things from a 
“homogeneous” chaos to “heterogeneous” order.13 The “natural order” of the Physiocrats 
and Smith was beneficent, but for Spencer the order itself was progressive and evolving 
as well.14 As things grow continuously heterogeneous, the social order will become more 
orderly and coherent.  
 The belief in an underlying “order of nature,” specifically one that exercises 
influence on human society, is a hallmark of laissez faire thinking. This is a logical and 
persuasive starting point for a laissez faire stance. If the government is to abstain from 
establishing order (economic or otherwise) in a positive manner, it is reassuring to think 
that a natural process of ordering will take its place. This is precisely why Spencer 
advocates laissez faire. 
No; they know, or they ought to know, that the laws of society are of such a  
character, that natural evils will rectify themselves; that there is in society, as in  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, 31. 
13 Ibid., 37. In Hofstadter’s words, “This progress from homogeneity to 
heterogeneity . . . is the principle at work in everything man can know.”  
14 As a point of clarification, I must emphasize that Spencer is not “progressive” 
in a political sense. His progressivism is entirely scientific and biological. In political 
terms, Spencer has a conservative mindset, which cautions against social engineering on 
the part of legislators. He defends laissez faire, primarily, as a way of letting the natural 
progress of society advance without interference. Spencer’s notion of progress suggests a 
conservative stance toward social issues. This complicated relationship is nicely 
summarized by Hofstadter: “We may wonder whether, in the entire history of thought, 
there was ever a conservatism so utterly progressive as this.” Ibid., 8. 
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every part of creation, that beautiful self-adjusting principle, which will keep all 
its elements in equilibrium; and moreover, that as the interference of man in 
external nature often destroys the just balance, and produces greater evils that 
those to be remedied, so the attempt to regulate all the actions of a community by 
legislation will entail little else but misery and confusion.15 
 
One will notice that Spencer’s “self-adjusting principle” is strikingly similar to Smith’s 
“invisible hand.” The crucial difference is that Spencer extrapolates beyond the economic 
sphere to the social and political as well. His “natural order,” an abstract and self-
regulating process that benefits humankind, is itself a justification of laissez faire. But the 
characteristics of that order establish Spencer as one of the staunchest and most 
uncompromising defenders of limited government.  
 Spencer describes society in terms of evolutionary biology, and he contrasts the 
accuracy of evolutionary science with the “superstitions” that legislators advance.16 
Spencer believes that the fundamental fact of human society is the same as the 
fundamental fact in nature—organisms must struggle against each other for survival. He 
bolstered this evolutionary view by incorporating Parson Malthus’s dire view of a 
population that was rapidly outpacing its ability to provide for itself.17 Spencer accepted 
Malthus’s depiction of society, but he rejected his pessimistic conclusion that the result 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Spencer, The Proper Sphere of Government, 6. 
16 Although he sided with Lamarck over Darwin his entire life, he frequently 
appealed to “the arguments of Mr. Darwin” to show the increasing acceptance of 
evolutionary theory. See Spencer, The Man versus The State, 131, 141. Hofstadter argues 
that Lamarck’s “theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics” was more progressive 
than Darwin’s theory of random genetic variation. Spencer favored Lamarck’s version of 
“evolutionary optimism . . . . even when scientific opinion turned overwhelmingly against 
it.” Social Darwinism in American Thought, 39. 
17 Ibid. 
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would be crisis and upheaval. Spencer believed that such hardship was conducive to 
progress: 
The demands upon his powers by everyday wants—by the endeavor to overcome 
difficulty or avoid dangers, and by the desire to secure a comfortable provision for 
the decline of life, are so many natural and salutary incentives to the exercise of 
those powers. Imperious necessity is the grand stimulus to man’s physical and 
mental endowments, and without it he would sink into a state of hopeless 
torpidity.”18 
 
For Spencer, Malthus’s prediction of resource scarcity relative to the population was a 
progressive force because it allowed individuals to exercise their industriousness. 
However, the real progressive force behind “imperious necessity” for Spencer was the 
belief that some individuals are better equipped to survive than others. 
 Spencer speaks of the conditions of humans in society in strikingly cold biological 
terms. “Placed in competition with members of its own species and in antagonism with 
members of other species, it dwindles and gets killed off, or thrives and propagates, 
according as it is ill-endowed or well-endowed.”19 Society naturally selects “superior 
units” for survival while not allowing the “innately unworthy” to “multiply.”20 He does 
not specify the exact mechanism by which this selection should take place, but his 
language suggests that the proper course of action is to let these “innately unworthy” 
individuals fend for themselves. This is not cruelty, but a sober understanding of how 
natural processes work. Spencer coined the phrase “survival of the fittest” to describe this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Spencer, The Proper Sphere of Government, 49. 
19 Spencer, The Man versus The State, 127. 
20 Ibid., 128 
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“beneficent working” of the natural laws of society.21 This notion of “survival of the 
fittest” privileges the natural laws of society over the artificial reforms advanced by 
legislators. By attempting to help those who cannot provide for themselves, legislators 
“are doing all they can to further survival of the unfittest.”22 
 Spencer argued that “survival of the fittest” distributes rewards and punishment 
according to individual merit. “Each adult gets benefit in proportion to merit—reward in 
proportion to desert: merit and desert in each case being understood as ability to fulfill 
the requirements of life—to get food, to secure shelter, to escape enemies.”23 This system 
of meritocratic rewards and punishments is the force of progress by which human society 
advances. Spencer’s advocacy of the “survival of the fittest” and the laissez faire policies 
that conform to it is based upon both his naturalistic and meritocratic arguments. On one 
hand, “survival of the fittest” is a natural process—an extension of the natural struggle 
for existence to human society. Given the increasing population and the scarcity of 
resources, the “struggle for existence” is unavoidable.24 On the other hand, the “survival 
of the fittest” rewards virtue and punishes vice. “Survival of the fittest” spurs on human 
progress by allocating resources on the basis of merit. Instead of legislative reform to 
assist the poor, Spencer calls for survival of the fittest, a natural process in which 
individuals get the degree of success they deserve.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid., 131. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid, 127. 
24 Ibid, 134. 
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 Spencer’s praise of the “survival of the fittest” is very individualistic in its focus. 
He shares the “ethical individualism” of the Physiocrats, which emphasized the 
responsibility each individual has to provide for himself or herself. Spencer writes of the 
“undeniable truth . . . that there are no phenomena which a society presents but what have 
their origins in the phenomena of individual human life.”25 He dismisses any claims made 
by society against the individual as “superstition” due to a failure to recognize the proper 
relationship between the individual and society.26 Spencer thinks any legitimate scientific 
approach to understanding human relations must start by focusing on the individual as a 
biological organism existing alongside other individuals. Unlike classical political 
economists, Spencer does not offer a psychological description of human nature. Adam 
Smith identified the human proclivity to “truck barter and exchange” as a natural force 
that encouraged competition. Spencer’s version of human nature is based upon biological 
necessities, which he sees as constant across time and place. Natural rights, for example,  
are based upon the recognition of these necessities. “The alleged creating of rights was 
nothing else than giving formal sanction and better definitions to those assertions of 
claims and recognitions of claims which naturally originate from the individual desires 
of men who have to live in the presence of others.”27 The competitive economic order, 
for Spencer, conforms to biological realities.  
 Spencer’s theory of society is quite atomistic, but he does acknowledge social 
realities that require cooperation among individuals. He identifies an “ethical character” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid, 138. 
26 Ibid., 140-4. 
27 Ibid., 154. Emphasis added. 
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of society of coexisting individuals where “mutual limitation is necessitated.”28 Spencer’s 
theory of society is not one in which the individual stands alone against the forces of 
nature; rather, individuals must coexist and cooperate.  In his view of social progress, 
primitive societies rely upon coercion to force individuals to cooperate, but as societies 
advance, there will be less need for coercive governments. He gives the example of 
“industrial organization” as an example of this social progress because such organization 
relies upon “voluntary co-operation” among individuals.29 The essence of this voluntary 
cooperation under an industrialized society is contractual. Breaking from the labor theory 
of value advanced by earlier laissez faire proponents, Spencer argues that the fulfillment 
of contracts is the true productive force in the economy.30 A government cannot abridge 
an individual’s right to freely enter a contract without violating “rights to free action,” 
which are essential for voluntary cooperation.31 One rather severe implication of 
Spencer’s focus on the inviolability of contracts is that contracts must be enforced even if 
it seriously disadvantages one party to the contract. In this case, Spencer’s notion of 
“survival of the fittest” comes into play by rewarding those who enter contracts wisely 
and punishing those who are apparently less discerning.32 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid., 158. Fine argues that this “law of equal freedom” is implied by Spencer’s 
belief in the “survival of the fittest.” If there is to be a practice of individuals freely 
pursuing their desires and interests, there must also be a mutual limit to individual action. 
See Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State, 34. 
29 Spencer, The Man versus The State, 161. 
30 Ibid., 161-3. 
31 Ibid., 163. 
32 This debate between free labor and freedom of contract was very important in 
American thought between 1860 and 1900. Lincoln and the Republican Party famously 
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 My discussion of Spencer’s thought up to this point has emphasized that his 
vision of human progress is one in which individuals are free to act in a competitive 
environment where they are punished or rewarded based upon merit. Spencer’s claim is 
that this will result in “survival of the fittest,” but he is equally concerned with justifying 
the bleak situation of the “unfittest.” Spencer was reacting against a growing welfare 
movement in Great Britain, in which assistance to the poor was justified, in his thinking, 
by the belief that the poor were victims of a cruel society rather than “good-for-nothings, 
who in some way live off the good-for-somethings.”33 Once again, Spencer believes that 
the degree of success that one attains in the struggle for existence is based upon 
individual merit. Of the “numerous cases of distress and destitution,” he writes, “in nine 
cases out of ten, such miseries result from the transgressions of the individual or his 
parents.”34 Spencer argues that the Poor Law interferes with the allocation of resources 
based upon merit replacing “survival of the fittest” with a paternalistic scheme that 
provides “subsistence without labor.”35 This figure of the “good-for-nothing” allowed 
Spencer to defend laissez faire against a growing chorus of legislators calling for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
supported a free labor position that identified labor as the source of value. The 
implication here is that labor is entitled to a just share of the profits from enterprise. A 
major upshot of this free labor ideology is that slavery is unjust due to the fact that slaves 
are completely deprived of the value of their labor. Spencer represents the opposing view 
of freedom of contract. Under this view, the value of labor is based on a prior agreement 
between the employer and employee. Spencer and others argued that this was a voluntary 
arrangement in which the laborers forfeited the right to claim any share of profits beyond 
the agreed upon wage. See Cohen, The Reconstruction of American Liberalism: 1865-
1914, 29, 34-38. 
33 Spencer, The Man versus The State, 80. 
34 Spencer, The Proper Sphere of Government, 17. 
35 Ibid. 
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assistance to the poor. One of Spencer’s objections to welfare assistance was his belief 
that the natural workings of society should be left alone to produce “survival of the 
fittest,” but one should not underestimate the influence of his argument that the poor are 
victims of their own “improvidence.”36 
 All of these features of Spencer’s thought—the abstract and comprehensive 
scheme of grand evolutionary progress, the notion of a “natural order” with natural laws, 
the struggle for existence and “survival of the fittest,” the individualism, and the belief 
that poverty is natural and necessary—were used to support his laissez faire vision of the 
state. Spencer believed that the state should engage in no positive actions that would 
interfere with the “natural order” of society. Instead, the sole function of the government 
is “simply to defend the natural rights of man—to protect persons and property—to 
prevent aggressions of the powerful upon the weak—in a word, to administer justice.”37 
Spencer agued that justice is primarily about enforcing property rights and protecting 
individuals from aggression. By limiting itself to administering justice, the state places 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Spencer, The Man versus The State, 90. Contemporary defenders of laissez 
faire share Spencer’s concern that the government will unfairly take resources from the 
industrious and prudent individuals and give those resources to individuals who are lazy 
or unwise. One will recall Rick Santelli’s famous “rant” on the floor of the Chicago 
Board of Trade that marked the beginning of the Tea Party movement. Santelli’s primary 
complaint was that the government would help distressed homeowners at the expense of 
the hard-working taxpayers. Specifically, “He lambasted the Obama administration . . . 
for ‘promoting bad behavior’ by buying up bad mortgages, which he said was merely 
rewarding ‘losers.’” This echoes Spencer’s own belief that the government should allow 
individuals to succeed or fail based upon their own decisions and actions. See Ed 
Pilkington, “US Elections: The Tea Party Phenomenon: Legendary Anger, or Midterm 
Bickering Over Taxes?,” The Guardian, October 9, 2010. 
37 Spencer, The Proper Sphere of Gov’t, 7. 
	   70 
itself into “harmony with the original wants of society.”38 He argued that governments 
have historically overstepped their limited duties because they were ignorant of the 
natural laws of society. Spencer was attempting to prove that government intervention 
was contrary to nature itself. 
 Spencer’s writing betrays the urgency of a man who perceives himself to be 
swimming against the current. He lamented the increasing popularity of reform 
legislation evidenced by Poor Laws, public health regulations, “communistic theories,” 
and “the numerous socialistic changes made by Act of Parliament.”39 Anticipating a 
concern of modern conservatives, he complains that these mistaken beliefs are 
strengthened by “press-advocacy” as journalists “speak of laissez faire as an exploded 
doctrine.”40 Spencer believed that legislators had moved far beyond the original and 
natural function of government to a more expansive version of justice that ignored the 
natural laws of society. He notes that even “Liberalism” has moved beyond its original 
position as advocating “greater freedom from restraint, especially in political 
institutions,” in favor of “positive coercion” that serves “class interest.”41  
 As mentioned above, Spencer believed that government interference with the 
struggle for existence only inhibits the natural progress that would result from “survival 
of the fittest.” Besides for this, government assistance to the “unfittest” upsets the natural 
distribution of rewards and punishments on the basis of merit. Spencer believed that  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid, 8. 
39 Ibid., 46-8; The Man versus The State, 80, 93, and 95. 
40 Ibid., 94. 
41 Ibid., 77-8. 
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legislators violate the “natural order” of society because they overestimate the ability of 
the government to change the natural workings of society. The Physiocrats and Smith 
deployed a very similar critique, although their idea of a “natural order” was not as 
expansive and deterministic as Spencer’s. But Spencer argues that legislators also 
underestimate the dangers of expanded governmental authority. “Every extension of the 
regulative policy involves an addition of regulative agents—a further growth of 
officialdom and an increasing power of the organization formed of officials.”42 Spencer 
believed that this “army of civil officials” will become increasingly coercive and 
consolidate more power until “the coming slavery” of “State-Socialism” results.43 The 
ultimate result of this is that society takes priority over the individual, and government 
administration takes over private enterprise. In short, the individual “becomes a slave to 
society.”44 
 Spencer clearly believed that “the coming slavery” of socialism has a cumulative 
effect—once programs and offices are created, they begin to furnish their own defense.45 
For this reason, he opposes any positive actions on the part of the government, especially 
those actions that seek to interfere with economic relations. He opposes a national plan 
for public education because “the salaried state-teacher” would impose uniformity of 
opinion and close off the “promise of future perfection” that is afforded by “the principle 
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43 Ibid., 95, 104 
44 Ibid., 96. 
45 Spencer notices an uncontrollable growth “in the bureaucracies of the 
Continent” once they reach a certain size. Ibid., 91. 
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of honourable competition.”46 Similarly, public health programs would create a 
“monopoly” controlled by a bureaucracy of medical officials.47 He argues against public 
works on the grounds that public ownership of transportation infrastructure would 
provide “good precedents for extending [the State’s] function to retail distribution.”48 
This is further evidence of how different Spencer’s vision of laissez faire is from the 
economic system of Adam Smith. Smith thought that public infrastructure was essential 
for his “system of perfect liberty,” but Spencer tended to view any positive action on the 
part of the government as a potential violation of individual liberty. All of these reasons 
led Spencer to a very rigid and dogmatic vision of laissez faire in which he saw any 
positive actions on the part of the government as step toward socialism. 
 In conclusion, Spencer’s argument for laissez faire rests upon three interrelated 
criticisms of positive government. An interventionist government is unnatural, regressive, 
and despotic. An active government is unnatural because it interferes with the natural 
workings of society. Overactive government results from lawmakers who do not 
understand the “natural order” of society. This line of thought is consistent with the 
Physiocrats and Smith, but Spencer goes further in his defense of laissez faire. He also 
considers an active government to be regressive because it softens the “struggle for 
survival.” Spencer argues that this competitive struggle between individuals serves as a 
selection mechanism by differentiating the “fittest” from the “unfittest.” Progress, for 
Spencer, results from increasing the proportion of industrious individuals in relation to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Spencer, The Proper Sphere of Government, 36-7. 
47 Ibid., 44-6. 
48 Spencer, The Man versus The State, 100. 
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individuals who are less industrious. Finally an active government becomes increasingly 
despotic by assuming more and more duties, employing more officials, and collecting 
more revenue. This criticism anticipates the argument presented by twentieth-century 
laissez faire advocates, specifically F. A. Hayek’s Road to Serfdom. Spencer considered 
limited government to be the only alternative to centralized state-socialism. Laissez faire 
solved all of these issues for Spencer. Under a severely limited government, society will 
be allowed to operate according to a natural competitive order that ensures progress. At 
the same time, limited government allows individuals to act freely in their own self-
interest and avoids the temptation to assign more and more responsibility to the state. 
Spencer clearly had these concerns in mind when he wrote a series of essays in 1884 to 
denounce the growing reform movement in the United Kingdom. He collected these 
essays into a book with a title that neatly summarized his view of society—The Man 
versus The State. 
 
WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER: LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 
 William Graham Sumner’s defense of laissez faire is more nuanced and less rigid 
than Spencer’s. Originally an admirer of Spencer, he came to reject Spencer’s totalizing 
system and focused instead on sociology. Sumner was attempting to formulate a “science 
of society” by discovering the natural laws underlying social reality. His writing is more 
academic and less rhetorical than Spencer’s. He dispenses with Spencer’s appeal to 
natural rights and other “metaphysical” beliefs in favor of what he considers to be a more 
scientific approach based upon observable social laws. Sumner’s work was not nearly as 
popular or influential as Spencer’s, especially among businessmen, many of whom 
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distrusted his academic approach and “independence.”49 He broke with conservatives by 
acknowledging the legitimacy of labor organization and by opposing the Spanish 
American War. However, his sociology presented a vigorous defense of laissez faire. 
 
The Social Order and Natural Laws 
Much like Spencer, Sumner believed in a “natural order” that was discoverable by 
scientific investigation. Also like Spencer, he believed that government officials and 
reformers rejected laissez faire because of their failure to recognize this natural order. 
Sumner argues that the “social thinker” mistakenly believes “there are no laws to the 
social order, no science of society; no limits, in fact, to the possibilities of manipulation 
by ‘the State.’”50Such “manipulation” by the state is a direct result of ignorance 
concerning the complex workings of society. Sumner’s “science of society” is an attempt 
to clarify the workings of the social order so that lawmakers and reformers would realize 
the wisdom of laissez faire.  
Sumner’s theory of society presupposes law-like generalities that can be applied 
to human society. He writes, “The social order is fixed by laws of nature precisely 
analogous to those of the physical order. The most a man can do is by ignorance and self-
deceit to mar the operation of social laws.”51 As we saw in the Physiocrats, Smith, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, 63-4. Hofstadter insists 
that Sumner “was not a business hireling” but a man of science who was committed to his 
principles. Critics portrayed him as an apologist for the status quo, but “he was 
doctrinaire because his ideas were bred in his bones.”  
50 Sumner, “Democracy and Plutocracy,” 138. 
51 Sumner, “Socialism,” 172. 
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Spencer, Sumner’s defense of laissez faire rests upon the presumption of a “natural 
order” that operates best when left alone. While Spencer’s defense of laissez faire was 
largely rooted in biology and physics, “Sumner’s version of laissez faire was grounded in 
classical political economy and sociology.”52 Sumner actually makes clear that biology 
and sociology deal with separate phenomena. Both sciences deal with the human 
“struggle for existence,” but biology deals with this struggle in terms of “competition 
with other forms of life;” whereas, sociology deals with aggregates of humans who “are 
carrying on this struggle side by side.”53 The social order is completely distinct from the 
biological and physical order giving rise to a new “social forces” that are poorly 
understood.54 Sumner’s sociology is an attempt to understand these social forces in a 
concrete way without resorting to “metaphysics” or ungrounded speculation.55 
Sumner’s sociological investigations begin with a phenomenon that he considers a 
natural and elemental fact of human life—the “struggle for existence.”56 Sumner 
employed Malthus’s “law of population,” much like Spencer had, as a basic fact of 
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53 Sumner, “Sociology,” 187. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Sumner, “Sociology,” 183. Hofstadter argues that Sumner was attempting to 
counteract the American adherence to the “dogmas of the Enlightenment” and “set 
himself the task of deflating the philosophical speculation of the eighteenth century with 
the science of the nineteenth.” See, Social Darwinism in American Political Thought, 65-
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human society that leads to an inevitable competition for scarce resources.57 He also joins 
Spencer in drawing optimistic conclusions from Malthus’s dire scenario.  
The laws of population and diminishing return, in their combination, are the iron  
spur which has driven the race on to all which it has ever achieved, and the fact 
that the population ever advances . . . is the guarantee that the task of civilization 
will never be ended, but that the need for more energy, more intelligence, and 
more virtue will never cease while the race lasts.58 
 
As it is in Spencer’s view of the “social order,” scarcity of resources is the fact that leads 
to human progress. Scarcity logically entails a struggle for resources, and it rescues the 
human race from complacency. 
 Sumner is not concerned with the biological struggle for existence in a state of 
nature, but the social struggle for existence which he defines as “the competition of man 
with man in the effort to win a limited supply [of subsistence].”59 Sumner sees this 
competition among individuals as the starting point for sociological investigation. This 
individualistic focus is consistent with the history of laissez faire thinking, and Sumner 
considers it essential. “The relation, therefore, between each man’s needs and each man’s 
energy, or ‘individualism,” is the first fact of human life.”60 Individualism, for Sumner, 
involves the notion that individuals are responsible for their degree of success in the 
struggle for existence. This is the same meritocratic logic advanced by Spencer in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid., 188-9. 
58 Ibid., 189. 
59 Ibid. It is interesting that Marx similarly identifies the need for subsistence as 
the starting point of his investigation, but Sumner suggests that this need will always take 
place in an environment of scarce resources characterized by competition between 
individuals. 
60 Sumner, “Socialism,” 159. 
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success or failure—better yet, survival or misery—is a result of individual character and 
initiative.  
 Sumner treated resource scarcity as an empirical fact and a firm basis for his 
scientific investigation of society. He united this fact with the notion that people earn 
resources in proportion to their individual character or merit. The result of these 
preliminary facts is the law of “survival of the fittest.” Sumner carefully pointed out that 
this is not a “moral” doctrine, but a “scientific” one.61 He believed that the “fittest” are 
those who best adapt to the realities of society. The fittest are not better in some absolute 
sense, but best equipped to compete in the specific circumstance of ”modern civilized and 
industrial society.”62 Given the fact that resources are scarce, the distribution of resources 
is a zero-sum game between those who are “fittest” and “unfittest.” Echoing Spencer, he 
wrote, “if we do not like the survival of the fittest, we can only substitute the survival of 
the unfittest.”63  
Sumner is especially concerned with the individual characteristics that foster 
industrial progress such as “industry, self-denial, and temperance.”64 Progress is a very 
slow process “won in minute stages” by individuals, not by government implemented 
reforms.65 If the various “social pressures” are allowed to operate freely, society will 
advance “by improvement in the arts, in science, in morals, in political institutions, to 	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62 Ibid., 224. 
63 Ibid., 224. 
64 Sumner, “Socialism,” 181. 
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widen and strengthen the power of man over nature.”66 Survival of the fittest leads to 
progress by allowing industrious individuals to employ their talents in the way they 
choose, but this process also has a harsh prescription for those who are not fit for 
competition in an industrial society. 
 Sumner believes that each individual or family is responsible for its own survival 
in the industrial society. Simply put, the rewards of the responsible should not be taken 
and redistributed to the irresponsible. “Poverty and misery will exist in society as long as 
vice exists in human nature.”67 Indeed, Sumner argues that the struggle for existence 
would continue even if the government did adopt a laissez faire stance.68 Society will 
never progress to a point where the unfittest can enjoy the fruits of industry without 
consequence. Sumner has no patience with “sentimentalists” who depict the poor as 
victims.69 He writes, “But the weak who constantly arouse the pity of humanitarians and 
philanthropists are the shiftless, the imprudent, the negligent, the impractical, the 
inefficient, or they are the idle, the intemperate, the extravagant, and the vicious.”70 
Mercifully, he opposes any attempt to “kill off certain classes of troublesome and 
burdensome people,” but he does concede that “it would have been better for society, and 
would involve no pain to them if they had never been born.”71 These “burdensome 
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people” provide no benefits to the society, but reformers insist that they should be 
assisted. In a striking passage, Sumner reveals that nature has a way of eliminating these 
burdens: “A drunkard in the gutter is just where he ought to be. Nature is working away 
at him to get him out of the way, just as she sets up her process of dissolution to remove 
whatever is a failure in its line.”72 Sumner applauds this process as a natural alternative to 
government regulation and assistance to the poor. 
 To reiterate, Sumner believed that sociology is completely distinct from biology, 
but as the forgoing discussion reveals, he applied the biological concept of evolution to 
society itself. Sumner was attempting to uncover social phenomena, but evolutionary 
biology provided him with a basis for his “science of society.” The “social forces” that he 
identifies are strikingly similar to the natural forces that operate in evolutionary biology. 
An environment characterized by scarce resources, competition among individuals for 
subsistence, and selection based on those best adapted to survive are all characteristics 
that apply to Sumner’s society as well as Darwin’s Galapagos.73 The paradigm of 
evolutionary biology also helped Sumner in his attempt to rescue sociology from the 
relativistic theories based upon “authority, tradition, arbitrary invention, or poetic 
imagination.”74 Sumner argued that such ungrounded speculation about social 	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phenomena was a main source of opposition to laissez faire. Socialists and other 
reformers consider society to be “artificially organized,” and therefore, subject to human 
control.75 Sumner combatted this conception of society by depicting society as a natural 
phenomenon that operates according to natural laws. His “social determinism” convinced 
him that the conditions of society are immutable and largely impervious to human 
guidance.76 One essential fact of modern society, according to Sumner, is that “economic 
forces such as competition and self-interest” are non-negotiable.77 
  
The Proper Role of the State 
There are numerous similarities between Sumner and Spencer in regards to their 
view of a “social order” that operates according to natural laws, but Sumner’s view of the 
state is decidedly less radical than Spencer’s. Spencer argues that the State is founded on 
“aggression” and the “ethics of war;” whereas, “social development” arises from 
individuals’ “private activities and their spontaneous co-operations.”78 He refers to the 
“social structure” in an abstract manner, but portrays government institutions as a force 
that counteracts voluntary cooperation. Sumner, on the other hand, has a more 
complicated view of the “social order” due to the importance he attributes to civil and 
political institutions. His sociology is meant to provide a more concrete understanding of 	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society so that these institutions can be used wisely. Sumner challenges us to “struggle 
with the problems offered by social pressure . . . by improvements in the arts, in science, 
in morals, in political institutions, to widen and strengthen the power of man over 
nature.”79 
 Sumner also rejected the idea of natural rights, which marks another departure 
from Spencer. For Sumner, natural rights are the remnants of an antiquated sophistry.  
The notion of natural rights is destitute of sense, but it is captivating . . . . It lends  
itself to the most vicious kind of social dogmatism, for if a man has rights, then 
the reasoning is clear up to the finished socialist doctrine that a man has a natural 
right to whatever he needs.80 
 
This is the reason that Sumner rejects the natural right of property and favors a positive 
legal basis for property rights and individual liberty. Sumner is averse to the abstract and 
ahistorical visions of natural liberty and natural rights because he believes that these 
concepts “must be defined at any moment of time by the constitution, laws, and 
institutions of the community.”81 He rejects “the doctrine of natural liberty,” which 
depicts the individual in “a condition of complete non-restraint” before the State is 
established.82 This was Spencer’s view of natural liberty. For Sumner, this abstract notion 
of natural liberty implies “liberty without responsibility.”83 He supports instead the idea 
of “civil liberty,” which is “guaranteed by law and civil institutions” and allows the 
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individual “exclusive employment of his own powers for his own welfare.”84 Sumner 
considers liberty to be an historical achievement rather than a natural condition. Civil 
liberty must be supported by institutions in which “liberty and responsibility are made 
equal and co-ordinate.”85 
 Despite Sumner’s insistence on the importance of institutions, he still has a very 
restrictive view of the role of the state, especially in matters of economics. His concept of 
civil liberty involves allowing individuals to use their property as they see fit, and the 
state is in violation of civil liberty if it interferes with property rights. Sumner defends 
private property on the grounds that it is an institution that directly conforms to a natural 
law of competition. By protecting private property, civil liberty transforms “the 
competition of man with man from violence and brute force into an industrial 
competition under which men vie with one another for the acquisition of material goods 
by industry, energy, skill, frugality, prudence, temperance, and other individual 
virtues.”86 The establishment of civil liberty allows the struggle for survival to continue 
in a non-violent form because it protects private property. Liberty, therefore, is “the 
complete and regular action of the force of competition.”87 
 Although Sumner is careful to distinguish his idea of civil liberty from the 
supposed natural right of liberty, the implications for the state are mostly the same. Civil 
liberty leaves individuals free to exercise control over their private property, and this 	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ensures a competitive society. The primary role of the state is to prevent aggression and 
enforce property rights with well-designed institutions. “Civil institutions are constructed 
to protect, either directly or indirectly, the property of men and the honor of women 
against the vices and passions of human nature.”88 The state is charged with 
administering the rule of law so that the natural forces of competition can insure “survival 
of the fittest.” 
 Sumner supports his vision of limited government by deploying three distinct but 
related arguments based upon his study of sociology. Sumner’s first argument against 
government interference is that the laws of society are immutable. A favorite tactic of 
Sumner is to juxtapose his own “science of society” with the relativistic and fanciful 
notions of reformers. “Utopians and socialists . . . . revolting against the social order, take 
upon themselves the task of creating a new and better world.”89 Sumner criticizes this by 
identifying laws of society that cannot be abridged, such as Malthus’s law of population, 
the struggle for existence, competition between individuals, and “survival of the fittest.”90 
Sumner’s sociology is based upon this foundation of social forces that obey natural laws. 
The job for institutions is not to abrogate these laws, but to conform to them and allow 
these social forces operate freely. Government sponsored reform is usually an attempt to 
counteract the forces of competition and survival of the fittest. Reform, therefore, is the 
product of ignorance. Sumner believes that “socialism” and “sentimental philosophy” 
arises from the belief that society is a human invention that can be altered rather than a 	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natural phenomenon that is “fixed by laws of nature.”91 The socialist attempt to eliminate 
hardship and misery “is therefore as impossible, from the outset, as a plan for changing 
the physical order.”92  
The second conclusion that Sumner draws from his sociology is that the natural 
force of competition can only lead to progress when it is unrestricted in its operation.   
Sumner clearly sees a role for political institutions in protecting private property, but he 
argues that most existing institutions are paternalistic and regressive. Sumner’s view of 
social progress is based upon a competitive struggle between individuals that ensures 
“survival of the fittest.” This notion of progress is lost on proponents of reform who see 
progress as a force for greater equality. Sumner sees inequality as a fact of social life 
based upon the differing abilities of individuals. Given this reality, attempts to “take the 
rewards from those who have done better and give them to those who have done worse . . 
. . carries society downwards and favors all its worst members.”93 Society progresses by 
selecting the fittest members for survival, not by promoting equality. 
The third conclusion that Sumner derives from his sociology is that government 
interference with the social order produces unintended consequences. The “social 
thinker” does not understand that all parts of society are complex and interrelated, and it 
is impossible to change one part of society without affecting others.94 To illustrate the 
unintended consequences of social reform, Sumner presents the figure of “the forgotten 	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man.” “He is the simple, honest laborer, ready to earn his living by productive work.”95 
Through his prudence, sobriety, and virtue, the forgotten man has proved himself fit to 
survive. He is the direct opposite of the “weak who constantly arouse the pity of 
humanitarians and philanthropists.”96 Sumner shifts the focus of pity by portraying the 
“independent and productive laborer” as the “real victim” of social welfare programs.97 
Sumner portrays the forgotten man as a person who does not require government 
assistance, but bears the burden of paying for it. Whether the state engages in poor relief, 
regulation of industry, or hiring police officers to save a drowning man, the costs falls 
primarily upon the forgotten man.98 The forgotten man serves the same function as the 
small merchant did for Smith and as the small farmer did for Jefferson. It illustrates that 
the true victim of government intervention in the economy is the hard working individual 
of modest means rather than the wealthy businessman. This is yet another aspect of 
Sumner’s sociology that prescribes a policy of laissez faire. 
 
Sumner’s Definition of Laissez Faire 	  
Much like Spencer, Sumner realized that laissez faire was increasingly coming 
under attack. In 1886 Sumner penned an essay to clarify the concept of laissez faire. He 
wished to rescue the concept from caricature, to defend it by means of clarification, and 
to distinguish it from dogma or metaphysics. He complained that “professional socialists” 	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and other would-be reformers had mischaracterized laissez faire as “meaning the 
unrestrained action of nature without any intelligent interference by man.”99 Sumner 
counters that laissez faire entails “the only rational application of human intelligence to 
the assistance of natural development.”100 In its fundamental sense, laissez faire is an 
imperative, applicable to statesmen and legislators, based upon scientific knowledge of 
the laws of society. Sumner writes, “Laissez-faire is a maxim of policy. It is not a rule of 
science.”101 He likens a prudent statesman to a gardener who takes his cues from natural 
processes in an attempt to “aid nature in that course of development which fits the 
interests and purposes of man.”102 Sumner believes that there are laws of society, which 
set the boundaries of possibility, and failure to recognize these laws is at the bottom of all 
idealistic attempts to reform society. Indeed, his recommendation is conservative in 
nature. “Laissez-faire means: Do not meddle; wait and observe. Do not regulate; study. 
Do not give orders; be teachable. Do not enter upon any rash experiments; be patient until 
you see how things will work out.”103  
Sumner follows classical economic theory by opposing protectionism, but the 
striking feature of his thought is his attempt to extend the logic of non-interference 
beyond economics to society in general. It is true that he considers economic forces to be 
the primary basis of human society, but his advocacy of laissez faire is based upon 	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sociological rather than economic reasoning. He defends concentrated wealth as essential 
to industrial progress, but his defense of laissez faire focuses on how “non-interference” 
aids social development.104 Sumner’s singular contribution to laissez faire thinking was 
his attempt to identify the natural laws of society by confining his examination to society 
only. Spencer’s “natural order” was founded upon physical and biological realities. The 
features of his “social order” are an extension of the laws of the natural sciences. Sumner 
insists that society has laws of its own that are independent and separate from the laws of 
physics and biology. He does argue that social laws are immutable in the way physical 
laws are, but these laws stand on their own and originate in society. For Sumner, these 
social laws demonstrate a “natural order” consisting of self-interested individuals who 
earn their living according to personal merit under a system of civil liberty which protects 
property rights. If legislators were to accept Sumner’s sociological conclusions, the only 
viable policy option is laissez faire.  
 
ANDREW CARNEGIE AND THE INDUSTRIAL STATUS QUO 
 The process of industrialization that took place in the United States after the Civil 
War dramatically changed the ways in which Americans understood business and 
commerce. In the decade before the Civil War, successful businessmen were seen as 
upwardly mobile individuals who had often “begun their working lives as craftsmen, 
mechanics with a knack for invention.”105 The self-made businessman had built his 
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wealth and success upon a foundation of individual virtue and productive skills. This idea 
of the “inventor-entrepreneur” came to represent “proof of the republican principle that 
self-taught men of skill and ingenuity might rise to wealth and social position.”106 In the 
decades after the Civil War industrial production increased dramatically in scale, and this 
image of the inventor gave way to the image of the captain of industry. This “new breed 
of business leaders” did not exhibit talents for invention, but skills in “finance,” “market 
manipulation,” and “corporate organization.”107 This new industrial businessman was not 
an inventor, but a manager. With industrial growth and mechanization of production, 
there was also an increasing reliance on unskilled labor. The new industrial labor force 
was constituted by “operators and machine tenders, with little hope of significant social 
improvement through their own talents and efforts.”108 Anyone seeking to defend this 
new industrial status quo would have to justify this new role of businessman as corporate 
manager. This is precisely what Andrew Carnegie attempted do in his Gospel of Wealth. 
Carnegie argues that the effects of industrialization are overwhelmingly positive. 
He credits industrial advances for increasing the stock of material goods and for making 
them more accessible. “The poor enjoy what the rich could not before afford . . . . The 
laborer has now more comforts than the farmer had a few generations ago.”109 He argues 
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that industrial combination and competition lead to ever-increasing efficiency in 
production. The consequence of this system is an abundance of high quality goods at 
more affordable prices. Carnegie believes that this process of industrial advancement is 
based upon “the law of competition” and a free market for exchange110 Such a system 
allows those individuals of special talents to administer capital and streamline production. 
Because of competition and industrialization, the poor laborer in the late nineteenth 
century has greater access to material goods than the middle-class professional had in the 
late eighteenth century. 
 On Carnegie’s telling, the poor are better off in an absolute sense, but not in a 
relative sense. They may be better off than the poor of the distant past, but they are 
clearly worse off than the wealthy in the present. Carnegie considers this a necessary 
consequence of the law of competition. “We accept and welcome, therefore, as 
conditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, great inequality of environment, 
the concentration of business, industrial and commercial, in the hands of a few, and the 
law of competition between these, as being not only beneficial, but essential for the future 
progress of the race.”111 Like Spencer, he considers competition essential “because it 
ensures survival of the fittest.”112 Carnegie considers inequality to be a fact of modern 
industrial civilization. If we are to accept the abundance afforded to us by virtue of a 
competitive economy, we must accept the inequalities of wealth that result. 
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 Carnegie, like both Spencer and Sumner, considers any intrusion in the right of 
private property to be a sign of coming socialism. Capitalism, for Carnegie, is the way 
forward for the human race. The only alternative to this is “primitive communism” that 
disregards the benefits of “Individualism.”113 He believes that modern civilization rests 
upon individualism and the right of private property, but communistic reforms would 
require “the total overthrow of our civilization.”114 Carnegie’s deployment of 
“communism” as the only possible alternative to a capitalist economy reveals his 
dogmatic adherence to the philosophy of Spencer, especially the doctrine of “survival of 
the fittest.” However, Spencer was arguing against what he took to be the status quo of 
legislative reform. Carnegie is arguing in favor of the status quo, but his argument rests 
upon the assumption that human civilization has advanced “to a condition of affairs under 
which the best interests of the race are promoted.”115 Carnegie’s focus in “The Gospel of 
Wealth” is to establish private charity as a better alternative to public assistance, but his 
cursory defense of the existing economic conditions is necessary to justify the massive 
accumulations of wealth that he himself epitomized. After only four short pages of 
defending industrial capitalism, he issues the almost-biblical pronouncement: “Thus far, 
accepting conditions as they exist, the situation can be surveyed and pronounced 
good.”116 
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 Carnegie also applies Spencer’s idea of “survival of the fittest” to the American 
condition of industrial capitalism, and in so doing, identifies a specific talent that applies 
to the fittest individuals. In an age of combination, the fittest will be those possessed of 
“special ability . . . to conduct affairs on a great scale.”117 He argues that only rare 
individuals will possess “this talent for organization and management,” and under the 
conditions of laissez faire, these individuals “must of necessity soon be in receipt of more 
revenue than can be judiciously expended upon themselves.”118 The captains of industry, 
according to Carnegie, are successful because of their talent for industrial 
administration—their ability to marshal large amounts of capital, labor, and equipment in 
service to industrial production. He considers the vast accumulations of wealth to be a 
necessary consequence of individualism and competition.  
 For Carnegie, legitimizing the concentration of wealth in the hands of a relative 
few is not the end, but the beginning of his project. His defense of capitalism is entirely 
utilitarian. He does not discuss a “natural order” as previous defenders of laissez faire 
were wont to do. His argument rests entirely upon the supposition that material 
abundance is the result of competition. His defense of private property is very similar: 
“there is nothing sacred about individual ownership except as man has established it as 
the system under which progress can be made.”119 This consequentialist defense of 
individual ownership allows Carnegie to dispense with the traditional laissez faire 
defense of private property as strictly a result of individual initiative. He allows that some 	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“fortunes,” especially those made up of real-estate holdings, are the result of “purely 
communal growth” rather than “individual effort and ability.”120 While defending 
individualism and private property, Carnegie insists that the wealthy still have a 
responsibility to care for the community that contributed to these fortunes. His aim in 
“The Gospel of Wealth” is to convince the wealthy that they do indeed have a duty to 
support the community. “As wealth comes mainly from the community, it should be 
administered as a sacred trust, by the temporary recipient, for the public good.”121 The 
imperative here is private charity on the part of the wealthy. One curious result of 
Carnegie’s “Gospel of Wealth” is that, by establishing the fact that the wealthy owe a 
debt to the community, he adds additional moral justification of vast inequalities of 
wealth, which result from a policy of laissez faire. 
 Carnegie’s “Gospel of Wealth” may impose duties on the captain of industry, but 
he tempers this with a flattering depiction of the wealthy industrialist. “The man of 
wealth thus becoming the mere agent and trustee of his poor brethren, bringing to their 
service his superior wisdom, experience, and ability to administer, doing for them better 
than they would or could do for themselves.”122 His attitude is paternalistic, but he casts 
the industrialist rather than the state in the role of parent. The talent for administration 
that allows the “fittest” to amass their fortunes also makes them uniquely qualified to 
administer their wealth in charitable pursuits.  
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We shall have an ideal state, in which the surplus wealth of the few will become, 
in the best sense, the property of the many, because [it is] administered for the 
common good, and this wealth, passing through the hands of the few, can be 
made a much more potent force for the elevation of the race than if it had been 
distributed in small sums to people themselves.123 
 
Carnegie’s “antidote” for unequal distribution of wealth is to allow competition and 
accumulation to continue with the understanding that the wealthy will best administer it 
in service to the community.124  
 By portraying the wealthy as gifted administrators, Carnegie is able to establish 
vast accumulations of wealth as not only tolerable, but desirable. Amassing a fortune is 
the preliminary step for public service.  
It becomes the duty of the millionaire to increase his revenues. The struggle for  
more is completely changed from selfish or ambitious taint to a noble pursuit. 
Then he labours not for the self, but for others; not to hoard, but to spend. The 
more he makes, the more the public gets.125 
 
Carnegie is quite sincere in presenting this moral prescription. He calls for the wealthy to 
deploy all of their “surplus wealth” in service to the public good before they die.126 One 
will notice that the state plays no role in Carnegie’s solution for unequal distribution of 
wealth. He does support a severe estate tax, but this is because it creates an incentive for 
the wealthy to spend their fortunes before they die, not because he believes the tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Ibid., 8. 
124 Ibid., 8. 
125 Carnegie, “The Advantages of Poverty,” 50. 
126 “Gospel of Wealth,” 5-8. Carnegie is very critical of those who pass on 
fortunes to their descendants. He also rejects the idea of leaving a designated amount of 
money to a public trust to be administered after death. He insists that the wealthy must 
use their particular talents to administer their wealth in service to the community during 
their life. 
	   94 
revenue can be put to good public use.127 The role of the state is to allow individualism 
and competition to operate freely so that the wealthy can amass great fortunes that will be 
put to public use. 
 By focusing on the necessity of public investment, Carnegie acknowledges that 
there is a need for such investment to provide for the communal goods that private 
enterprise does not provide. The purpose of charity is to increase the avenues of 
individual initiative. “The best means of benefitting the community is to place within its 
reach the ladders upon which the aspiring can rise.”128 Carnegie calls for the wealthy to 
eschew “indiscriminate giving” in favor of establishing long-lasting institutions such as 
universities, public parks, libraries, art museums, music halls, and churches.129 All of 
these institutions are designed to increase the opportunities for individuals who are 
willing to work hard. They foster individualism, and individualism is the engine of 
progress. 
 Carnegie’s model of charity is designed to preserve the competitive market 
economy and ensure “survival of the fittest.” As we saw with Spencer and Sumner, the 
doctrine of “survival of the fittest” entails the figure of the social scapegoat—the very 
opposite of the fittest. “For one of the serious obstacles to the improvement of our race is 
indiscriminate charity. It were better for mankind that the millions of the rich were 
thrown into the sea than so spent as to encourage the slothful, the drunken, the 
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unworthy.”130 He considers such charity to be “selfish” because it indulges one’s 
immediate sympathies without requiring careful consideration of the greater good.131 The 
role of charity is to assist the deserving poor, who wish to help themselves, rather than 
the undeserving poor, who seek help from others. Indiscriminate charity rescues the 
undeserving poor from the competitive struggle for survival and creates “a spirit of 
dependence upon alms.”132 Carnegie supports charitable contributions in the form of 
public institutions because it encourages individualism; he opposes direct assistance to 
the poor because it produces a culture of dependency. 
 Nevertheless, Carnegie does concede that the state is minimally responsible for 
caring for the indigent. He concedes that “common humanity” dictates that we prevent 
the poor from dying of hunger or exposure.133 However, Carnegie is equally concerned 
with containing the disease of dependence so that it does not infect the deserving poor. 
He calls for “social lepers” to be placed “under the care of the State in workhouses.”134 
Dependency is like a disease calling for quarantine: “Every drunken vagabond or lazy 
idler supported by alms bestowed by wealthy people is a source of moral infection to a 
neighborhood.”135 He does not share Spencer’s belief that such people should be left to 
fend for themselves, but he fears that their improvident habits will influence other 	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members of the working class. Curiously, Carnegie does not countenance the possibility 
of this influence going in the opposite direction. Separating the “social lepers” from the 
industrious poor precludes any redeeming influence that the latter may have on the 
former. He gives no explanation for why this influence can only be negative, but it is safe 
to assume that the logic of “survival of the fittest,” which he borrowed from Spencer, led 
him to view the unfittest as obstacles to progress.  
 Carnegie’s “Gospel of Wealth” essays were published in the widely circulated 
North American Review and directed towards a popular audience. He sought to justify the 
status quo of extreme concentration of wealth by giving wealth a noble moral purpose. 
On his telling, the wealthy are temporary trustees of their fortunes, which they are to 
administer for the good of the community. It is this focus on communal goods that 
distinguishes Carnegie’s thinking from that of Spencer and Sumner. He shares their 
criticism of paternalistic government, but his solution to this problem is the paternalism 
of the market. He clearly believes in large scale assistance to aid community 
development, but he expects the market to produce the wealthy benefactors who are 
responsible for this public investment. Carnegie envisions a new aristocracy of wealthy 
benefactors that will provide the community with the public resources that it needs. 
Considering this prescription, one wonders if the “fittest”—being forged in the fires of 
individualistic competition and accumulating wealth with complete abandon—will 
abandon their own self-interest and fulfill their duty to the community as Carnegie 
suggests. 
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CONCLUSION 
In less than a century after its appearance, laissez faire had gone from a 
revolutionary and slightly subversive doctrine to a concept that was deployed to defend 
the status quo. The Physiocrats and Adam Smith argued that laissez faire would benefit 
the common consumer by dismantling the political favoritism that led to wasteful 
monopolies. However, in the United States, as early as 1840, businessmen began to argue 
that laissez faire was the best way to ensure prosperity, and they looked to the 
Constitution as the guarantor of property rights.136 By the 1880’s, laissez faire had been 
largely sanctioned by the US Supreme Court, which used the “due process clause” of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down numerous legislative proposals aimed at 
regulating and controlling large corporations and trusts on the grounds that such 
proposals violated property rights.137 Legal scholars identify the period between 1880 and 
1930 as the “era of laissez-faire constitutionalism.”138 In the famous case of Lochner v. 
New York the Supreme Court struck down a New York state law that restricted the 
number of hours that a bakers were allowed to work. The court viewed this as a form of 
favoritism of employees over employers: “Liberty of contract relating to labor includes 
both parties to it; the one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell labor.”139 This 
reasoning was so similar to Spencer’s own defense of freedom of contract that Oliver 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, 87. 
137 Benedict, “Laissez-Faire and Liberty,” 294.  
138 Ibid., 295-6. Benedict points out that even conservative Justices like William 
Rehnquist considered this application of laissez faire to Supreme Court decisions during 
this period to be an example of “judicial activism.” 
139 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1906). 
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Wendell Holmes responded in his dissent: “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact 
Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”140  
A strict policy of laissez faire was never adopted by the United States Congress 
during the Gilded Age, despite the dire warnings issued by Spencer, Sumner, and 
Carnegie. Laissez faire had its most potent impact in the courts. Critical observers, most 
noticeably Henry Demarest Lloyd, saw the teachings of laissez faire being used as a lens 
through which to interpret the law of the land. The proper role of government was now 
more than an academic question because laissez faire thinking was deployed by the 
Supreme Court to strike down legislative reforms.  
Proponents of reform and critics of laissez faire were on the losing side of the 
battle during this period of laissez faire constitutionalism. Fine notes that during this time 
“the laissez faire views of academic and popular theorists and of practical businessmen 
were translated from theory into practice.”141 In remaining chapters, I will examine the 
ways laissez faire critics challenged the theoretical foundation of laissez faire. They 
rejected the idea of a natural order by pointing to evidence that economic relations were 
not necessarily harmonious or beneficent. They also revisited the idea of individual self-
interest and questioned its applicability to an economy based upon industrial cooperation. 
Many critics emphasized the other features of human psychology and character, which 
accompany self-interest. Smith had similarly identified an array of “sentiments” that 
tempered the sentiment of self-interest. Critics also questioned the notion of individual 
liberty defined as security of property rights. There was a growing sense that this vision 	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of liberty unfairly advantaged people who owned the most property and afforded little 
benefit to those who owned little. Finally, reformers challenged the belief that the 
distribution of wealth was a fair outcome of a meritocratic process. Competition, they 
argued, was not a fair contest between honest individuals, but a ruthless environment 
where wealthy combinations dominated small entrepreneurs.  
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CHAPTER 5 — HENRY DEMAREST LLOYD: CRITIC, POLEMICIST, 
REFORMER 
 
The reformer of to-day is simply he who, with quicker ear, detecting that another 
change of heart is going on, goes before.    
— Henry Demarest Lloyd, Wealth Against Commonwealth 
 
 
 Although he was an original thinker who made an important contribution to 
political and social thought in the United States, Henry Demarest Lloyd was more a 
journalist-cum-social theorist than an academic. Academic economists who belonged to 
the reform-minded American Economics Association as well as political scientists 
criticized his most accomplished work, Wealth Against Commonwealth, as 
“unscholarly.”1 In fact, Lloyd was not a neutral or dispassionate observer of events. His 
writing is glaringly polemical and moralistic. Yet, herein lies Lloyd’s true significance as 
a critic of laissez faire. He was not primarily concerned with formulating a scholarly 
economic critique of capitalism and laissez faire; the task to which Lloyd set himself was 
much more ambitious. Lloyd wanted to use his writing to effect a moral regeneration in 
the United States. He believed that the moral outlook of most Americans was shaped by 
the selfish, individualistic ethic of laissez faire capitalism, and he considered this to be an 
antiquated moral system. Lloyd argued that the American industrial community was more 
suited to an ethic of cooperation and mutual concern rather than self-interest and mutual 
suspicion. 	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 Lloyd was quite familiar with the teachings of classical political economy, and he 
used this familiarity to full effect in his attempt to undermine the intellectual basis of 
laissez faire. While attending Columbia College, he was supportive of the “Manchester 
School” with its emphasis on laissez faire and free trade.2 After his graduation from 
Columbia Law School in 1869, he went to work for the “Free Trade League”—an 
organization “advancing the interests of New York’s importing and shipping businesses” 
by opposing Horace Greely’s protectionist program.3 He wrote articles in the League’s 
publication, The Free Trader, supporting the principles of orthodox political economy, 
and he gave a series of lectures criticizing protectionism.4 His affiliation with the League 
was short-lived, and he took a position at the Chicago Tribune in 1872, making a name 
for himself by writing literary criticism.5 Having been appointed to the position of 
financial editor in 1873 during a drastic post-war economic downturn, he became 
acquainted with questionable business practices, and by 1877, he began to question the 
teachings of orthodox political economy.6 From that point on, he would maintain that the 
teachings of classical political economy were largely responsible for unethical business 
practices, concentrated wealth, and widespread poverty. Due to his familiarity with 
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3 Turner, “Henry Demarest Lloyd and Business Ethics,” 55. 
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Declaration of Independence. 
5 Ibid., 75. 
6 Ibid., 93-8. 
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economic science and actual business practices, Lloyd was ideally placed to assess the 
effects of laissez faire.   
 Lloyd argues that the science of political economy is ill-suited to deal with the 
most important economic problems of the day.  
We feel ourselves caught in a whirl of new forces, and flung forward every day a  
step farther into the future dim with portents of struggle between Titans reared on  
steam, electricity and credit. It is an unfortunate moment for the breakdown of the  
science that claimed to be able to reconcile self-interest with the harmony of  
interests.7 
 
The new phenomenon of industrial production is accompanied by a host of new and 
unprecedented problems. Lloyd argues that the science of political economy, and the 
laissez faire policy that it recommends, has lost its relevance considering the host of new 
problems that emerged during the Gilded Age. “Laissez-faire theories of politics and 
political economy are useless in the treatment of the labor question, in the regulation of 
railroads, sanitary and educational government, and a multitude of similar questions.”8 
His writing seeks to expose the inadequacies of laissez faire in respect to the new 
industrial economy, and in so doing, to chart a path for a more appropriate and 
serviceable moral outlook to match the modern industrial economy. 
 My aim in this chapter is to present and explicate Lloyd’s criticism of laissez faire 
and his proposed alternative for moral revival. The analysis begins with Lloyd’s critical 
appraisal of classical economic theory, which constitutes the intellectual edifice of laissez 
faire. He challenges nearly every feature of the “natural order” advanced by classical 
economic theory. Lloyd calls into question the accuracy of an economic model that is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Lloyd, “The Political Economy of Seventy-Three Million Dollars,” 51. 
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largely abstract and that he believes does not apply to actual economic practices. Equally 
important, Lloyd highlights the moral implications of this theoretical model, which 
emphasizes self-interest, competition, and acquisitiveness. His extensive focus on the 
theory that undergirds laissez faire is prompted by his belief that ideas have an 
independent influence on events. He invariably roots his criticisms of the current 
economic order in the thinking of philosophers and economists to show that prevailing 
beliefs and practices are a product of the tradition of ideas that we inherit. Lloyd sought 
to reform these beliefs and practices by way of criticizing the theory that supports them. 
 Following Lloyd’s overall critique of classical economic theory, I present his 
concerns that laissez faire capitalism results in political problems such as social unrest 
and government corruption. He fears that the increasing destitution of the wage-earners 
will result in social unrest and upheaval as employers pursue their own interests at the 
expense of their employers. Lloyd also believes that the policy of laissez faire gives the 
forces of wealth and big business excessive influence and control over the political 
system. Some industries are so large and influential that they have effectively escaped 
public control and oversight. Lloyd argues that a policy of laissez faire in the era of 
industrial combinations essentially surrenders the public interest to the private interests of 
a very small minority. 
 I conclude with an examination of Lloyd’s proposal for moral and political 
reform. He sketches an alternative vision of human nature and society that serves as the 
basis for his recommended moral reform. This vision is one of a reciprocal relationship 
between the individual and society that replaces the atomistic theory of society, which 
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characterizes laissez faire. He also constructs a moral alternative to the “ethical 
individualism” of laissez faire, which he calls the “new conscience.” The “new 
conscience” is Lloyd’s idea of a moral alternative to laissez faire that is better suited to 
the cooperative nature of the industrial economy. He also proposes to extend the 
teachings of this “new conscience” to the political arena so that the public can reclaim the 
power of government from the forces of wealth and to institute a cooperative 
commonwealth. 
 
LLOYD’S CRITIQUE OF LAISSEZ FAIRE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
 Lloyd has a reputation as a muckraker—an investigator who illustrates and 
exposes the harsh realties of the working poor.9 His writing is a combination of carefully 
documented reporting to expose the damaging effects of industrial capitalism and soaring 
rhetoric containing optimistic solutions and promises of future progress. In respect to the 
former, Lloyd’s journalistic approach led him to base his investigations on the facts of 
economic relations. His exposés display an impressive array of evidence spanning court 
proceedings, records of corporate meetings, private correspondence, earnings reports, and 
testimony from figures on the sides of labor and management. When he released his most 
famous work, Wealth Against Commonwealth, documenting the efforts of Standard Oil to 
stifle competition and establish a monopoly, Standard Oil hired investigative writers in an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Destler, Empire of Reform, 354. Destler argues that Lloyd’s “pioneering 
journalism” of the 1880’s set the stage for the muckraking journalists who rose to 
prominence around the turn of the century. For an excellent description of how the frenzy 
for muckraking “revolutionized” journalism between 1900 and 1912, see: Hofstadter, The 
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unsuccessful attempt to identify the factual errors in his reporting.10 This effort failed as 
John D. Rockefeller refused to meet Lloyd in person and defend himself against the 
charges.11  
 Lloyd used this journalistic, fact-based approach as a distinct alternative to the 
abstract approach adopted by supporters of laissez faire. He objected to the ease with 
which political economists and other academics resorted to abstract naturalistic laws to 
address real social and economic problems. Laissez faire defenders such as William 
Graham Sumner and academic economists “are suffering for facts” and rely instead upon 
assumptions and the hypotheses derived from these assumptions.12 Lloyd believes this 
approach severely limits the scope of economic investigation. Political economy, with its 
deductive and abstract approach, tends toward a reductionist account of society.  
They begin with the highly “scientific” method of “isolation,” and discuss society 
as only an economic organism—of self-interest—eliminating its other forces and 
facts of the moment. Next, they forget that the elimination was only a logical 
device setting aside part of the facts to concentrate attention on the other, and 
finally they end by denying altogether that these eliminated forces have any part 
to play in the mechanism.13  
 
His description of political economy emphasizes the abstract rationalistic approach to 
knowledge that has existed since the Physiocrats and Adam Smith based their own 
investigations upon an “order of nature” which conformed to abstract laws. He considers 
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this self-contained, abstract theoretical approach to be “a structure reared with syllogistic 
brick on imaginary foundations.”14 
 Lloyd is dismayed that political economy is not suited to explain the workings of 
the modern industrial capitalism. He draws a connection between the abstract character of 
economic theory and its inability to countenance novel phenomena. Political economy is 
not treated as “an investigation to be pursued in the laboratory of facts, but as a body of 
settled truths, revealed by teachers, and to be applied as a universal solvent.”15 Lloyd 
seems to provide a caricature of political economy by suggesting that students fail to 
move beyond the stale doctrines of their former teachers. This conception leads him to 
dismiss political economy as an “apostolic science” rather than a useful science that can 
help us understand economic reality.16 As an alternative, he points to the historical and 
empirical approach of German economists, whom he considers more nuanced and 
independent than their American counterparts. “Germany has a school called the political 
economists of the chair. America has the political economist of the pigeon-hole.”17  
 Lloyd scrutinizes political economists because he considers their support of 
laissez faire to be based upon scientific pretensions and moral ambivalence. “They 
claimed to be teachers of science, that is, of things that are. They turned out to be teachers 
both of what is not and ought not to be. They are neither scientific nor moral.”18 By 	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clinging to the notion of an abstract natural order, political economists close themselves 
off from the moral significance of free competition. With characteristic hyperbole, Lloyd 
describes the laws of political economy as “murderous” in some instances, and he 
complains that these laws are nevertheless treated as benign by political economists.19 
Besides simply being amoral, the laws of political economy are ahistorical as well. Lloyd 
argues that the laws pertaining to economic relations change and evolve along with the 
habits and attitudes of people.20 Defenders of laissez faire tend to argue that government 
intervention upsets the natural working of economic laws. Lloyd rejects this impersonal 
and abstract depiction of “laws” that explain human behavior. Political economists did 
not discover these laws, according to Lloyd, they created them. “In social science the 
‘laws’ that rule men are the laws that men make.”21 He believes these laws are outdated 
and useless. They serve only to shackle communities to policies of laissez faire by 
positing a “natural order” that is permanent and unchanging. Lloyd also believes that 
these laws militate against reform efforts and new modes of investigation. “When the 
alarm was raised by a few scouts who thought it better political economy to record new 
facts than to thresh over old theories, the public was given the soothing syrup of the let-
alone philosophers.”22 
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Scarcity or Abundance? 
 
 One prevalent feature of the abstract “natural order” advanced by political 
economists is the idea of scarce resources as a constant feature of human existence. 
Parson Malthus provided a theory of population growth in which resources become 
increasingly scarce in relation to the overall population. David Ricardo argued, along 
similar lines, that the population of agricultural laborers would outgrow the amount of 
available land, leading to ever-increasing rent charged by landowners.23 Taken together, 
Malthus and Ricardo had established a theoretical relationship in which resources would 
become increasingly scarce relative to a growing population. Laissez faire proponents 
such as Spencer and Sumner deployed Malthus’s “law” to establish resource scarcity as a 
permanent condition of society itself. Spencer and Sumner argued that resource scarcity 
actually benefits human society because it forces individuals to compete. By placing the 
emphasis on scarcity of resources, Spencer and Sumner dismissed social legislation and 
poor laws as a waste of resources on individuals who were not fit to compete. However, 
if the defining characteristic of industrial capitalism is abundance, rather than scarcity, 
the logical basis of the competitive struggle for existence posited by Spencer and Sumner 
is at best problematic, and at worst, completely false. 
 Like many other reform-minded thinkers of the time, Lloyd thought that 
industrialization had made resources abundant. The influential antebellum political 
economist and social theorist Henry Carey had rejected the pessimistic assessments of 
Ricardo and Malthus, in which population growth would eclipse economic productivity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers, 94-5. 
	   109 
leaving the population to compete for an increasingly small surplus of goods.24 Henry 
George, the author of the widely read Progress and Poverty, similarly argued that the 
notion of “natural scarcity” did not comport with facts. George argued that the industrial 
revolution had made the availability of farmland and natural resources less important 
because cooperative markets for exchange had replaced agriculture as the primary force 
of production.25 George viewed industrial production as a “social resource” relying on 
cooperative association in the marketplace to produce an abundance of material goods.26 
By conceptualizing land as a space for establishing commerce and markets, rather than 
strictly a site for agricultural production and a store of natural resources, George called 
into question the thesis that scarce natural resources and restricted availability to land was 
the cause of poverty. 
Although Lloyd vehemently rejected Carey’s doctrine of the “harmony of 
interests” as well as George’s proposal for a “single tax” on rent, he agreed that 
abundance, rather than scarcity, was the result of social evolution. He credits the 
“unsuffering labours of machinery” with advances in productive abilities that far outstrip 
pre-industrial societies.27 For this reason, he believed that abundant resources 
characterized society in the Gilded Age. “The world, enriched by thousands of 
generations of toilers and thinkers, has reached a fertility which can give every human 
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being a plenty undreamed of even in the Utopias.”28 Lloyd’s challenge was to 
demonstrate how and why so many large sections of the population did not share in this 
abundance. He states this emphatically at the outset in Wealth Against Commonwealth: 
“Nature is rich; but everywhere man, the heir of nature, is poor.”29 Lloyd believes that 
scarcity is not a result of our limited ability to extract resources from nature, but of an 
artificial process in which large businesses restrict the supply of goods to turn greater 
profits.  
 Lloyd argues that industries have gained such control over the productive and 
distributive forces on the economy that they are able to control the flow of goods and 
services so that there is always a condition of scarcity. Industries limit production to 
artificially inflate the price of goods in order to generate greater profits. Lloyd argues that 
industrial combinations “declare war against plenty,” and by conspiring to limit 
production, “they imitate the policy of scarcity.”30 Rather than competing to flood the 
market with cheap goods, large industries conspire, collude, and combine to ensure that 
prices and profits remain high. “In a society which has the wherewithal to cover, fatten, 
and cheer everyone, Lords of Industry are acquiring the power to pool the profits of 
scarcity and decree famine.”31 In one of his earliest pieces of journalistic exposure, “The 
Story of a Great Monopoly,” Lloyd describes, in vivid imagery, farmers with vast stores 
of wheat that they are unable to sell because of manipulation by futures markets and 	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30 Lloyd, “Lords of Industry,” 143, and Wealth Against Commonwealth, 153. 
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conspiratorial control of railroad shipping rates.32 Production is actually abundant, but 
many sellers are unable to bring their goods to market because of the various attempts by 
syndicates to “corner” the market for certain goods.33 This once again shows how Lloyd 
resorted to factual reporting to show that abstract theories, like Malthus’s Law, are 
divorced from the reality of economic relations. Spencer and Sumner lauded the benefits 
of resource scarcity because  it ensured competition and survival of the fittest. On 
Lloyd’s telling, industrialists discovered that they could subvert competition and maintain 
a situation of scarce resources even when natural resources are abundant.  
Lloyd documents numerous cases of industries engaging in anti-competitive 
practices by underselling smaller competitors. The most famous case of such practices 
was Standard Oil’s attempt to monopolize oil production throughout the United States. 
Lloyd argues that oil was abundant and inexpensive in the period between 1850 and 1870 
with “numerous independent producers and refiners.”34 Displaying his prowess for 
detailed journalistic exposure, Lloyd, along with Ida Tarbell, documents Standard Oil’s 
systematic attempt to undermine and co-opt all of these smaller producers. Once they had 
gained sufficient control over the supply and distribution, “they made oil poor, scarce, 
and dear.”35  
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The issue of scarcity is relevant to any debate over laissez faire especially because 
of the importance placed upon it by Spencer and Sumner. Both thinkers argued that 
scarcity logically entailed competition between and among individuals and that 
competition is the engine of progress. Lloyd’s argument is that resource scarcity is not a 
factual assessment of resource availability or productive capabilities. Instead, Spencer 
and Sumner look at the competitive practices of individuals abstractly and remotely 
through the lens of Malthus’s pessimistic analysis. In their attempt to find natural laws 
that are applicable to economics and society, they overlook the possibility that scarcity is 
artificial rather than natural. Lloyd’s criticism of Malthusian logic also undermines the 
social Darwinists’ argument that competition is the natural and necessary result of 
resource scarcity. By showing that scarcity in a modern industrial economy is man-made, 
not natural, Lloyd opens the possibility that competition between individuals is not 
necessary and unavoidable as social Darwinists suggest. 
 
Competition and Combination 
 
Lloyd, having been a member of the Free Trade League as a young man, 
possessed a firm understanding of classical political economy, and he was especially 
attentive to the importance of free competition as a feature of the abstract “natural order” 
that underlies their theories. “All the machinery of the abstract political economist is 
driven by the force of competition.”36 He argues that political economists are so fixated 
on competition as an essential feature of their abstract theoretical models, they are unable 	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to account for other economic forces that are anti-competitive. Instead, they portray the 
state as the main threat to free competition, and they suggest laissez faire as the policy 
that ensures a competitive market. Lloyd argues that competition has been supplanted by 
new economic forces like combination, speculation, and high finance. “We go on 
repeating, as if we were back in the days of Adam Smith, the formulas of competition, as 
the protector of society and the individual. We cry Competition, Competition! But there 
is no competition.”37 He places most of the blame for this mistaken belief in competition 
on political economists who are so devoted to the policy of laissez faire that they cannot 
account for new disruptive forces in the market. “By neglecting the other forces, from 
sympathy to monopoly the abstract political economist deduces principles which fit no 
realities and has to neglect those realities for which we need principles most.”38 Lloyd 
focuses on two specific modern economic forces that act counter to the force of 
competition: combination and speculation. 
 The economic phenomenon to which Lloyd devoted the most attention was 
combination or monopoly. His early writings, which revealed the extent of monopolistic 
practices in industry, established him as a leading critic of industrial capitalism, and his 
seminal work, Wealth Against Commonwealth, acquainted a generation of public officials 
with the problem of monopoly.39 Lloyd argues repeatedly that competition, as an 	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economic force, is being increasingly displaced by combination. “The change from 
competition to combination is nothing less than one of those revolutions which march 
through history with giant strides.”40 He treats competition as an historical phenomenon 
that was a temporary stage in the evolution of society. Competition had once taken the 
place of “mediaeval contrivances and regulations,” and combination is now taking the 
place of competition.41 In the modern industrial economy, the size and scale of some 
industries, their ability to combine and consolidate, allows them to smother smaller 
competitors.  
 Surveying the economic terrain of the Gilded Age, Lloyd noticed that most 
industries were entering pools, syndicates, and conspiracies in order to fix prices, limit 
supply, and control production. None of this was countenanced by political economists 
who insisted on competition as permanent feature of the economy. Lloyd argues that 
Standard Oil has not achieved unprecedented success by virtue of their “great business 
capacity” but by “conspiracy with the railroads” and an overall “genius for monopoly.”42 
“This corporation has driven into bankruptcy or out of business, or into union with itself, 
all of the petroleum refineries of the country except five in New York, and a few of little 
consequence in Western Pennsylvania.”43 He also cites the example of railroad “pools,” 
conspiratorial agreements between companies to fix prices, as examples of “combinations 
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to prevent competition.”44 Any small or independent oil producers cannot meaningfully 
compete against monopolies such as Standard oil, which controls a large portion of oil 
refineries and has conspiratorial agreements with railroad pools to restrict distribution. 
“The Standard,” as Lloyd dubiously refers to the oil giant, “produces only one fiftieth or 
sixtieth of our petroleum, but dictates the price of all and refines nine tenths.”45 
Consumers stand on the losing side as Standard oil prevents competitors from bringing 
their products to market and eliminates the competitive need to provide high-quality 
products at low prices. 
 By arguing that combination rather than competition was the primary means for 
economic success, Lloyd develops a critique of the Spencer’s doctrine of “survival of the 
fittest.” Spencer depicted the competitive market as a meritocratic environment in which 
the most industrious and prudent individuals gain a greater share of available resources 
than those who are indolent and improvident. Lloyd argues that, since competition has 
given way to combination as the greatest economic force, success is not indicative of 
one’s skills in individual competition. “The ‘fittest’ in the trade world are those who have 
learned the magic art of the manufacture of prices.”46 Although Carnegie would object to 
Lloyd’s characterization of wealthy industrialists as “criminal rich,” he does admit that 
this new breed of industrialists has a talent for administration that is distinct from the 
talents of individual entrepreneurs.47 Lloyd also highlights the fact that the success of 	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large industries is also in part due to political contacts and connections, a fact that 
Carnegie conveniently overlooks when extolling the virtues of the “law of competition.” 
In order to show that survival of the fittest is not based strictly on individual talents, 
Lloyd points to the fact that some large producers get rebates from railroads due to their 
political influence. “Many other men had thrift, sobriety, industry, but only these [large 
producers] had the rebate, and so only these are the ‘fittest in the struggle for 
existence.’”48 By Lloyd’s telling, economic success is not a product of individual 
competitive skills operating in a meritocratic market; it is a product of administrative 
skills operating in a faux market that shows favoritism to large and powerful entities. 
 Along with combination, Lloyd identifies speculation as a new force that 
overpowers honest competition. Speculation had been widespread and controversial in 
the United States since the colonial period. Speculators bought large swaths of land on 
the expanding western frontier, and this speculative boom revealed a class division 
between independent yeoman farmers and wealthy “absentee landholders.”49 “Eastern 
speculators consolidated control over larger and lager tracts of the most fertile western 
land, while hardscrabble settlers faced increasing destitution.”50 Speculators also bought 
large quantities of Revolutionary War bonds that had been issued by the states and sold to 
citizens. As it appeared that the states would be unable to honor these debts, bondholders 
sold their holdings to speculators for a fraction of the original value. When Treasury 
Secretary Hamilton suggested that the Federal government assume all state debts and 	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repay all bondholders in full, Jefferson and other skeptical observers noted that this 
amounted to a windfall for speculators who had exploited a dire fiscal crisis brought on 
by the war for independence.51 Americans were also loath to consider speculation as a 
noble or even legitimate enterprise because speculation is not based upon labor or 
production. Sklansky has shown that Americans during the Revolutionary period thought 
economic value and private property were based upon productive labor.52 From this 
perspective, speculation is suspect because it requires no actual productive labor. In the 
case of war bonds, speculators were actually reaping a profit by buying bonds that had 
been purchased by farmers and other productive laborers. To gain a profit from 
speculation, one does not need to employ labor or produce anything; one only needs 
capital and good timing. 
 Lloyd argues that by the 1880’s speculation had taken on a new importance as 
speculative exchanges like the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) allowed investors to buy 
“futures” in a vast array of commodities. Lloyd points out that Adam Smith predicted that 
agricultural products such as wheat could not become monopolized or totally controlled 
by wealthy merchants because “its owners can never be collected in one place.”53 The 
CBT created a market for speculators and opened the possibility that wealthy capitalists 
could in effect gather in one place and thus exert control over the market price for 
commodities. Speculative exchanges like the CBT, in Lloyd’s view, allow wealthy 	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investors to control prices and manipulate supply without controlling the means of 
production and distribution as Standard Oil and other industrial monopolies have done. 
The ultimate effect of this development is that consumers end up paying higher prices for 
goods as speculators buy the futures cheap and sell the products dear. “As wheat rises, 
flour rises; and when flour becomes dear, through manipulation, it is the blood of the 
poor that flows into the treasury of the syndicate.”54 
Lloyd argues that “the dance of speculation” that characterizes the CBT has taken 
over the productive process as the determinate of the value of goods.55 His argument is 
that these elusive, intangible, and largely inaccessible exchanges have gained more 
importance than the tangible process of production by which independent producers earn 
their living. “The prices of the speculative wheat and the spectral hog of the Board fix 
those of real wheat and the actual hog of the field.”56 Such a relationship between futures 
and actual market goods is mysterious, but not necessarily exploitative. However, Lloyd 
argues that the futures market allows speculators to “corner” the market for certain 
commodities and manipulate prices. The CBT “can put the combination of rich men in 
instant possession of the crop that is in market and of contract for all that is to come.”57 
Once these speculators successfully corner a commodity they are able to dictate when 
and where it is to be sold in order to maximize their return. On Lloyd’s telling, there is no 
longer a competitive market for agricultural commodities in which farmers compete with 	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one another. This market has been surmounted by “the criminal rich . . . who are to-day 
degrading competition into a rivalry of adulteration and seizing upon them for speculative 
purposes.”58 
By way of criticism, Lloyd showed how these amorphous and abstract exchanges 
affect actual people who are producing and selling these commodities.  
These corners put prices down when the farmers want to sell, and put them up  
when the miller needs to buy. They exaggerate gambling by intensifying the  
fluctuations in price and they cripple legitimate business.”59 
 
So great is the influence of wealth, according to Lloyd, that actual farmers and 
husbandmen are beholden to speculative agreements forged among participants in the 
CBT, who will never observe the process of production or actually handle the 
commodities that they have purchased. In a striking instance from Wealth Against 
Commonwealth, Lloyd relates the attempt by the city of Toledo to finance and develop 
their own natural gas infrastructure rather than sell all rights to Standard Oil. When the 
city issued “natural gas bonds” to finance a pipeline, “the agents of the Standard Oil 
Company” used their extensive reach in the financial sector to discourage any investors 
from buying the bonds.60 “The officials of this free city [were] compelled to sneak around 
in the open money market under cover . . . seeking buyers for its bonds as if they were 
stolen goods!”61 Lloyd uses this case as yet another example of how the laws of political 
economy and the regulating force of competition do not match reality. “What a picture of 	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‘high finance,’ of the ‘beneficent interplay of the forces of supply and demand,’ of the 
‘marvelous perfection’ with which capital moves under ‘natural laws’ to carry its 
fertilizing influences where they are most needed!”62 In this instance, Standard Oil was 
able to gain an advantage over the municipality of Toledo, not through honest 
competition, but through a conspiracy to restrict financing of their own oil resources. 
 
Individualism and Self-interest 
 
Lloyd also believes that the “natural order” of classical political economy is based 
upon a misunderstanding of the relationship between the individual and society. He 
argues that the teachings of classical political economy place undue emphasis on the 
autonomous individual at the expense of society as a whole. Lloyd thinks that individuals 
actualize their true potential only in social relationships of interdependence. “Men in 
juxtaposition must associate. A multitude must always become a society, a collection of 
friends, or—separate, in anarchy or despotism—decay.”63 His concern is that an opposing 
spirit of atomism and unbridled self-interest is working against this natural tendency for 
association.  
 But the new power, the new temptation, the new immunity of the new world of  
wealth where men and women and children have been thrown together pell mell, 
have waked the sleeping furies. In this new crowd the restraints of the home spirit 
and the community spirit are thrown off. All are strangers. Everyone is to take 
what he can get. The motto is Laissez Faire, Laissez Aller. Do what you will. Go 
where you will.64 	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Although he offers a generous translation the famous maxim, Lloyd correctly identifies 
laissez faire as the popular expression of this atomistic conception of society. His extends 
the logic of laissez faire to what he takes to be an individual ethic of “do what you will,” 
and this ethic treats all individuals as “strangers.”  
 For Lloyd, this focus on the individual is not completely unrealistic, but it is only 
half of the picture. He frequently argues in favor of a society that supports and 
encourages individuality, but he believes we must always evaluate individuality from the 
perspective of the overall community. This is especially true in economic relations 
because the effects of economic activities vary among individuals, and the effects on 
individuals are different from the effects on the overall community. Lloyd argues that 
“the point of view of the whole society” is “the only true economic point of view.”65 
Only from the perspective of society as a whole does one appreciate that some individual 
benefits such as a wider variety of inexpensive goods come “at the cost of want, 
bankruptcy, and loss of hopes to others.”66 Lloyd insists that our conception of the 
individual must be related to a social setting in which the needs and hopes of other 
individuals are in play. “The perfect self-interest of the perfect individual is an admirable 
conception, but it is still individual, and the world is social.”67 Lloyd tends to laud the 
forces that connect individuals to others, such as love, and he criticizes the forces that 
separate individuals from one another, such as self-interest. His posthumously published 	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collection of essays, Man, The Social Creator, is an elaborate attempt to establish social 
love and cooperation as forces of human progress and to characterize self-interest as a 
regressive force. 
 It is not merely the atomism and individualistic focus of classical political 
economists that draws Lloyd’s ire. He challenges their model of human nature in which 
self-interest is the primary, if not the exclusive, explanation of economic behavior. “The 
political economist thinks he has made the world simple by throwing away sympathy. 
But he has only made it impossible.”68 True to their abstract theoretical approach, 
political economists reduce human nature to convenient assumptions. Lloyd has no 
patience for “deductive economists” who “waste good lives elaborating hypotheses 
assuming the supremacy of self-interest and competition.”69 Lloyd does not deny the 
existence of self-interest; what he objects to is that political economists reduce human 
nature to this one instinct and imply that pursuit of self-interest is an ethical imperative 
for the individual. This imperative goes back to the “ethical individualism” first 
developed by the Physiocrats. 
 Classical political economists also lend credence to the policy of laissez faire by 
positing self-interest as a harmonizing productive force in the economic order. “The main 
doctrine of industry since Adam Smith has been the fallacy that the self-interest of the 
individual was a sufficient guide to the welfare of the individual and society.”70 Lloyd’s 
tactic for refuting Smith’s theory is not to dismiss it, but to historicize it. He views 	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Smith’s theory as “a temporary formula for a passing problem” rather than a timeless 
law.71 Industrialization has created a novel economic situation in which self-interest can 
be destructive and even contrary to Smith’s “system of perfect liberty.” Lloyd believes 
that the most common expression of self-interest in the industrial economy is monopoly. 
“Business motivated by the self-interest of the individual runs into monopoly at every 
point it touches social life . . . . Monopoly is business at the end of its journey.”72 Living 
in an age of combination and consolidation, Lloyd realized that would-be competitors, no 
matter how great their degree of self-interest, could not meaningfully compete with 
industrial monopolies. Monopolies such as Standard Oil reveal that self-interest can lead 
powerful industries to disrupt production and distribution, arbitrarily raise prices, and 
bankrupt competitors in efforts to ensure higher profits.  
 Even though Lloyd rejects the “old self-interest” of Adam Smith, he relies upon 
Smith to demonstrate that his successors have stripped away the nuanced portrait that he 
painted of human psychology. “Their master, Adam Smith, grasped both sides of social 
science and wrote a theory of moral sentiment to add the philosophy sympathy to that of 
self-interest in his ‘Wealth of Nations.’”73 Lloyd believes that the exclusive focus on self-
interest diminishes the importance of the competing aspects of human psychology, and in 
so doing, it encourages people to pursue their own self-interest and eschew sympathy for 
others. It is striking how Lloyd, writing mostly about the actual economic practices and 
beliefs of his contemporaries, places the blame on intellectuals and philosophers for 	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mistaken beliefs and untoward business practices. “The capitalist who says that business 
is business merely puts into action the mistake of the philosopher who first isolated, then 
forgot, and at last denied, the existence of the sympathetic forces of political economy.”74 
In Lloyd’s view, self-interest is accompanied by the force of sympathy which he 
alternatively refers to as “love,” “altruism,” “self-sacrifice,” or “conscience.”75 Human 
behavior is influenced by both of these sentiments, but laissez faire proponents treat self-
interest as the only relevant sentiment.  
 It is clear that Lloyd thought the classical economic model of human nature was 
incorrect from a scientific standpoint, but he also considered it to be morally problematic 
as well. “The whole basis of modern industrial society, and that is to say the whole social 
basis, rests upon the cynical skepticism that conscience and business cannot be 
reconciled.”76 Businessmen are encouraged to sublimate their sympathetic tendencies to 
an amoral, hedonistic rationality. Lloyd believes this attitude exacerbates the atomistic 
detachment of individuals from their fellow citizens. Business ethics is informed by the 
“false theory that men cease to be brothers when they buy and sell.”77 By asserting the 
primacy of self-interest in economic affairs, laissez faire theorists have established the 
market as an amoral meeting place for self-interested individuals. For Lloyd, amoral 
behavior is a gateway to positively immoral business practices. 
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 Lloyd also laments the fact that self-interest is applauded and that wealthy 
industrialists are treated as celebrities with special talents. Spencer, Sumner and Carnegie 
all argued that the competitive economic struggle was a fair environment and that the 
uneven distribution of wealth was a result of “survival of the fittest.” Much like Veblen, 
Lloyd recognized that the “fittest” possessed a specific quality that was particular to their 
environment. 
 It means that among the cruel, the cruelest; among the mean, the meanest; among  
the greedy, the greediest; among the selfish, the most selfish will survive. The 
phrase and the doctrine it covers leave unchallenged the power of man to change 
the social environment so that a better kind of fittest shall survive.78 
 
Lloyd points out that this use of the term “fittest” is anything but a moral assessment—a 
point which is conceded by Sumner.79 Lloyd argues that many of the “fittest” in terms of 
wealth would be “equally eminent as leaders in good works” if they found themselves in 
an environment that encouraged selflessness or altruism.80 One will recall that Carnegie 
conflated these two types of fitness as he maintained that the skills for industrial 
organization were the same set of skills that qualified the wealthy for administering their 
wealth for public purposes. Lloyd does not argue that the wealthy are incapable of 
engaging in “good works.” His point is that the type of “fitness” they demonstrate in a 
selfish environment is antithetical the type of selfless behavior that encourages us to help 
the less fortunate. 	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 Lloyd also credited the prevalence of self-interest with oppressive and dishonest 
business practices. He considers the rapid advances in industry and finance to constitute a 
revolution, “and the gospel of the revolution is the doctrine that you can do anything with 
your fellow man provided you do it in the market.”81 By removing moral concerns from 
the market interactions and characterizing economic agents as strictly self-interested, 
laissez faire theorists have provided businessmen with justification for questionable 
practices. Lloyd believes that laissez faire thinking lends itself to “belligerent selfishness” 
in which large entities engage in coercive practices.82 He describes the relationship 
between selfishness and business practices as such: 
Syndicates, by one stroke, get the power of selling dear, on one side, and 
producing cheap on the other. Thus they keep themselves happy, prices high, and 
the people hungry. . . . The Syndicate has but to turn its screw and every neck 
begins to break. Prices paid to such interceptors are not an exchange of service; 
they are ransom paid by the people for their lives.83 
 
This type of market manipulation and exploitation of the powerless, according to Lloyd is 
the ultimate consequence of a system that relies upon only self-interest to provide 
benefits for all. 
 Charles Destler, one of Lloyd’s most thorough and admiring observers, takes note 
of Lloyd’s “keen appreciation of historical continuity and development,” which he may 
have derived from his familiarity with German philosophy and social thought, 
particularly the historical dialectic of Hegel.84 Indeed, Lloyd does treat the concepts and 	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“laws” of classical political economy as historical phenomena rather than timeless truths. 
He argues that the classical political economists saw primitive societies in which 
everyone was “scurrying about to get what he could,” and they assumed that self-interest 
was a permanent feature of human nature.85 He argues that the “principle” of self-interest 
put forth by “old fashion politics and political economy . . . . will go down in the records 
as one of the historic mistakes of humanity.”86 Lloyd actually concedes that such a view 
of human society as competitive and self-interested at all costs was appropriate at certain 
points in the past, but they are no longer applicable or useful in the modern industrial 
economy. Situating the “philosophy of self-interest” in its proper historical setting, he 
writes, “these were frontier morals” more suited to settlers taming the frontier than 
citizens in a modern industrial society.87 Lloyd clearly believes that historical progress 
involves greater cooperation. “The scrambling of mankind over each other for property is 
but a passing phase of the moon.”88 
 Lloyd’s solution to this reductive view of human nature is to acknowledge that 
human beings are self-interested but also to present competing sentiments that must be 
brought into harmony with self-interest. He identifies in human nature a tension, perhaps 
dialectical, between the sentiments of self-interest and sympathy: “Selfishness and 
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altruism, competition and socialism, will persist as long as the other persists. Progress is 
made up of their successive harmonizations.”89 One proposal for such “harmonization” is 
to break self-interest of its moorings to the individual by elevating it to the level of the 
community. Lloyd calls for replacing the primitive notion of individual self-interest with 
the more modern and civilized “self-interest of the whole.”90 Such “enlightened self-
interest” suggests that “when the individual has progressed to a perfect self-interest, there 
will be over and against it, acting and reacting with it, a corresponding perfect self-
interest of the community.”91 Lloyd believed that individual self-interest run amok acts 
against the interest of the community at large. Traditional laissez faire theorists assert the 
primacy of self-interest, and in some extreme cases they completely deny the existence of 
communal or societal interests. According to Lloyd, “the true laissez-faire is, let the 
individual do what the individual can do best, and let the community do what the 
community can do best.”92 This depiction of laissez faire is so dramatically different from 
the version presented by supporters that Lloyd seems to have misappropriated the phrase 
to suit his own purposes. Nevertheless, his insistence that self-interest must be tempered 
by selflessness and common concern for others is clearly an attempt to move beyond the 
model of “economic man” as rational creature motivated solely by self-interest. 
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Market Order and Market Chaos 
 
The forgoing discussion of Lloyd’s criticism of the abstract constructions of 
classical political economy demonstrates that he found the concepts and theories of 
economic thought to be both erroneous and harmful. The final aspect of this abstract 
intellectual edifice to come under Lloyd’s critical gaze is the concept of the market itself 
as an orderly and efficient environment which produces positive benefits for the overall 
community. He thinks that laissez faire is based upon the naïve and idealistic belief in the 
stabilizing force of the market. “In abstract political economy, wealth is the subject, 
desire of wealth the motive, competition the regulator, supply and demand the law, 
freedom of contract the condition, and equalization of rent wages and profits the result.”93 
For classical political economists and laissez faire proponents the market is part of the 
“natural order,” and the free play of self-interest and competition will maintain this order 
and maximize production. 
Lloyd rejects this view of the market as nostalgic hope packaged in a simplistic 
and normalizing theory. He contends that the modern market under industrial capitalism 
is a new phenomenon which is accompanied by unforeseen problems. 
The concentration of news, capital, and middle-men in a focus; steam, electricity, 
and credit; the specially modern means of finding out the “statistical situation”; 
the development of the corporation; the multiplication of huge private fortunes 
and their union in syndicates; and the lupine standard of business morality, make 
the modern market a thing new in development if not in kind.94 
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For Lloyd, the defining feature of this modern market is chaos rather than order. These 
new features of the market such as concentrated wealth and consolidation of industry 
produce unpredictable fluctuations in rents, wages and profits.  
 Employing his usual empirical approach to combat the abstract teachings of 
political economy, Lloyd documents the economic panics and labor unrest that result 
from the chaotic market. He writes of “the wrecks of panics and militant competition, the 
unemployed, the pauperised, the idle land, the shut-down machinery, the concentrated 
wealth, the luxury” that result from a policy of laissez faire.95 In Wealth Against 
Commonwealth he documents the disruptive effects of industrial combinations such as 
the South Improvement Company—a predecessor to market behemoths like Standard 
oil—which began monopolizing refining and distribution of oil as early as 1865.96 Less 
powerful independent producers grew increasingly worried as “the market for oil . . . 
began to move erratically, by incalculable influences.”97 Entrepreneurs, acting out of self-
interest and relying upon fair competition, found themselves at a severe disadvantage as 
the South Improvement Company conspired to corner the market. “There were panics in 
oil speculation, bank failures, defalcations. Many committed suicide. Hundreds were 
driven into bankruptcy and insane asylums.”98 With such examples, Lloyd was conveying 
to his audience that these panics, which occurred with alarming frequency between 1873 
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and 1893 in the United States, had a real human cost that was not countenanced by the 
abstract theories of political economists. 
 By documenting such cases of market manipulation, Lloyd advances the idea that 
economic disruptions and panics have a tangible immediate cause. Economic 
disturbances are not the result of abstract workings of the “natural order;” they are based 
upon the actions of individuals and companies who conspire to subvert competition. By 
1894, Lloyd had finally concluded that competition had all but disappeared.  “There is no 
longer the fact of competition. The protection of the public as laborers, producers, and 
consumers by competition has come to an end.”99 The “beneficent” order of nature 
lauded by the Physiocrats and Adam Smith had given way to a chaotic and disordered 
market economy where powerful entities manipulated supply and demand until there was 
little to no regularity left. Lloyd, in characteristic optimism, believes the vicissitudes of 
economic instability will spur a change in thinking.  
Politically, we are civilized; industrially, not yet. Our century, given to this 
laissez-faire—‘leave the individual alone; he will do what is best for himself, and 
what is best for him is best for all’—has done one good: it has put society at the 
mercy of its own ideals, and has produced an actual anarchy in business which is 
horrifying us into a change of doctrines.100 
 
Given this belief, it is fitting that Lloyd set himself the task of exposing the horrific 
results of an economy that is unregulated and unsupervised. His hope was that such 
exposure would pave the way for reform. 
The prescription of laissez faire is tied to this notion that the market works best 
when the forces of self-interest and competition are allowed to operate freely without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Lloyd, “The Uses and Abuses of Corporations,” 182-183. 
100 Lloyd, Wealth Against Commonwealth, 496-7. 
	   132 
oversight. If the order of the market has broken down, as Lloyd suggests, laissez faire can 
offer no solutions for how to control it or reinstate order and regularity. The defender of 
laissez faire can only watch as companies and corporations combine to form increasingly 
powerful monopolies. “Power can never halt itself. Market power stands today 
unchecked by mediaeval regulation or modern competition. It has become an arbitrary 
power, with all the progressive appetite for everything in sight that arbitrary power has 
always shown.”101 Lloyd portrays these economic combinations as a new form of 
despotism as the “arbitrary power” of various industries is used to control the market. He 
also claims that these new capitalists have attained a power greater than monarchs ever 
possessed, but unlike monarchs they exercise it “without restraints of culture, experience, 
the pride, or even the inherited caution of class or rank.”102 According to Lloyd, 
Americans had overthrown the arbitrary rule of the British monarchy only to witness, 
within the span of a single century, the crowning of a new despotic power that was even 
less restrained. 
Given that Lloyd believes that the unregulated market is chaotic—if not positively 
despotic—and without the means to regulate and police itself, the only viable solution is 
to impose regulation on the market from without. His criticism of the abstract theoretical 
system of classical economic thought reveals that he identifies no purely economic 
phenomena that can effectively ensure fairness or even competition. Lloyd calls upon the 
community to “civilize industry” in order “to make men fellow-citizens, brothers, lovers 
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in industry, as it has done with them in government and family.”103 He inverts the 
hierarchy presented by social Darwinists, in which the market or private sector, is meant 
to be efficient, ordered, and progressive. Lloyd believes precisely the opposite. He 
believes that our political theories and institutions, especially the notion of the republic or 
commonwealth, are a mark of our advanced civilization. Economic thought and business 
practices, by contrast, are arbitrary and amoral. Lloyd believes the only way in which the 
“chaos” and  “anarchy of business” can be “civilized” is by bringing the market under 
“the rule of the people” in the same way republicanism brought the state under the rule of 
the people.104 Having examined the industrial economy, Lloyd concluded that political 
control and regulation were necessary in order for the economy to best serve the good of 
all.  
 
LAISSEZ FAIRE AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS 
 
 Much of Lloyd’s criticism of laissez faire focused on economics, and he paid 
particularly close attention to the relationship between classical economic theory and 
actual economic practice. The thrust of Lloyd’s criticism was that the classical economic 
model, which forms the basis of laissez faire, had proved to be outdated in the face of 
industrialization. The theory was based upon the assumption of free competition, and the 
presumed result was widely distributed prosperity. The economic reality, according to 
Lloyd, was combination, inequality, and market manipulation that led to disruptions. He 
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also tried to demonstrate that these new economic phenomena and new economic 
problems posed political problems as well. Lloyd highlighted two political problems that 
emanated from a laissez faire economic policy, and both were related to severe inequality 
in the distribution of wealth. First, Lloyd feared that widespread poverty and misery 
posed the threat of social unrest and possible revolution. Second, Lloyd argued that the 
overall political community was becoming increasingly beholden to the interests of the 
wealthy and that the American Republic was giving way to plutocracy.  
 
Social Unrest and the Danger of Revolution 
 
Lloyd believed that the chaos and disorder in the economy would manifest itself 
in social chaos and disorder. He was keenly aware of the social and political unrest that 
arose in response to the economic hardship of the Gilded Age. He and other “middle 
class” reformers were fearful of the revolutionary implications of widespread poverty.105 
Lloyd was prone to radicalism, but he was not a revolutionary. He treats revolution as a 
real danger to the American society, and he places the blame for this unrest at the feet of 
the harsh economic climate. Lloyd sees a continuation of the policy of laissez faire as a 
sure recipe for social upheaval. The radicalism that he exhibited in pursuit of reform was 
motivated by a desire to stave off a revolution, not to start one. 
 As the preceding section demonstrated, Lloyd believed that laissez faire policies, 
and the theories of classical political economy which support and legitimize it, cannot 
adequately address the problem of poverty and severe inequalities in the distribution of 
wealth. A common tactic of laissez faire supporters is to characterize poverty as a feature 	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of the natural economic order, but Lloyd considers this to be an intellectual slight of 
hand: “These doctrines of the desire of wealth, of exclusive regulation by competition, 
and of the irresistible laws of trade have been a royal road for shifting the responsibility 
for injustice and legal selfishness from human shoulders upon the back of Nature.”106 
Lloyd believes that laissez faire theorists rely upon this concept of an alleged natural 
order as a rhetorical prop. It allows them to explain away the consequences of human 
ideas and institutions as part of some larger natural process that escapes our control. 
 Lloyd went to great lengths to show that the industrial revolution was 
accompanied by widespread misery. The economic consequences of the policy of laissez 
faire were widespread destitution and misery among large portions of the population. He 
depicts the destructive effects that poverty has on a society as similar to a military 
conquest. 
The distresses of the industrial world are like those of a country ravaged by 
foreign invasion and domestic insurrection. Millions are without work; millions 
who are making daily bread do not get daily bread; hardly anyone knows what to 
count upon as to certainty of employment or subsistence; the people create 
property only to see it pass to others; there is famine; families are torn apart; there 
is, in the unnecessary death rates, a greater mortality than that of battles, and a 
greater maiming of limb by the machinery of peace than by that of war; and 
cyclones of passion tear across the surface of society. This is war.107 
 
Such is Lloyd’s assessment of poverty. He argues that poverty has replaced war as “the 
great terror that blackens the sky of the people to-day.”108 He believes that the terror of 
poverty will continue to tear away at the fabric of society unless some solution can be 	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found. “War slays its thousands, but poverty its tens of thousands. War draws our blood 
once in a while, but poverty never lets go its killing hand.”109 By likening poverty to war, 
Lloyd is also making the point that poverty is not strictly a natural phenomenon; it is a 
product of human agency. 
 For Lloyd, the economic system of laissez faire capitalism has deleterious ethical 
implications, especially because it recommends unerring pursuit of individual self-
interest. One example of this ethic is the collection of speculative “corners” and price 
fixing—documented by Lloyd in “Making Bread Dear”—in which large combinations of 
wealth conspire to raise the price of consumer goods. Such practices effectively place the 
poor at greater hazard as the cost of bare subsistence increases. This manipulation of 
prices is further compounded by the poor treatment of workers that also follows from the 
ethic of self-interest. Lloyd argues that this ethic of self-interest has the dehumanizing 
effect of characterizing our fellow citizens as mere economic competitors. “Businessmen 
and their college professors will easily prove to you that you are not a man but merely a 
seller in the market, and that your labor is not your life, only a commodity.”110 Once 
again, Lloyd argues that the intellectual edifice of laissez faire leads to an ethic of self-
interested behavior in which the pursuit of profit outweighs other social relationships. He 
notices that the tendency to view the labor force as a “commodity” is strikingly similar to 
the way plantation owners viewed slaves.111 “The central doctrine of the money power is 
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that labour is merely merchandise.”112In his view, this gives capitalists license to treat 
workers as they would any other merchandise. 
 One of Lloyd’s great contributions to the intellectual critique of laissez faire was 
his attempt to connect the poor condition of industrial labor to business practices, and, 
more importantly he connects those business practices to the teachings of laissez faire 
and classical political economy. He dismisses the argument that workers choose 
voluntarily to submit to the harsh conditions of industrial labor. “They are kept down by 
force, by the force of competition instead of conquest, by the strategy of the generals of 
supply and demand. Once it was the force of the warrior, now it is the force of the 
capitalist.”113 Proponents of laissez faire, most notably Spencer and Sumner, stressed the 
importance of “freedom of contract” as the typical arrangement between capital and 
labor. Workers, they argued, choose voluntarily to work for certain employers, and if 
they were dissatisfied, they were free to find employment elsewhere. For Lloyd, this 
argument mischaracterizes the nature of these contracts and seeks to absolve employers 
of the charge that they mistreat their workers. “They are devoid of the essential attributes 
of contracts. They will be simply servitudes imposed by wealth on poverty, by strength 
on weakness, by knowledge on ignorance, and by plutocracy on the people.”114 Industrial 
monopolies are able to manipulate wages in a manner similar to their control of prices of 
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consumer goods, according to Lloyd. He gives the example of the Reading Railroad, 
which gained control of a large swath of Pennsylvania coal mines to show how “freedom 
of contract” applied to coal miners. “These companies flood coal country with helpless 
laborers . . . in order to create a condition of ‘supply and demand’ in which wages 
steadily tend downward.”115 An actual miner has no meaningful choice in this 
environment; his vocation is mining coal, and all of the coal mines are controlled by the 
Reading Railroad. 
 This adversarial relationship between capital and labor poses the unavoidable 
political problem of social unrest as labor unions clash with the forces of industry. Lloyd 
argues that labor organizations are “a measure of self-defense forced on the men who saw 
their rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness being taken away one by one.”116 
He sees labor organization as a necessary reaction to the combinations and monopolies 
established by the forces of organized capital. Nevertheless, employers treat labor 
organizations as illegal and illegitimate. “American rich men say to American poor men: 
Union is right for us; it is wrong for you.”117 Rather than acknowledge the poor 
conditions and insufficient compensation for the labor force, these employers employ 
various methods to frustrate efforts to organize and keep workers “divided so that they 
may be conquered.”118 This adversarial relationship, according to Lloyd, is at the heart of 
the labor unrest that was so prevalent in the United States between 1870 and 1900. That 	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is not to say that he apportions blame equally to these two entities; rather, Lloyd believes 
the mistreatment of workers by employers stems from the teachings of classical political 
economy and laissez faire.  
 Although he is very supportive of the labor movement on the whole, Lloyd argues 
that labor unrest is a symptom of a larger social and political problem. He documents a 
series of railroad strikes that took place in 1877, which he refers to as “the greatest labor 
disturbance on record” or “an American reign of terror.”119 The “terror” to which Lloyd 
refers came not from below, but from above. “In the actual physical violence with which 
railroads have taken their rights of way through more than one American city, and in the 
railroad strikes of 1876 and 1877, with the anarchy that came with them, there are social 
disorders we hoped never to see in America.”120 He sees such labor disturbances as an 
example of economic relations spilling the banks of the market and entering the political 
arena. Lloyd considers labor disturbances a warning sign that “popular anger” is growing 
as a response to inequality in wealth and poor treatment of workers.121 
 Lloyd was fearful that such popular resentment would lead to full-scale revolution 
unless the economic and political structure of industrial capitalism could be reformed. 
Historians have noted that Lloyd shared the widespread fear among the American middle 
class that a violent revolution would result from the increasingly desperate condition of 
the poor.122 Lloyd understood that the economic system in America was based upon a 	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legal framework, but he argued that the framework was based upon the laissez faire 
assumption of free competition.123 As he repeatedly notes, Lloyd believes that “the 
ossification of competition into consolidation” has rendered this framework obsolete.124  
 Lloyd saw reform as the force that would prevent revolution, and he understood 
that political reform would be necessary to establish control over unwieldy economic 
forces. Laissez faire offers no political solutions inasmuch as it recommends that the state 
refrain from economic intervention, regulation, or supervision. Lloyd believes the 
“railroad problem” illustrates the disconnect between our political ideals and our 
economic practices. “These incidents in railroad history show most of the points where 
we fail, as between man and man, employer and employed, the public and the 
corporation, the state and the citizen, to maintain the equities of ‘government’—and 
employment—‘of the people, by the people, and for the people.’”125 As early as 1881, 
Lloyd had argued that the future of the United States democracy hinged on how it 
handled large combinations like the railroads.126 If the political arm of the United States 
could not alleviate the tensions between capital and labor or wealth and poverty, Lloyd 
feared that America would witness violent revolutionary movements not unlike the “Paris 
commune.”127 However, in the realm of politics, Lloyd did not believe lawmakers and 
elected officials understood the dangers of revolution and the necessity of reform. In fact, 	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government officials moved in the opposite direction. Lloyd saw that legislatures and 
courts had abandoned laissez faire, not in favor of reform, but in favor of plutocracy. 
 
Plutocracy 
 
 Lloyd goes to great lengths to demonstrate to his readers that wealth translates 
rather quickly into political power. The foregoing discussion shows that he considered 
the economic power of concentrated wealth to be a danger to the social order. In this 
sense, the unprecedented economic advantage of large combinations led to increasing 
poverty and social unrest. The economic process by which wealth is concentrated in the 
hands of a small minority has produced the political problem of social protest and the 
danger of revolution. But Lloyd also believed that wealth is a type of power, and he 
repeatedly demonstrates to his readers the ways in which the forces of wealth coopt 
political power. This occurs in two ways. First, the massive concentration of wealth and 
the size and scope of some industries are beyond the control of the political authorities. 
The unprecedented size and reach of these combinations outstrips the ability of the 
federal government, and especially the state governments, to impose meaningful 
regulation or oversight. Second, government has ceased to be an impartial arbitrator 
between competing interests, as the wealthy exercise undue influence on the political 
process. Lloyd documents countless cases of industrial combinations being afforded 
government assistance in the form of tariffs, favorable legislation, and even police and 
military protection to counteract labor protests. The organizing idea of his seminal work, 
Wealth Against Commonwealth, is that private wealth gains such a degree of power that it 
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supplants democratic control over the American political system. The issue at hand for 
Lloyd was democracy versus plutocracy. 
 Lloyd was concerned that the concentration of wealth on an unprecedented scale 
created a new type of power that was beyond the control of the American community. “In 
any age where uncontrolled power is, there is crisis. In our times it is in the market that 
uncontrolled power has arisen—and there is our crisis.”128 He considers “concentrated 
wealth” to be “the greatest sovereign in the modern world.”129 In other words, the power 
of wealth has outstripped the power of the larger democratic community. Furthermore, if 
the distribution of political power mirrors the distribution of wealth, this is profoundly 
undemocratic as it represents rule by a new aristocracy of wealth. “In all ages wealth, like 
all power, has found that it must rule all or nothing. Its destiny is rule or ruin, and rule is 
but a slower ruin.”130 Lloyd encourages Americans to consider whether this unchecked 
power of wealth is acceptable—whether it is consistent with the American ideal of 
democracy. In Wealth Against Commonwealth, he presents a well-documented argument 
that the power of private wealth threatens the overall community’s ability to act in its 
own interests. He is clearly in favor of meeting this rising power of wealth head-on. This 
is evident in his strategy for controlling industrial monopolies such as Standard Oil. “In 
either case, it must be confronted by a power greater than itself. There is only one such 
power.”131 The power to which he refers is “the body of citizens” represented in “the 	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corporate sovereign at Washington.”132 Lloyd sees the state as the only viable power that 
can confront the power of concentrated wealth. The problem with this solution, according 
to Lloyd, is that the prevailing legal and political institutions are still beholden to the 
laissez faire idea that the state should refrain from interfering with commerce and the free 
market. 
 Rather than exercise its regulatory power to check the influence of wealth and 
industrial combinations, the state, in Lloyd’s view, actually cedes political responsibility 
to large companies. The railroads have been grated the power to control the transportation 
system and impose taxes—functions that even Adam Smith said should be left to the 
government.  
The railway officials are, in the world of the highway, the government. They hold 
their supreme power to tax commerce, and to open and close the highways, solely 
and altogether by grant of the State, and under the law of the common carrier.133  
 
Lloyd argues that monopolistic industries have assumed the regulatory functions that 
should be democratically controlled by the people. The implication here is that large 
combinations in industry, being left alone as laissez fare recommends, do not use their 
freedom of action to compete, but to stifle completion and to amass ever more power and 
influence. A particularly striking example of the power of industrial combinations is the 
use of “agents” or “spies” by Standard Oil to gain information about competitors, such as 
the quantities of oil being produced and shipped, so that they may gain a competitive 
advantage.134 Lloyd considers this practice to be a form of despotism that has no place in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Ibid., 46. 
133 Lloyd, Wealth Against Commonwealth, 97. 
134 Ibid., 212. 
	   144 
a modern democratic society. “Modern liberty has put an end to the use of spies in its 
government only to see it reappear in its business.”135 Yet again, the influence of wealth 
runs counter to the ideal of a government by and for the people. 
 One of Lloyd’s primary concerns is that large combinations will become 
uncontrollable as they gain ever more influence over the industrial economy. He clearly 
thinks that the state governments are ill-equipped to control these large combinations 
which operate on a national level. He points to the labor unrest of 1877 as an example of 
how state governments cannot effectively manage “the struggle between these giant 
forces within society.”136 As a matter of fact, Lloyd believes that wealth and industry 
exercise control over the political process. Economically, certain industrial combinations 
have amassed “unchecked power,” but they still feel the need “control everything by 
which it could be attacked—Congress, the judges, presidents and governors, newspapers, 
schools and colleges, social leadership.”137 For Lloyd, this influence is exercised in 
precisely the wrong direction as wealth coopts political power when the desirable 
arrangement would be one in which the political arm of the country exercises control 
over industry.  
 This ability of the wealthy to influence the political system brings me to the 
second political problem that arises from concentrated wealth. Lloyd argues that the 
federal and state governments have ceased to serve as impartial representatives of the 
whole community. Instead, they have tended to grant special favors to the wealthy and to 	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large industrial combinations. According to Lloyd, the political authorities have 
surrendered the public interest to private interests. 
The real governors of the Government of this country are neither the people nor 
their official representatives, but the agents of private interests which, through 
their “legal representatives” and their lobbyists, prepare the tariffs, subsidies, 
contracts, grants, exemptions, appointments for office, and see to their enactment 
and confirmation.138   
 
It should be noted that such governmental favoritism toward large industries is not 
consistent with the policy of laissez faire; indeed, it is not even consistent with 
Hamilton’s program for protecting “infant industries,” given that these industries were 
well established and very prosperous. Lloyd seems to think that the underlying logic of 
laissez faire has brought the country to this impasse. With its emphasis on individual self-
interest, the intellectual defense of laissez faire presupposed that this self-interest would 
be exercised primarily in the market. Lloyd points out that the same force of self-interest 
led the wealthy to assert control over the government to further their own private 
interests. Such a situation is more akin to the favoritism—or, in a more modern idiom, 
“crony capitalism”—that characterized mercantilism rather than the impartial government 
favored by Adam Smith and other proponents of laissez faire. 
 Lloyd surveyed the economic system and its political framework and concluded 
that the government was systematically violating the policy of laissez faire, but not in 
order to assist the poor or encourage fair competition; rather, the government was 
actively assisting industrial combinations. The government helps large combinations 
“transfer . . . business from the many to the few” by providing numerous subsidies to 
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combinations while imposing punitive taxes on smaller competitors.139 He notes the 
hypocrisy of business interests who profess the policy of laissez faire while collecting 
government assistance. “It is the business class who talk of ‘not looking to government,’ 
who extol ‘self-help’ while they are continually hunting for government franchises and 
privileges and buying them by bribes from traitorous representatives of the people.”140 
The prevailing system was socialism for the rich and capitalism for the poor. Lloyd notes 
that if the same assistance was afforded to ordinary people, it would be dismissed as 
“socialism.”141 In Wealth Against Commonwealth, he argues repeatedly that the state and 
federal governments provided “subsidies” to the Standard Oil and various railroads which 
effectively made it impossible for smaller businesses to compete.142 Because of their 
reach and influence, large industrial combinations were able to secure government 
protection for their own businesses, and they used this advantage to eliminate 
competitors. 
 According to Lloyd, government support for industry has become so essential that 
political influence has overtaken taken individual initiative as the path to economic 
success. Concerted political influence has become a “condition of survival” for American 
companies.143 The ultimate result of this is that government, rather than promote the good 
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of the whole community, becomes a tool for the advancement of special interests, 
particularly the interests of the wealthy.  
Government is being used as an active partner by great business interests. 
Meanwhile any effort of the people to use their own forces through government to 
better their condition . . . is sung to sleep with the lullaby about government best, 
government least.144 
 
More often than not, this “partnership” between business and government is used to grant 
large companies an even greater advantage over smaller competitors. For example, when 
independent oil producers sought government help against the monopolistic practices of 
Standard oil, their protests fell on deaf ears. “The plundered found that the courts, the 
governor, and the legislature of their State, and the  Congress of the United States were 
tools of the plunderers.”145 
 In Wealth Against Commonwealth, along with his many articles of investigative 
journalistic exposure, Lloyd documents the myriad of ways that business interests use 
governmental institutions to serve their own purposes. One prevalent way in which they 
are able to influence government officials is through lobbying. The ideal of government 
by the people has been replaced with “government by lobby,” which is to say government 
by special interest.146 The people have no “bulwark . . . against the Washington lobby of 
these combined syndicates.”147 Lobbyists, according to Lloyd, had unprecedented access 
to representatives, which the common people did not. Lloyd describes this influence in 
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his typical colorful language: “These beggars on horseback . . . are forever at the elbows 
of the secretaries, representatives, [and] senators.”148 This shows that Lloyd believed that 
the business lobby was exerting private influence on the government representative who 
were supposed uphold the public interest, or at the very least, not grant special favors to 
private interests. Additionally, Lloyd believes that the representatives themselves are 
technically chosen, not by the people, but by the agents of big business. “Its lobbyists 
force the nomination of judges who will construe the laws as Power desires, and of 
senators who will get passed such laws as it wants for its judges to construe.”149 The fact 
that this is allowed to happen, in Lloyd’s view, demonstrates a moral failing on the part 
of the government officials who have succumbed to their own self-interest, and see more 
benefit from an alliance with business rather than from advancement of the public good. 
 With such a strong foothold in the halls of government, the business lobby is able 
to promote and pass laws that are actively hostile to competitors. They promote “special 
legislation” meant to benefit only the small minority of business owners.150 Such special 
legislation takes the form of tariffs and onerous inspections imposed on competitors, 
rebates on transportation costs, grants of exclusive contracts, and direct subsidies for 
industries that are already quite prosperous. “The few men who are the beneficiaries of 	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taxes paid by the many will be powerful and shrewd enough to get other dispensations 
and benefits, . . . and with this help from the taxpayer they can do business at a figure 
which, . . . will drive the unaided citizen competitor out of business.”151 When these 
citizen competitors attempt to pass countermeasures such as national regulation of the 
railroads, they find Congress unreceptive. Small oil producers, “fighting for self-
preservation” by urging Congress to curtail the unfair practices of the Standard oil 
monopoly, realized just how powerless they were as “the money of the Standard was 
more powerful than the petition of business men who asked only for a fair chance.”152 In 
Lloyd’s view, the power of the big business lobby shows how the legal framework of the 
country does not provide an impartial political structure to support free and fair 
competition. 
 Lloyd argues that the favoritism that the legislatures show toward large businesses 
is compounded by a judiciary that also sides with combinations. In “Making Bread 
Dear,” he points to “an unbroken line of decisions by the Supreme Court of Illinois” that 
effectively established the “sovereignty” of the Chicago Board of Trade.153 When smaller 
producers appealed to the Supreme Court that the CBT had effectively conspired to stifle 
competition and fix prices, they found the court unwilling to interfere with the exchange. 
“The monotonous response of the judges has been that the Board was a voluntary 
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association, and that it was not amenable to the court.”154 The court applied the logic of 
freedom of contract to the appeal—so long as agreements and contracts were entered 
voluntarily, the government had no right to abrogate the terms of the contract. For Lloyd, 
this is evidence of the Court acting as an “ally” of the conspiratorial forces that 
dominated the CBT.155 This laissez faire stance of the Supreme Court allowed the CBT to 
set up its own adjudicative body to settle disputes. Lloyd argues that these “summary 
tribunals” were staffed with allies of business interests. “The members who are ‘the 
judges’ of these tribunals are men preoccupied with their own business. They are ignorant 
of the law and the rules of evidence.”156 Left by the Supreme Court to regulate itself, the 
CBT established what Lloyd considered to be groups of business hirelings that sided with 
the syndicates and corners. This lack of proper judicial oversight does not merely render 
these exchanges unfair, it actually makes them less efficient as they become “paralyzed 
by manipulation.”157 Lloyd believes that the practical solution to this is “the 
establishment of tribunals, of competent and disinterested men, to settle the disputes that 
arise in the course of business and cannot wait for the courts.”158 Such a solution is 
impeded both by the self-interest of those who control the exchange and by the insistence 
on the part of the courts that freedom of contract is absolute. 
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 All of these political problems—social disorder, the uncontrollable power of 
industrial combinations, and the failure of the government to regulate these 
combinations—led Lloyd to the conclusion that private wealth is incompatible with 
commonwealth. Lloyd does not think wealth is synonymous with private property. 
“Wealth is not the home, farm, shop or savings of the poor man; it is riches, excess. It is 
an unfair share of the general product which was made by the co-operation of all.”159 The 
wealth to which Lloyd refers is the surplus extracted from the common effort by well-
positioned individuals. Commonwealth, by contrast, is a cooperative arrangement 
whereby “that which is the source of real power, wealth, and delight shall also be the 
ruler of it.”160Lloyd thought the transition from wealth to commonwealth would require a 
revision of the prevailing moral outlook of the country. If the power of wealth was to be 
brought under the control of the commonwealth, Americans needed a moral alternative to 
the selfish individualism of laissez faire. 
 
A VISION OF REFORM: MOVING BEYOND LAISSEZ FAIRE 
 
 Historians generally acknowledge that Lloyd was more accomplished and 
influential as a critic of the existing system than as a proponent of workable solutions. 
Michael Turner notes that “he was better at exposing and condemning than formulating 
practical reform programmes.”161 This was partially due to the fact that he never settled 
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on a definitive reform movement. As he became affiliated with populism, Christian 
socialism, collectivism, and the labor movement, and became disenchanted with each in 
turn, his beliefs about the appropriate way forward evolved. Nevertheless, throughout his 
writings Lloyd points to the necessity of challenging popular ideas. His efforts to link real 
economic hardship with the intellectual edifice of laissez faire demonstrates the 
importance that he attributes to prevailing ideas in shaping our social and political 
institutions. Lloyd believed that the prevailing norms of behavior, particularly economic 
behavior, were based upon an incorrect and inaccurate conception of human society. 
Toward the end of his life, Lloyd collected his ideas for an alternative view of human 
society in the collection Man, the Social Creator. 
 
Lloyd’s Alternative to the “Natural Order” of Laissez Faire 
 
 To say that Lloyd was not a systematic thinker is to risk understatement. He 
approaches ideas circuitously in the manner of Emerson rather than directly and 
analytically in the manner of Sumner. Nevertheless, Lloyd does present a discernible 
theory of human nature and social progress that forms an alternative to the natural order 
of classical political economics. Lloyd considers the standard concept of economic man 
as inherently and unavoidably self-interested to be an “atheistical doctrine” that only 
gives license to the “wickedness and cruelties” that are present in society.162 He agrees 
with Adam Smith that human nature is more complex and nuanced; self-interest is 
accompanied by social sentiments that connect us to other individuals. Of course, Lloyd 	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even rejects Smith’s assertion that self-interest is the most relevant sentiment in terms of 
economic relations. Lloyd believes that the laissez faire conception of human nature 
overlooks the most characteristic of human sentiments—he calls this sentiment “love.” 
“Man is not to be a loving animal; but is one.”163 His view of human nature is optimistic, 
perhaps “romantic,” and he rejects the Calvinist insistence on the frailty of human nature 
and instead emphasizes the potential for goodness and cooperation.164 “There are two 
human natures—the human nature of Christ and of Judas; and Christ prevails.”165 He 
does not argue for the eradication of self-interest, which he actually believes is “sacred,” 
but he does believe it should be placed under the guidance of love.166 “Love is that which 
makes us do for others; self-interest is that which makes us do for ourselves.”167 The 
laissez faire conception of human nature as merely self-interested, for Lloyd, emphasizes 
the component of human nature that makes it more difficult for us to get along in society. 
 I have mentioned previously that Lloyd rejected the atomistic conception of 
society that is exhibited in the natural order of classical political economy. However, his 
alternative version of human nature led him to develop an alternative set of “laws” that 
apply to social relations and social progress. By extending his conception of human 	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nature to the social setting, Lloyd argues that individuals in “contact” naturally form 
cohesive groups or “associations”168 “The fusion of men into families and multitudes is 
the work of a natural force. The force is called Love.”169 Love, for Lloyd, is the force 
behind all human associations, and he presents it as a natural force of society in the same 
way that Sumner presented the “struggle for existence” as a naturally occurring force 
amenable to scientific laws. He also follows Sumner by trying to establish love as a 
scientifically verifiable social phenomenon. Love is “one of the natural forces” that 
operates in “the world of life as gravitation and electricity have theirs in the world of 
matter.”170 The metaphor of gravitation is more apt in Lloyd’s case than it is in Sumner’s 
because Lloyd considered love to be a force of attraction. “Every page of domestic or 
international history has its specimen facts to illustrate the law that men always seek 
contact; contact tends to union and multitudes grow into societies.”171 This preternatural 
attractive force of love, according to Lloyd, is the force of social progress. 
Lloyd depicts social progress as an evolution in human associations from 
primitive societies to larger collective communities that afford more fulfilling forms of 
social life. His theory of social progress reads like a folksy Hegelianism: “The factory has 
been an advance on the cottage, the corporation an advance on the individual, the 
corporation of corporations an advance on the corporation, and the combination of all 
citizens in the greatest corporation of all—the whole people—will be the longest step 	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forward of all.”172 The industrial revolution, by creating unprecedented combination in 
industry, has had the progressive effect of bringing more individuals into contact. Once 
individuals are brought together, the force of love counteracts the force of self-interest 
and brings men from atomistic “contact” to collective “association.”173 He argues that the 
very fact of individuals in contact leads to a spontaneous effusion of love. “Contact 
produces love; love makes more contact.”174 Love, being elemental in human nature, 
naturally leads people to cooperative association, and the concentration of industrial 
production brings more and more individuals together to create ever more inclusive 
associations.  
 Having identified love as “a primal social force . . . which underlies all social 
institutions,” Lloyd derives a set of laws to explain how this force operates.175 The most 
powerful and universal law of society is the Golden Rule. Lloyd treats the Golden Rule as 
a positive expression of love that goes beyond the maxim “of doing as you would be done 
by.”  
We need not kiss all our fellow-men, but we must do for them all we ask them to 
do for us—nothing less than the fullest performance of every power. To love our 
neighbor is to submit to the discipline and arrangement which make his life reach 
its best, and so do we best love ourselves.176  
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Lloyd treats the Golden Rule as both objective and normative much the same as Spencer 
and Sumner treated the notion of “survival of the fittest”—it is both a factual description 
of how society works, and an ethical ideal.  
The Golden Rule is a description of a social process, put into the form of an 
exhortation for the guidance of conduct, and generalized out of myriads of 
experimental observations, which prove that for some reason men tend to do unto 
others as they would that others should do to them.177 
 
In terms of the objective status of the Golden Rule as a social law, Lloyd believes it is at 
the heart of social progress. Society evolves and advances due to “self-sacrifice” rather 
than self-interest.178 He also treats the Golden Rule as a law that is progressively 
expanding throughout history, and his program of reform is based upon the need to 
extend this law to yet more human arenas, particularly economics. “The persistence of 
the Golden Rule in its progress toward supreme jurisdiction can now be regarded as a 
verified scientific fact in the political history of the race.”179 
 Regardless of the seeming similarities to Sumner’s sociology, and his framing of 
social forces as conforming to natural laws, Lloyd had a drastically different view of the 
ways in which the individual and society interact. Spencer and Sumner both treated 
society as a more or less fixed “environment” that encourages and rewards self-interested 
behavior. Lloyd too believed that individuals responded to environmental factors, but he 
also adopted the Aristotelian notion that human beings have an identifiable purpose or 
telos and the that institutions of society should allow individuals to pursue and actualize 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Lloyd, “Mere Contact Making for Spiritual Union,” 71. 
178 Ibid., 68. 
179 Lloyd, “New Conscience Transforming Party Politics,” 153. 
	   157 
this purpose. His “tellic environmentalism” is clearly evident in Man, the Social 
Creator.180 He believes that individuals are a product of their environment, but they are 
also in a position to shape and alter their environment so that this influence is 
constructive. “The whole theory of true reform is to set free the ‘inward perfecting 
principle within the individual and society,’ to use Aristotle’s words, which when 
released from interceptions and oppressions can easily be guided to move to its proper 
ends.”181 The selection process of “survival of the fittest” promotes the worst aspects of 
human nature, but Lloyd does not think this is necessary. “There is a power in society of 
social selection which can create a new environment and make over again men and 
communities.”182  
 By presenting this new vision of the social order, Lloyd replaced the pessimistic 
and deterministic natural order of laissez faire proponents with the progressive and 
malleable social order that lends itself to reform. In a clear expression of his social theory 
he writes, “Earth is rich, man is good, love is the law.”183 This is the antithesis of 
Sumner’s “science of society” which implied that the earth is poor, man is selfish, and 
survival of the fittest is the law. However, Lloyd was not primarily concerned with 	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formulating an alternative to Sumner’s sociology. Lloyd believed that the revolution in 
economic production in the United States, represented by industrialization and 
combination, was not accompanied by a necessary evolution of moral ideas and political 
institutions. The new facts of the economic production were collective and cooperative 
relations, but the country still exhibited the moral outlook that characterized laissez faire 
individualism and competition. Lloyd’s optimistic view was that moral and political 
reform would eventually catch up to the new economic realities, but as a reformer, he 
saw it as his duty to aid in an intellectual and moral regeneration that would replace the 
prevailing ethic of laissez faire.  
 
Moral Reform and the New Conscience 
 
 Lloyd recognized the necessity of a moral regeneration in America as early as 
1884, nearly two decades before he gathered his ideas for moral reform into the 
collection, Man, the Social Creator.  
In the presence of great combinations in all departments of life, the moralist and 
patriot have work to do of a significance never before approached during the 
itinerant phases of our civilization. It may be that the coming age of combination 
will issue nobler and fuller liberty for the individual than has yet been seen, but 
that consummation will be possible, not in a day of competitive trade, but in one 
of competitive morals.184 
 
For Lloyd, the moral framework of the country had to be updated to reflect new 
economic and social realities. “The New Conscience” is the name that Lloyd gave to the 
new system of morals and ethics that were needed to make proper sense of the 
unprecedented contact that individuals experienced in industrial society. Lloyd believed 	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that industrialization constituted a step in economic progress, but the “money power,” 
with the help of economists and intellectuals, shaped the social consciousness of the 
population so that they came to accept the atomistic conception of society advanced by 
laissez faire supporters.185 Lloyd sought to provide an alternative moral outlook for the 
American community that would supplant selfish, individualistic morality of laissez faire 
and “establish a new order based upon the general welfare and social virtue.”186  
 Lloyd’s ideas concerning moral reform are eclectic, but the unifying moral 
principle of his new conscience is the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule is not strictly a 
Christian doctrine according to Lloyd, but a widespread if not universally accepted ethic. 
“The exhortations of Confucius and Buddha are so close to [the Golden Rule] that it may 
be correctly described as the chosen ideal of the vast majority of mankind.”187 Lloyd 
notices that the ethical individualism of laissez faire is inconsistent with this ideal, so his 
proposal is to extend the ethic of the Golden Rule to society, politics, and economics. As 
industrialization produces new forms of contact, the Golden Rule must be extended to 
new areas and new relationships. “The sudden and vast expansion of modern business has 
made the co-operative commonwealth physical fact. Now comes the next expansion—
that which will make the co-operative commonwealth a moral fact.”188  
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 Lloyd thought that the “new conscience” could help establish a new economic 
ethic that would replace the selfish and predatory ethic of laissez faire. This new ethic 
values cooperation and public concern rather than competition and self-interest. “The 
remedy is the new conscience, which says simply that a man shall never be so much of a 
buyer or seller as to cease to be a brother, and that labor shall not be made a thing.”189 
Lloyd wants to reform business ethics so that large corporations do not use their market 
resources coercively—a practice that leads to social unrest and possible revolution. “The 
Golden Rule is conservative, not radical. . . . It is practical, not ideal.”190  Lloyd believes 
that extending the Golden Rule to business practices is merely a matter of moral beliefs 
and ethical practices catching up to our current economic organization. 
 Lloyd’s new conscience does not seek to dismiss individual needs or interests, but 
to establish “harmony” between the individual and the community.191 The supposed 
conflict between individual interests and communal interests will be subsumed under 
various “reciprocities” between individuals and the collective.192 Lloyd actually believes 
that individuality is enhanced and enriched by its reciprocal relationship to social groups. 
All the great, beautiful and brilliant ones have their roots in that deep mother soil 
of humanity, and draw from the common source that which makes them different 
for the moment from commonality. It is not from themselves but from all that 
they get their distinction. They are the efflorescence of common genius. All that 
they have they owe.193 	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The individualism of laissez faire prioritizes the individual distinction that would not be 
possible without the larger community. Furthermore, this individualism—with its focus 
on competition—is particularly ill-suited to an industrial economy in which the vast 
majority of individuals are working cooperatively in factories, assembly lines, mines, and 
railroads. These increasingly cooperative enterprises require a “reconciliation of 
individual love and social love with each other, of individual self-interest and social self-
interest.”194Such a realization of the “new conscience,” an extension of the Golden Rule 
to economic practices, would be an essential component of the moral regeneration that 
Lloyd was trying to facilitate. 
 For all of the problems that Lloyd sees in the economic system and its intellectual 
support structure, he remained an optimist. As he became involved in various reform 
movements and travelled the world, he observed instances of his new conscience 
emerging. He considered the labor movement to be one manifestation of the new 
conscience that was leading the way for an extension of the Golden Rule. This is due to 
their ability “to group and to organize themselves on the lines of mutual respect, equal 
justice, reciprocal profit and social love.”195 Labor had become such a prevalent form of 
association that “the toiling millions” were in a position to extend the ethic of cooperation 
by acknowledging their roles as “co-creators.”196 One aspect of the labor movement that 
was particularly attractive to Lloyd was that it was a practical movement with 	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demonstrated results. He contrasted the labor movement with “Utopias” such as Edward 
Bellamy’s Nationalism and favored the former because it “grows itself outdoors” rather 
than in the comfort of stylish drawing rooms.197 The labor movement, for Lloyd, 
represented a practical application of the new conscience and a real world expression of 
the Golden Rule. 
 Lloyd also looks to the variety of cooperative movements and communities as 
beacons of the new conscience. He points to the existence of “seventy-two communistic 
societies” in the United States as early as 1875 to serve as evidence that the ethic of 
cooperation is taking hold.198 He refers to these communes as “pioneers” for a new 
system of political economy; they represent the experimentation that is necessary to 
actualize a more cooperative society.199 Lloyd also observed cooperative movements in 
Europe, and Australasia when travelling abroad. He has high praise for the local and 
municipal cooperatives in Great Britain because its members have the necessary political 
experience to institute a larger cooperative community. “These men have had the 
practical success and the actual experience which would qualify them to officer and 
administer a Cooperative Commonwealth, if by some lucky accident it should come to 
England tomorrow.”200 These movements are social and political experiments that serve 
as examples to guide us in the direction of needed moral and political reform. This is the 
source of reform for Lloyd. It does not come primarily from intellectuals, but from 	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ordinary people who are trying different ways to live and work together. “The martyrs, 
the Socialists, the labor agitators, the strikers, the anarchists, the profit sharers, the co-
operators, who are teaching us the industrial conscience, are the precursors of the joys 
and properties of the co-operative commonwealth.”201 
 
Political Reform: From Wealth to Commonwealth 
 
 Lloyd believed that moral reform would have to be accompanied by political 
reform so that the political institutions of the United States would reflect the realities of 
industrial production. His program for political reform is based upon a progressive 
evolution of institutions so that they adapt to the principle of social love and the ethic of 
the Golden Rule. The specifics of Lloyd’s proposals for political reform changed 
throughout his life. Nevertheless, Lloyd clearly saw the need to wrest control of the state 
from the influence of wealth in order to give the people democratic control over society. 
He calls for “reorganization of the state on lines more nearly parallel with those of human 
and social development.”202 This is another aspect of Lloyd’s telic environmentalism 
because he sees reform as an effort to alter our social environment so that human beings 
can actualize their true potential as loving and cooperative social beings. 
 As I have discussed above, Lloyd thought that the most powerful entities in 
American society were the forces of concentrated wealth. After the Civil War, the power 
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of wealth had grown so great that the federal government was the only organization 
powerful enough to control it.  
There is nobody richer than Vanderbilt except the body of citizens; no corporation 
more powerful than the transcontinental railroad except the corporate sovereign at 
Washington. . . . The States have failed. The United States must succeed or the 
people will perish.203 
 
Lloyd called for the people to use the government in a positive manner to create a society 
for the benefit of all rather than for the benefit of wealth. “The greatest social instrument 
at hand to use in developing society is the government.”204 The policy of laissez faire 
suggests that this “instrument” should only be used negatively to protect property rights 
and provide a legal framework for a competitive market economy. But Lloyd argues that 
this negative conception of the state simply allows the power of wealth free reign over 
society. A policy of laissez faire is tantamount to surrendering public influence over 
society to private influence.  
 Lloyd was not in favor of using the power of the state to dismantle industrial 
combinations. He considered combination to be efficient in terms of material production 
and beneficial in terms of bringing more individuals together in cooperative enterprises. 
The real problem posed by these combinations was that they were beholden to the 
influence of private wealth and beyond the control of the public. Lloyd’s solution to his 
was oversight, regulation, and public control of combinations. “If the tendency to 
combination is irresistible, control of it is imperative.”205 This is what Lloyd means by 	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the term commonwealth. It is not merely the synonym for a republic; it is a community 
that puts its wealth and resources to public use. He points to Australia and New Zealand 
as examples of political communities that have come to understand that industry “must be 
administered for the common benefit” according to “the intelligence of all.”206 “The 
Australasians have gone beyond negative interference with wealth into the field of 
positive creation of commonwealth by the use of common resources.”  
 Lloyd, much like Marx, considered industrialization to be a progressive step in the 
evolution of human society and, therefore, something that should be preserved rather than 
undone. Despite all of his careful documentation of the abuses perpetrated by industrial 
combinations and monopolies, Lloyd was not in favor of breaking up combinations. He 
was critical of the American tendency to challenge monopolies with anti-trust measures 
and boycotts, and he praised the German “national economists” who called for “state 
monopoly” to replace private monopoly.207 The problem was not combination itself but 
the undemocratic result of an antiquated moral and political system, which gave these 
combinations undue influence. Lloyd sees these industrial combinations as public goods 
that should not be allowed to serve private interests. “The commonwealth the world over 
is manifestly now preparing to take up from the monopolists all such public utilities as 
gas, light, water and transportation monopolies, just as they have already taken up the 
roads, which were not long ago private property.”208  
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 Lloyd also takes an optimistic stance towards the “social problem,” the existence 
of widespread poverty. He does not propose any specific programs for poor relief but he 
lauds the “Poor laws” of Great Britain as evidence of social progress that can “at last put 
poverty into the Museum of Antiques.”209 These were the very same Poor laws that 
Spencer rejected as ill-considered hand-outs to “good-for-nothings.” Lloyd tended to 
approach the problem of poverty from a moral standpoint rather than from a policy 
standpoint. He frequently ties the existence of poverty to the unethical practices of 
business and mistreatment of labor, but he shies away from any specific proposals for 
direct assistance to the poor. His assumption is that the poor are willing and able to work, 
but they lack opportunities to get ahead in an economy where most of the economic 
benefits accrue in the hands of the few. Carnegie and other captains of industry propose 
private charity as a way of increasing these opportunities, but Lloyd sees this as a half-
measure that does nothing to change the underlying economic privilege afforded to the 
industrialists. “Charity as we practice it is but the insolvency of brotherhood, paying back 
one cent where it received a dollar.”210 Private charity, according to Lloyd, comes from 
the same force that contributes to poverty, the power wealth and the system that supports 
it. He argues that there must be some measure of “security of subsistence” in any viable 
commonwealth so that the people have the freedom and independence to achieve their 
true potential.211 This task of securing subsistence for the population is too onerous for 
private charity as well. “Aristocratic benevolence spends but a shrunken stream in 	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comparison with democratic benevolence.”212 Such democratic benevolence is an 
application of Lloyd’s new conscience to political communities and a recommendation 
for a policy based upon the Golden Rule.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Lloyd was never able to find a reform movement to embody his vision of moral 
regeneration. Turner notes that the fluidity of reform movements during the 1890’s left 
Lloyd with “no vehicle for effective action.”213 He attempted to formulate an alliance 
between organized labor and the Populist movement between 1893 and 1896, but was 
frustrated by the inability of labor to unite behind common cause and its tendency to form 
radical and disagreeing factions.214 He also broke with the Populist movement after they 
adopted a “free silver” platform in 1896 calling for monetizing silver to expand the 
money supply.215 Lloyd always took a holistic and eclectic approach to reform, which 
explains why he rejected the free silver platform of the Populists and the single tax 
proposal of Henry George. His “new conscience” did not put forward these types of 
specific proposals. Instead, it pointed to a needed change in moral ideas that was not 
addressed by the free silver or the single tax movement. Lloyd also rejected Bellamy’s 
Nationalism, which he considered idealistic and untested.216 He tended to look to actual 	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social movements such as organized labor and cooperative movements for inspiration and 
guidance in pursuit of practical and realistic reform. Lloyd thought cooperatives had the 
best chance of bringing the Golden Rule into practice and to institutionalize it in business 
practices.  
 After his break from the Populist movement in 1896, Lloyd ended his 
involvement with third party politics, and much of the radical fervor was seized by the 
radical socialist firebrand Eugene V. Debs. Around this time, Lloyd and his wife began to 
entertain a variety of practical and intellectual reformers at his residences the Watch 
House and the Wayside. These gatherings allowed Lloyd to learn of the current 
developments in various reform movements in which his guests were involved and to 
disseminate his own ideas for a new conscience.217By the turn of the century, Lloyd had 
gained the reputation as “dean of American Reform,” an acknowledgement of the 
influence he had on the reform minded thinkers.218  
 One serious shortcoming of Lloyd’s critique of laissez faire was his tendency to 
conflate the policy of laissez faire with the set of principles that justified that policy. As 
he thoroughly documents in Wealth Against Commonwealth, the prevailing economic 
policy in the United States during the Gilded Age was government favoritism or “crony 
capitalism” rather than laissez faire. Andrew Carnegie and other apologists for industrial 
combinations espoused the rhetoric of laissez faire while receiving assistance and 	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protection from the government. Lloyd mistook this rhetorical commitment to laissez 
faire for a deeper ideological commitment, and he thought that he could advance the 
cause of reform by presenting a criticism of that ideology. Carnegie’s flailing attempt to 
justify inequality and competition in The Gospel of Wealth is one clear example of a 
“lord of industry” who used the rhetoric of laissez faire to justify his own interests while 
displaying a cursory and informal understanding of the economic and social theory 
behind it. Perhaps due to his own familiarity with the doctrines of classical political 
economy, and his own acceptance of those doctrines as a young man, Lloyd treated 
industrial capitalists as unqualified adherents to those doctrines. In reality, wealthy 
industrialists were more pragmatic than doctrinaire, and they were quite willing to use the 
rhetoric of laissez faire to promote and protect their own interests, while simultaneously 
lobbying the government for special treatment. 
 Critics of Lloyd point to his polemics as evidence that he was not a serious and 
careful observer. He took a heavy-handed approach when criticizing business 
combinations, and he tended to portray smaller independent businesses as innocent 
victims, although they were similarly focused on pursuit of self-interests. It is true that 
Lloyd’s sympathies resided with the disadvantaged. Given the choice between supporting 
the powerful or the powerless, Lloyd invariably chose the powerless, and he frequently 
attributed malicious intentions to the powerful for good measure. Robert Wiebe, for one, 
characterizes Lloyd as nostalgic for “the life of the town”—a tradition of communalism 
in American life that changed as more and more Americans left rural communities for 
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economic opportunity in the urban centers.219 However, if one takes Lloyd at his word, 
this is precisely the opposite of what he set out to achieve. “Man knows himself to be a 
progressive animal; it is heaven for him to go forward; hell to go back.”220 In his heart, 
Lloyd was progressive, not nostalgic. He welcomed industrialization and the increased 
connectivity of individuals as a possible site for a new type of morality and human 
association.  
Admirers will point to his indefatigable hope that the American community could 
aspire to a higher form of economic, social, and political organization. Even Lloyd’s 
scathing criticisms of the existing economic and political system were informed by his 
ultimately positive and hopeful vision for the United States. His criticism was based upon 
a genuine moral belief that human beings were social, loving, and cooperative. In this 
sense, Lloyd actually epitomized the moralistic approach to social and economic 
problems that Sumner so vehemently opposed. Lloyd never saw the need to separate his 
moral concerns from his social commentary. Indeed, his moralism is encyclopedic and 
universalist. He supports his own moral vision of cooperation and love by referencing a 
range of moral teachers from Kropotkin to Confucius, and from Mazzini to Christ. He 
argues that all of these moral visionaries, himself included, have been informed by the 
very same moral idea—that human beings fundamentally love one another and that any 
human association must be a living embodiment of the Golden Rule. 
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CHAPTER 6 — THORSTEIN VEBLEN’S CHALLENGE TO LAISSEZ FAIRE 
ECONOMIC THEORY 
 
 
It becomes incumbent on the advocate of laissez-faire to “prove his minor 
premise.” It is no longer self-evident that: “Interests left to themselves tend to 
harmonious combinations, and to progressive preponderance of the general 
good.” 
     
—Thorstein Veblen, “The Preconceptions of Economic Science III” 
 
 
 
 
As the Gilded Age was coming to a close at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
Thorstein Veblen was one voice among many that challenged the dominant imperative of 
classical economics—laissez faire. Before the turn of the century, academic economics in 
America was dominated by “neo-classical economics.”1 Supporters of laissez faire, such 
as William Graham Sumner, adopted this school of thought—developed by Smith, 
Riccardo and others—to justify a competitive market economy.2 Although Veblen 
studied under Sumner at Yale, he would build his academic career on a profound 
rejection of his former teacher’s economic theory.3 He was a non-conformist his entire 
life, and his approach to economics was characteristic of this. He had trouble holding on 
to any academic position from his departure from Chicago in 1899 until his affiliation 
with The New School in 1919, although this was mostly a consequence of his hopelessly 
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complicated married life.4 Nevertheless, Veblen’s caustic insights into economic life gave 
his intellectual efforts an unmistakable originality that mirrored his famously eccentric 
persona.  
Although he is a much-appreciated satirist and social critic, Veblen’s polemical 
assessment of Gilded Age consumerism is rooted in a systematic and all-encompassing 
economic theory. He repeatedly grounds his somewhat inflammatory social criticisms in 
what he sees as a solid economic foundation. Veblen treats it as self-evident that a 
modern society with an industrial base of production has an objective interest in 
cooperative production. Based on this simple fact, he reconsiders the dominant beliefs 
and practices of American society in light of whether they facilitate or hinder cooperative 
relations of industrial production. Veblen’s approach to economics is based upon a 
rejection of the laissez faire assumption that free competition is necessarily the most 
efficient way to produce and allocate the goods that are necessary for human life.  
 Along with his insistence that modern societies have an economic interest in 
cooperation rather than competition, Veblen challenges the mainstays of laissez faire 
economic theory. He rejects the fixed hedonistic model of human nature along with the 
tendency among economists to identify abstract laws of a supposedly unchanging 
economic reality. Rather, Veblen describes economic phenomena as historically 
contingent and constantly in flux. Furthermore, economic behavior and social practices 
do not always develop in a progressive manner. There are habits and norms that can 
inhibit the economic community’s ability to produce things that are materially necessary 	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and to allocate these necessities to the population. Behaviors such as conspicuous 
consumption—a concept that Veblen famously identified—do nothing to further the 
economic interest of the community as a whole. Classical economists and adherents to 
laissez faire tend to normalize such economic practices as a “natural” outcome of a 
competitive market economy, but they do not challenge the value of such practices.  
 Veblen’s approach to economics involves a critical appraisal of the habits of 
economic life, which he refers to as economic institutions. Economic institutions are the 
complex array of beliefs, habits, practices, and behavioral norms that influence economic 
behavior. Institutions are social and historical, and they have a direct bearing on the 
economic system. Veblen focuses on these institutions in terms of their economic value. 
He accounts for how they originate, how they change, and how they affect economic 
production and distribution. More often than not, Veblen argues, the dominant 
institutions in society form obstacles to economic progress. Institutions such as private 
property, religious doctrines, and conspicuous consumption tend to reinforce selfish 
competitive habits. These institutions tend to conserve such undesirable traits; whereas, 
Veblen believes that economic progress involved the adoption of cooperative practices 
that facilitate collective production in an industrial setting.  
 Because of the fact that economic life is largely influenced by social and 
institutional factors, Veblen argues that the appropriate focus of the economist is to 
critically appraise these institutions in terms of their economic value. In this chapter, I 
investigate this critical appraisal in terms of its challenge to some of the important 
concepts of laissez faire. I begin by explaining Veblen’s theory of economic development 
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and considering how it differs from the classical model that forms the basis of laissez 
faire. Veblen’s theory of economic progress rejects the classical notion of a fixed human 
nature, replacing it with an evolving institutional explanation of economic motivations. I 
then assess the ways in which Veblen challenges the classical approach to economic 
theory. He believes that classical economic theory is based upon a set of erroneous 
assumptions about economic life, and he offers an alternative approach that is 
evolutionary and accounts for changing norms and practices. Finally, I consider the 
criteria that Veblen uses to critically assess these institutions and the ethical implications 
that these standards have for economists. Because of his argument that many institutions 
are wasteful, the economist has an ethical obligation to challenge them and to identify 
ways to make them more amenable to cooperative industrial production. Overall, Veblen 
provides not only a strikingly new model of economic development but also a new vision 
of what economics is as a discipline of study. For Veblen, an economist should not be a 
mere passive observer of timeless economic processes, but a critic of these very 
processes. An economist must also be an agent of change. 
 
VEBLEN’S THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Veblen considered the discipline of economics, as he found it, ill-suited to 
account for significant changes in economic life. Classical economists, he argued, could 
not account for the emergence of economic institutions—the habits, beliefs, and practices 
that relate to economic life. These institutions shape economic life in ways that the 
classical school of economists cannot account for. Veblen believes that any satisfactory 
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economic theory should be able to explain the process by which these institutions evolve. 
Because these institutions are the product of social and historical forces, the abstract and 
normalizing approach of classical economics tends to overlook these historical 
particularities in favor of timeless laws that hold across all historical epochs. Classical 
economists treat human nature and competition as permanent and static features of 
economic life. 
Veblen’s alternative to the static view of economics is his own theory of the 
development of economic institutions. His model of economic development posits an 
interactive relationship between social norms and economic practices. Although he is 
attentive to human instincts and material conditions, Veblen’s primary focus is on the 
changing nature of institutions. Institutions are the stimuli that condition most of 
economic life; therefore, they are the most appropriate focus of economics. Veblen’s 
theory of economic progress is as vague as it is sweeping, and he does not present it in a 
straightforwardly analytical or explanatory manner. One is compelled to piece together 
his evolutionary theory of economic development from the scattered explanations 
presented in his essays and treatises. In the section that follows, I will explicate Veblen’s 
economic model, including his view of human nature (or human instincts), his concept of 
institutions, and his explanation of how institutions evolve. 
 
Economic Interest, Material Means, and Production 
 
 Veblen’s project, as he sees it, is to develop a theory of cultural evolution based 
upon the economic beliefs and behavior of human beings. In contrast to Marx, for 
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example, Veblen is not trying to construct an all-encompassing theory of history rooted in 
the material facts of economic production.5 Rather, he is interested in cultural phenomena 
that are created and shaped by man’s “economic interest”—“interest in the material 
means of life.”6 Veblen refers to these cultural phenomena or “habits of thought” as 
“economic institutions,” which include things like private property, technological 
processes, and conspicuous consumption. Economists, Veblen believes, should compare 
the objective economic interests of the community with the cultural expression of that 
economic interest in the form of institutions. Relying upon this economic appraisal of 
cultural norms and practices, Veblen criticizes institutions that are seemingly trivial. He 
deems religion, sports, fashion, and even higher education to be arcane relics that are a 
result of a more primitive culture. Veblen attempts to account for the emergence and 
development of these institutions to show that they do not further the economic interests 
of a modern industrial community. 
 If there is a solid foundation to Veblen’s theory, it is the “economic interest” of 
human beings that has existed throughout history—the “economic life process.”7 “The 
economic life history of any community is its life history in so far as it is shaped by 
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men’s interest in the material means of life.”8 The types of action that emerge from this 
economic interest are oriented towards an end or goal. “Economic action is teleological, 
in the sense that men always and everywhere seek to do something.”9 That is not to say 
that the goal of economic activity is constant; rather, every cultural expression of the 
economic interest will be teleological in its own particular way. Veblen argues that this 
drive to accomplish a useful or productive goal is largely instinctual.10 He terms this 
“taste for effective work, and … distaste for futile effort” the “instinct of workmanship,” 
and it forms the “psychological ground” of his theory of economic development.11  
This instinctual and teleological economic interest will compel human 
communities to interact with their material environment in order to procure subsistence at 
the very least. But Veblen does not treat the changes in the material facts of life as 
determinative: “The physical properties of the materials accessible to man are constants: 
it is the human agent that changes,—his insight and his appreciation of what things can 
be used for is what develops.”12 Veblen considers the material and technological situation 
of a society to “stand in a system of interdependence” with social customs and habits. It 
is not simply an “exogenous” force that is unaffected by the process of societal 
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evolution.13 The economic interest develops progressively throughout history, but it is a 
social change, rather than a change in material facts. Veblen characterizes technology 
itself as a social, rather than material development. “The changes that take place in the 
mechanical contrivances are an expression of changes in the human factor. Changes in 
the material facts breed further changes only through the human factor.”14 In short, 
humans are goal-oriented creatures with material needs, and in pursuit of those goals 
economic agents affect the way the whole community thinks and acts. This is “the 
economic life process.” 
 Veblen thinks that economic production, the pursuit of the material means of life, 
is inherently communal or social. He writes, 
Production takes place only in society—only through the cooperation of an 
industrial community . . . . The isolated individual is not a productive agent. What 
he can do at best is live from season to season, as the non-gregarious animals 
do.15  
 
This is, of course, a challenge to the natural rights justification for private property, but 
Veblen is also trying to establish the economic interest as communal phenomenon. The 
collective knowledge of the community is necessary for any production beyond the mere 
subsistence minimum. Communal institutions such as “traditions, tools, [and] technical 
knowledge” are necessary to produce useful goods “since there is no individual 
production and no individual productivity.”16 An isolated individual may be able to 
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procure a degree of subsistence, but without the technical and cultural knowledge of the 
community he or she cannot produce useful goods. 
 
Human Nature and Human Development 
 
 Veblen’s conception of human development offers very little in terms of a 
psychological model for human nature or economic behavior. Human beings obviously 
must provide for themselves, and Veblen does suggest that this is a constant feature of 
human life. He does not identify any permanent features of human psychology other than  
basic human impulses such as “the economic interest” and the “instinct of workmanship.” 
However, one cannot predict the type of cultural expression that will result from these 
impulses. He argues that economists who resort to a static model of human nature assume 
what they are obliged to prove—that there is a permanent human impulse that explains 
why we act or how we make decisions. When Adam Smith, for example, argues that the 
instinct to barter is a result of “a direct propensity in human nature,” Veblen observes that 
Smith relies upon this feature of human nature “without any attempt at further 
explanation of how man has come by it.”17 This is one reason that Veblen criticizes 
economics as a “taxonomic” rather than an “evolutionary” science.18 
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 Veblen wants to reconceptualize human nature by focusing on habits and 
character rather than innate psychological propensities. Such a fixed conception of human 
nature prevents economists from accounting for human development.  
The economists have accepted the hedonistic preconception concerning human 
nature and human action, and the conception of economic interest which a 
hedonist psychology gives does not afford material for a theory of the 
development of human nature.19 
 
Veblen not only believes that this fixed model of human nature is inaccurate, it removes 
the human subject, in all its complexities, from the universe of economic theory. Such a 
simplistic view of human nature means “the element of human nature may be fairly 
eliminated from the problem, with great gain in simplicity and expedition.”20 Economic 
theory, in Veblen’s view, was not suffering from a want of simplicity. 
 In Veblen’s theory, economic agents do not have a fixed and permanent nature; 
they have an adaptable character that is in flux and subject to a myriad of social 
influences. “He is not simply a bundle of desires . . . but a rather coherent structure of 
propensities and habits which seeks realization and expression in an unfolding activity.”21 
Veblen puts forward an alternative to the psychologized notion of human nature that was 
so common in classical and neo-classical economic theory. He acknowledges that human 
evolution has a biological and material aspect, but “taken in the aggregate or average, this 
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human subject is more or less variable.”22 What is more, this variation in the human 
subject should be the primary focus of economics. “It is in the human material that the 
continuity of development is to be looked for; and it is here, therefore, that the motor 
forces of the process of economic development must be studied.”23 Veblen sees social 
evolution as primarily an evolution in what classical economists call human nature.  
 Of course, it is not nature that evolves and changes, but the ways in which 
individuals think and behave. For Veblen, economic behavior is based upon the economic 
interest of mankind expressing itself based upon inherited practices and customs. The 
individual has “circumstances of temperament” that are “products of his hereditary traits 
and his past experience, cumulatively wrought out under a given body of traditions, 
conventionalities, and material circumstances.”24 The economic motives of an individual 
are historical and cultural rather than natural or psychological, which makes the 
individual, to a certain degree, malleable.25 Veblen beleives that individuals tend to 
gravitate towards conventional methods of thinking and habits that are shaped by society 
in general. “Each individual is but a single complex of habits of thought.”26 For Veblen, 
these “habits of thought”—their formation, evolution, and effects—are the most 
appropriate focus for economic investigation.  
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The Crucial Role of Institutions in Veblen’s Theory of Development 
 
 Veblen’s concept of institutions is quite broad and goes beyond the traditional 
view of institutions as formal structures that are religious, legal, or political. Veblen uses 
the word “institution” interchangeably with “habits of thought, points of view, [and] 
mental attitudes and aptitudes.”27 These institutions are constitutive of human nature. 
They shape our very consciousness and form the basis of economic practices and 
behaviors. Institutions are “circumstances of temperament” manifested in the individual; 
they “are the products of his hereditary traits and his past experience, cumulatively 
wrought out under a given body of traditions, conventionalities, and material 
circumstances.”28 Institutions are the ever-changing constellation of habits, moral 
systems, technological processes, norms and attitudes that account for the way an 
economic community behaves. If economists are to construct a theory of economic 
development, Veblen believes, they must frame that theory in terms of the change of 
institutions.29 
 One will notice that Veblen’s concept of institutions, the broad array of human 
habits and attitudes, goes far behind the confines of economics, but Veblen is careful to 
point out that his interest is restricted to only economic institutions. That is, “comprising 
those institutions in which the economic interest most immediately and consistently finds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class, 140. 
28 Veblen, “Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science,” 390. 
29 As Olivier Brette has shown, institutions are both a cause and effect in Veblen’s 
theory of economic change. See, “Veblen’s Theory of Institutional Change,” 463-4. 
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expression and which most immediately . . . are of an economic bearing.”30 Again, 
Veblen frames the subject of economics in terms of this “economic interest,” interest in 
“the material means of life.”31 But this is hardly the only interest that drives human 
behavior. The economic interest exists alongside “aesthetic, sexual, humanitarian, [and] 
devotional interests.”32 This means that no human action is reducible to economic 
motivations alone, but it also means that virtually all cultural institutions are connected in 
some way to the economic interest of mankind. This does a great deal to explain why 
Veblen, as an economist, became such a trenchant critic of American culture. The 
economic interest is so pervasive that it opens a myriad of new avenues for Veblen’s 
economic critique. To illustrate how expansive this institutional focus can be, I will 
describe two very different economic institutions that come under Veblen’s critical gaze, 
the ownership or property and religious observance.  
The neoclassical view of property—championed by Spencer and Sumner—is 
based upon the belief that society has progressed from a “regime of status to one of 
contract.”33 These theorists argue that private property emerged under this “regime of 
contract” as a way of exchanging productive labor for scarce resources.34 Veblen 
maintains that the institution of ownership is a convention, reinforced by habit and 
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tradition, whose origin is predation and “the practice of plundering.”35 For Veblen, the 
institution of ownership is an institution that arose in a more primitive stage of human 
culture that was marked by violence and exploitation. Property, according to Veblen, 
originated in the need for men to establish their status in a primitive community. 
Ownership is not a progressive feature of a modern industrial economy: it is a cultural 
relic that is best suited to a “barbarian culture” that was defined by “exploit, coercion, 
and seizure.”36 Veblen questions the very utility of ownership in a modern society, and he 
does this by accounting for the development of ownership as an institution that grew out 
of the economic interest at an earlier stage in history. 
It is clear enough that such an institution as ownership is relevant for the purposes 
of economic investigation, but Veblen’s analysis also moves away from the traditional 
foci of economists to cultural phenomena such as religious observance. Never one to 
mince words, Veblen argues that the human proclivity for these “anthropomorphic cults” 
is based on a habitual tendency to identify “the presence of a pervasive extraphysical and 
arbitrary force or propensity in things or situations.”37 As irrelevant as it may seem for 
the purposes of economic theory, religious observance gives Veblen two points of entry 
from an economic front. First, the “animistic standpoint” which leads people to 
participate in religious observance is an earlier expression of the economic interest from a 
“predatory stage” of human culture.38 Religious observance can be explained in part by 	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36 Ibid., 360-1. 
37 Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class, 214-6. 
38 Ibid., 220. 
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accounting for the remnants of an earlier and more savage culture. Second, Veblen argues 
that the economic utility of this “animistic standpoint” is negative in so far as it 
contravenes “the matter-of-fact temper that recognizes the value of material facts as 
opaque items in a mechanical sequence.”39 The latter attitude is conducive to economic 
efficiency in a modern industrial community; the former is a hindrance. Veblen questions 
the economic value of religious observance because of the habit of mind that influences it 
and because of its uselessness from a purely economic standpoint in an industrial 
community.40 
Using his institutional focus, Veblen questions the economic usefulness of both 
ownership and religion. Both are the products of an earlier cultural form of the economic 
interest. They are the institutional relics of a more primitive culture from a distant past. 
Based upon this assessment, Veblen believes both of these institutions are ill-suited for a 
modern industrial community. 
 
The Evolution of Economic Institutions 
 
 Veblen was very critical of Social Darwinism, almost to the point of being 
dismissive, but this did not lead him to reject Darwinism or even the evolutionary 
terminology that accompanied it. Indeed, Veblen considered the discipline of economics 
to be somewhat antiquated because of its inability to transition to “an evolutionary 
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40 See ibid., 214-5. Veblen is very careful to point out that he is evaluating such 
institutions only on the basis of their economic utility. He does not question that such 
institutions may have spiritual or moral value for those who adhere to them. 
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science.”41 Veblen wanted economics to account for the evolution of economic 
institutions, not to classify the laws of economic reality based on a supposed struggle for 
survival among rational individuals. Veblen challenged Social Darwinism, not for 
employing evolutionary concepts, but for not being evolutionary at all.42 
 In his writing about economic institutions, Veblen constantly resorts to biological 
imagery. He conceives these institutions as organic complexes of norms, practices, and 
attitudes that are continuously evolving to meet changing circumstances.  He describes 
the process as follows: 
The progress which has been and is being made in human institutions and in 
human character may be set down, broadly, to a natural selection of the fittest 
habits of thought and to a process of enforced adaptation of individuals to an 
environment that has progressively changed with the growth of the community 
and with the changing institutions under which men have lived.43 
 
One will notice that Veblen’s description of institutional progress is shot through with 
biological and evolutionary imagery. Employing terms like “natural selection,” “fittest 
habits,” “adaptation,” and “environment,” Veblen reveals an inclination to apply 
evolutionary theory to human society. He goes on to say that institutional change is “a 
process of selective adaptation” or “of the nature of a response to stimulus.”44 Veblen 
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uses the paradigm of evolutionary biology to describe human social evolution as a series 
of adaptations to a social, rather than a natural, environment. 
 Veblen clearly states that life in human society is a “struggle for existence and 
therefore it is a process of selective adaptation.”45 But Veblen does not think that this 
selection is based upon natural or biological abilities, the likes of which are found in 
natural environments. Rather, “the evolution of the social structure has been a process of 
natural selection of institutions,” that is, “a natural selection of the fittest habits of 
thought.”46 Veblen believes this selective process discriminates between different types 
of character and habits that are more or less suited to the society at large. The 
characteristic nature of this process of institutional adaptation is stimulus and response. 
“Institutions must change with changing circumstances since they are of the nature of an 
habitual method of responding to the stimuli which these changing circumstances 
afford.”47 The biological imagery here is unmistakable. 
 What distinguishes Veblen’s theory of social evolution from biological evolution 
is that the “stimuli” to which economic institutions respond are not natural and constant, 
but historical and progressive.  Institutions themselves come to form the environment in 
which humans find themselves. Institutions are both cause and effect of human 
adaptation and behavior. These institutions constitute the social environment in which we 	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46 Ibid. It is curious that Veblen describes this process as “natural selection” since 
the “environment” that he describes is a social and cultural landscape that influences our 
habits and thinking. He may have mistakenly appropriated this phrase from evolutionary 
biology to support his own vision of evolutionary economics.  
47 Ibid., 139. 
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live, and consequently they form new stimuli that require further responses and 
adaptations. Veblen describes this interdependent relationship thusly,  
Changing institutions in their turn make for further selection of individuals  
endowed with the fittest temperament, and a further adaptation of individual 
temperament and habits to the changing environment through the formation of 
new institutions.48 
 
Stating economic theory in terms of natural selection, Veblen presents a novel approach 
to economics in which individuals, constituted mostly by habits, attitudes, and character, 
continuously change and adapt to the complex array of institutions that are themselves in 
flux.  
 One important implication of Veblen’s institutional and evolutionary approach to 
economics is that any “laws” posited by economists will be contingent upon a specific 
assemblage of institutions. Once these institutions change, the “laws” will no longer be 
applicable. From this perspective, classical economists are left to classify and identify the 
effects of institutions that they cannot account for. Veblen argues that this misguided 
approach to economics is based upon a series of erroneous assumptions that have been 
uncritically accepted by economists from the Physiocrats to the Utilitarians. His attempt 
to dislodge these assumptions amounts to a serious challenge to the foundations of laissez 
faire economics.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, EVOLUTION, AND LAISSEZ FAIRE 
 
Before discussing the ways in which institutions contribute to and hinder human 
progress, a crucial aspect of Veblen’s critique of laissez faire, I must explain the ways in 	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which Veblen’s theory of institutions challenges the foundations of classical economic 
theory. Primarily, Veblen’s institutional focus seriously undermines the laissez faire 
conception of the economic agent as a rational, self-interested actor with a constant 
human nature. Veblen’s approach also questions the “laws,” which are posited by 
classical economists. He argues that classical economists assume that there is some 
permanent “order of nature” and that such an order lends itself to fixed and discoverable 
“natural law.”49 Veblen also postulates an underlying worldview or metaphysical belief 
that classical economists unwittingly adopt. Classical economics originated during the 
Enlightenment and was heavily connected to the idea of natural law. This led economists 
to adopt an “animistic preconception” in which economic events are expected to conform 
to a permanent order of nature. Veblen believes that this focus on an abstract law of 
nature has lead economists to focus on taxonomy, the classification of economic 
phenomena that are part of an unchanging economic process. Veblen believes that the 
most important task for the economist is to break from taxonomy and account for how the 
economic process changes along with the evolution of institutions.  
 
Animism and the Classical Economic Worldview  
 
Veblen’s approach to economic knowledge is largely sociological. He believes 
that economic knowledge will be bound up with and determined by the dominant 
attitudes that exist historically at the time a theory is formulated. There are 
“preconceptions” held by economists that explain, to some extent, their approach to 	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economic truth. He writes, “The spiritual attitude of a given generation of economists is 
therefore in good part a special outgrowth of the ideals and preconceptions current in the 
world around them.”50 In his three-part essay, “The Preconceptions of Economic 
Science,” Veblen presents a genealogy of these preconceptions and “spiritual attitudes” in 
order to explain the origins and assumptions of classical economics, which he believes 
are still holding the discipline back. The discipline of economics itself is shaped and 
influenced by the existing institutions of society, institutions that shape the “spiritual 
attitude” of the economists themselves. The “canons of economic reality . . . are of the 
nature of habits of thought.”51 The ways in which economists approach the world are 
determined by these preconceptions and habits. 
 Veblen repeatedly criticizes the discipline of economics for not being 
evolutionary in its approach to knowledge. He challenges the laissez faire mission to 
deduce absolute laws from a supposed fixed economic order. His institutional focus is an 
attempt to account for the evolving nature of economic life and get beyond the classical 
focus on identifying laws of economics that are universal. The propensity for economists 
to look for abstract universal laws, Veblen believes, can be traced back to the first 
proponents of laissez faire, the Physiocrats. The Physiocrats were the inheritors of “the 
doctrines of Natural Rights and the Order of Nature,” which were prevalent in the 
enlightenment.52 Veblen is surprisingly lenient on the actual figures of the Physiocratic 
school. His focus instead is the intellectual structure that transmitted these preconceptions 	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and “spiritual attitudes.” “Physiocratic economics is a theory of the working-out of the 
Law of Nature (loi naturelle) in its economic bearing, and this Law of Nature is a very 
simple matter.”53 Physiocratic economics, it seems, was a product of the times, but their 
incorporation of natural law into economic theory would have lasting consequences.  
 Because of this natural law preconception, the Physiocrats assumed that the laws 
of economics would have the same character as the laws of nature. That is, legitimate 
economic laws would have to be “immutable and unerring” just like the laws governing 
nature itself.54 Veblen writes, “The great law of the order of nature is of the character of a 
propensity working to an end, to the accomplishment of a purpose.”55 The Physiocrats 
believed that nature was purposeful and progressive. They were intent upon working out 
in economic terms “the propensity imminent in nature to establish the highest well-being 
of mankind.”56 This “propensity” for progress was taken for granted by the Physiocrats as 
something that did not require explanation. Consequently, “the conclusions reached, 
when these laws and order are known, are therefore expressions of absolute truth.”57 
Veblen believes that the natural law preconception of the Physiocrats led them to 
conclude that the nature of economic reality was fixed and ordered, lending itself to laws 
that are based on this permanent ordering of economic life. Economic laws, like natural 
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law would have to be abstract and universal to fit the preconceived notion of an economic 
reality as a uniform and natural order of economic life. 
Such a focus on universal laws as a criterion for economic knowledge has been a 
mainstay of classical economic theory dominating the economic theories of Veblen’s 
contemporaries and persisting to the present time. But there is a more pervasive 
preconception that grew out of natural law. Veblen observes that the natural law 
preconception led the Physiocrats, and future economists from Adam Smith to John 
Stuart Mill, to attribute to economic phenomena “a quasi-spiritual or animistic 
character.”58 This means that economists tend to imbue inanimate facts of economic 
reality with a purposeful, animistic character. Rather than deal with the factual basis of 
economic life, Physiocratic “canons of knowledge are cast in the animistic mould and 
converge to a ground of absolute truth, and this absolute truth is of a ceremonial nature. 
Its subject matter is reality regardless of fact.”59 This type of animistic preconception is 
very similar to religious belief in that it is assumed that there is a purported absolute and 
intelligent order of things. From its very beginning, the discipline of economics adopted 
this animistic attitude from “natural theology, natural rights, moral philosophy, and 
natural law.”60 This attitude is an obstacle to the dispassionate observation of facts that 
Veblen advocates as an approach to economic knowledge. 
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 Veblen identifies two lasting features of this animistic preconception that have 
formed the “metaphysics of political economy.”61 The first feature is a treatment of the 
human agent as fundamentally hedonistic and part of a larger natural process.62 The 
animistic preconception of economic life, the proclivity to attribute living properties to 
economic events and processes, leads economists to accept a reductionist conception of 
the economic agent as a fixed site of hedonistic impulses. They naturalize the human 
agent so that the complexities of human behavior are eliminated in order to fit the human 
into a preconceived model of economic reality. “The motives and movements of men are 
normalized to fit the requirements of a hedonistically conceived order of nature.”63 
Veblen argues that this very conception of an “order of nature” is another holdover from 
the natural law and animistic preconceptions that the Physiocrats established. They have 
personified the very process of economic life treating it as a divinely ordered system with 
a predetermined end.  
 The second feature of the animistic preconception that runs through classical 
economics is the belief in a progressive and “benign order of nature” that will lend itself 
to natural laws.64 This preconception was originally accepted as a religious truth. “With 
Adam Smith the ultimate ground of economic reality is the design of God, the 
teleological order.”65 Smith’s animistic conception of economic life led him to attribute a 	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purposeful order to events and to interpret these events as inevitable and progressive. 
Veblen argued that this preconception of a benign and ordered nature was also a 
dominant feature of utilitarian economics that arose near the middle of the nineteenth 
century—specifically the economic writing of John Stuart Mill.  These economists held 
“an uncritical conviction that there is a meliorative trend in the course of events, apart 
from the conscious ends of the individual members of the community.”66 They dispensed 
with the theological undergirding of this “order of nature” and replaced it with “a belief 
in the organic or quasi-organic . . . life process on the part of the economic community.”67 
Regardless of their explanation, utilitarian economists hold to the same preconception 
that economic life is ordered, progressive, and teleological. Veblen argues that this belief 
is yet another legacy of the “animistic preconception” that accompanied economic 
science since its inception. 
 
Economic Theory, the Lineage of Natural Law, and the Animistic Preconception 
 
Veblen believes that this animistic preconception exhibited in economic theory 
has contributed to two major deficiencies in the discipline of economics. One such 
deficiency is the focus on the economic life as an ongoing and unchanging process rather 
than a focus on how these processes originate, change, and end. Veblen argues that this 
focus on economic process began with Adam Smith’s “preconception of a productive 
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natural process as the basis of his economic theory.”68 Veblen does not object to 
economists seeking to focus on the process of economic life; what he rejects is the 
purposeful teleological character of this process that results from animistic 
preconceptions. Smith, he argues, does not include the entire process of economic life 
into his theory. Instead he simplifies the process by “normalizing the chief causal factor 
in the process.”69 Smith normalizes the human agent so that he or she will fit neatly into 
an ordered teleological economic process. Subsequent theorists of laissez faire would 
renew their focus on the “process of economic life,” but Veblen argues that their focus on 
process is informed by a “metaphysics of normality” in which they attempt to categorize 
and normalize aspects of a changing economic process.70 Veblen argues that this leaves 
economic theorists with the task of classifying and explaining aspects and outcome of a 
certain economic process, but they fail to provide “a theory of the process as such.”71 The 
preoccupation with a normalized process of economic life is an obstacle to an accurate 
understanding of how these processes actually work and change. 
 A second deficiency in economic theory that results from the animistic 
preconception is the tendency to frame economic theories in terms of abstract concepts 
rather than focus on empirical facts. Veblen’s insight is especially valuable here because 
so much of economic theory is based upon assumptions that simplify economic reality. 
He traces this feature of economic theory back to the animistic preconceptions of the 	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Physiocrats and their desire to discover abstract natural laws. Animism, as a basis of 
scientific knowledge, is conducive to a presentation of knowledge on “a ground of 
absolute truth.”72 Veblen clearly states that this animistic frame of reference aims at an 
abstract form of knowledge: “Its subject matter is a reality regardless of facts.”73 Adam 
Smith, for example, moves away from “unconstrued observation” of economic 
phenomena to “normalization of data” in which phenomena fit into a nicely ordered 
teleological process.74 In Smith’s case, the preconceived notion of an abstract and ordered 
economic process takes precedence over the actual facts of the economic process. Veblen 
observes that this obsession with normalizing facts so that they fit into an abstract 
framework reached a fevered pitch during the middle of the nineteenth century. “The 
[economic] science is, therefore, a theory of the normal case, a discussion of the concrete 
facts of life in respect of their degree of approximation to the normal case.”75 Economics 
is beholden to a “metaphysics of normality” in which economic truth is judged according 
to an abstract hypothetical model of reality rather than “coincidence with matter-of-fact 
events.”76 
 These two consequences of this animistic preconception, a focus on economic 
processes and an application of abstract laws to such a process, are closely  
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related. If an economist conceives economic life as a fairly constant process, abstract 
descriptions of that process will seem appropriate. The economic process is assumed to 
be constant, and the laws pertaining to that process are assumed to be universal. Such a 
vision of economic life is why Veblen protested that economics was not evolutionary. An 
abstract assessment of a supposedly constant process leaves no room for a theory of how 
the process itself may change. Veblen’s insight here is that the intellectual grounding of 
this universal process came from outside the process itself.77 Veblen believes that the 
economic process was complex; the working out of the process historically will 
inevitably alter the process, primarily through evolution of institutions. Any credible 
explanation of an economic process will have to account for how the economic 
institutions affect, and are affected by, the process itself. Classical economists use natural 
law and the animistic preconception unwittingly as a referent to ground their belief in a 
constant, predictable economic process. 
 The preoccupation with economic process that Veblen identifies among classical 
economics lends itself to an abstract approach to knowledge. The process itself is an 
abstract concept; it is a useful fiction in which elements of the economic process are 
“normalized” to fit along with a consistent abstract standard. Given the abstract nature of 
the process, economists tend to favor abstract explanations for the workings of the 
economic process. The laws of supply and demand, competitive advantage, and marginal 
utility all present abstract explanations of the economic process and its possible 
outcomes. Again, Veblen challenges this approach based on evolutionary criteria. Veblen 
thinks that the process of economic life does not lend itself to abstract laws in the manner 	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of the natural sciences. This is because the process of economic life goes through various 
phases of development as institutions change and evolve. From Veblen’s perspective, 
abstract and universal laws, are inappropriate because they are based upon a hypostatized 
view of the economic process. Classical economists rely upon an abstract model of the 
economic process and proceed to formulate abstract laws that would predict and explain 
the outcome of that process.  
Veblen looks at the economic process empirically rather than abstractly. He treats  
economic life as something that is factual and adaptable. Indeed, much of Veblen’s 
research is devoted to an assessment of how various institutions have shaped the 
economic process. Such an approach to the economic process excludes the possibility of 
abstract universal laws of economics. Veblen’s model of the economic process as a 
constant evolution of institutions implies that abstract laws will only hold in certain 
situations, and as institutions change and progress, those laws will cease to be applicable. 
Therefore, the most important task for an economist is to investigate the evolution of 
economic institutions and consider how useful they are for the community at large. Most 
economists treat the economic process as static, and they seek to classify and identify the 
workings of the economy in an abstract manner. This is the reason that Veblen considers 
economics to be more “taxonomic” than “evolutionary.”78 Economists are left to supply a 
taxonomic classification of economic life similar to a naturalist identifying organisms in 
the wilderness. Veblen wants economists to consider, like Darwin, where those 
organisms came from and how they change.  
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INSTITUTIONS, PROGRESS, AND CONSERVATISM  
 
Having explained Veblen’s model of economic development as well as his 
criticism of the intellectual roots of classical economics, I now turn to Veblen’s own 
approach to economic phenomena. According to Veblen’s model of economic 
development, economic institutions are the most important focus for economic 
investigation. Human instincts and material reality are undoubtedly part of the model that 
Veblen presents, but he argues that the most important explanatory factors for economic 
theory are the habits and attitudes that supervene upon the economic agent. In Veblen’s 
view, an accurate appraisal of economic institutions explains much more about economic 
life than any static theory of human nature. However, Veblen also believes that the 
classical approach to economics is incapable of accounting for institutional evolution in 
any meaningful way. The classical approach is to formulate abstract theories relating to a 
supposedly unchanging economic process. Veblen believes that this process is constantly 
changing. The processes of economic life are influenced at every turn by institutional 
dynamics. Veblen wants economists to account for this influence by critically assessing 
economic institutions. For this reason, Veblen’s own economic investigations take the 
form of institutional critique. 
 	  
Serviceability and Waste 
 
Veblen recognizes a certain theoretical complacency among economists, and one 
instance of this complacency is the  “tacitly accepted law of equivalence between 
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productive service and remuneration.”79 According to classic economic theory, the 
explanation for the distribution of wealth is related to productivity. Classical economists 
tend to justify the income of “captains of industry” by arguing that capital itself is 
productive and necessary to industrial production. If this doctrine of equivalency is 
correct, Veblen wonders why the theory does not obtain in reality: 
 Why do we, now and again, have hard times and unemployment in the midst of  
excellent resources, high efficiency and plenty of unmet wants? Why is one-half 
our consumable product contrived for consumption that yields no material 
benefit? . . . Why are large and increasing portions of the community penniless in 
spite of a scale of remuneration which is very appreciably above the subsistence 
minimum?80 
 
These questions pose a problem for proponents of the “law of equivalency.” Can an 
economist honestly argue that the vast inequalities in wealth are based solely upon the 
difference in productive abilities? Veblen argues that the unequal distribution of wealth is 
conventional and contingent rather than natural and necessary. He supports his argument 
by showing that not all economic activities are productive, and some activities that are 
quite lucrative are actually wasteful. In fact, Veblen is skeptical that ownership itself 
serves a useful function in an industrial community, and he rejects the idea that capital is 
necessarily productive. But according to Veblen’s conception of economic reality, 
ownership and wealth are not naturally occurring phenomena; they are institutions that 
grew from human contrivance. By characterizing wealth as an institution, as a habit of 
thinking that evolved in a complex environment, Veblen is able to assess its value to the 
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economic community as a whole. It is from the perspective of the whole community that 
Veblen evaluates institutions.  
Veblen’s focus on institutions as the primary site of human development affords 
him a novel perspective on mainstays of culture that were all too familiar to some. One 
observer commented that Veblen approached the world as if everything were strange to 
him and nothing was familiar.81 His institutional analysis surely facilitates this. Veblen 
levels razor sharp criticism at various cultural practices, but his criticism is always based 
upon economic value. Veblen assesses institutions such as ownership, religion, higher 
education, and conspicuous consumption according to their usefulness to the modern 
economic community. He believes that these institutions should be analyzed from an 
economic standpoint. From such a vantage institutions are “gauged and graded with 
regard to their immediate economic bearing on the on the facility of the economic life 
process.”82 The institutions of society, the habits, attitudes, and character of individuals, 
Veblen thinks, should be conducive to the cooperative nature of modern industrial 
production. In other words, Veblen has a normative prescription for how institutions 
should develop. 
 Veblen ultimately judges the value of an institution based upon its economic 
“serviceability” or its “importance to the economic life process.”83 Institutional features 
such as norms, attitudes, and practices will ultimately find their expression in the 
character and actions of individuals. It is here that Veblen thinks that there should be a 	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“discussion of their economic bearing on the serviceability of the individual as an 
economic factor, and especially as an industrial agent.”84 From an economic standpoint, 
an individual can have character traits and habits that are more or less “serviceable” for 
the purposes of industrial production. Veblen considers the modern economic process to 
be industrial and cooperative: “The collective interest of any modern community centre 
in industrial efficiency.”85 Therefore, those traits and institutions that lead to cooperative 
productive relations are to be preferred over those that lead to competitive and wasteful 
behavior. Industrial serviceability is the standard by which Veblen evaluates economic 
institutions. 
 By framing individual beliefs and dispositions as a product of cultural norms, 
Veblen has identified a mechanism that links cultural influences with individual 
productivity. From an economic standpoint, there are numerous institutions that render 
the individual less serviceable for industrial purposes. The economic interest in society is 
a “collective interest [that] is best served by honesty, diligence, peacefulness, good will, 
an absence of self-seeking, and an habitual recognition and apprehension of causal 
sequence.”86 Veblen does not simply level his criticism at selfishness as a character trait; 
he attempts to identify the very determinants of this type of human attitude by examining 
certain aspects of culture, which he calls “institutions.” His analysis presents the self-
interested economic individual as neither natural nor desirable. 
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 If serviceability is the quality that renders institutions useful, waste is the quality 
that renders them less useful and even detrimental. Waste is an “expenditure that does not 
serve human life or human well-being on the whole.”87 Waste in this sense does not refer 
simply to wasteful expenditures on the part of individual consumers. Waste is an 
institutional quality. Wasteful expenditures arise from habits of thought that are 
reinforced by society and customs. One such habit of thought that Veblen continuously 
refers to is “pecuniary emulation” or “invidious pecuniary comparison.”88 The human 
propensity to compete in terms of accumulation of consumable goods does nothing to 
further the interest of the entire human community. This characterization of competition, 
accumulation, and consumption as wasteful stands contrary to the Social Darwinists’ 
claim that competition for consumable goods is the motor of economic progress. Veblen 
considers the institutional grounding of this desire for accumulation to be unserviceable 
and wasteful. The pursuit of wealth is not grounded in the desire to increase the well 
being of the human community, but to distinguish members of the community from each 
other on the basis of their skills for accumulation.  
 
Progress, Ownership, and Capital 
 
 If there is one consistent standard by which laissez faire theorists measure 
economic progress, it is the creation of wealth. Hence the contemporary characterization 
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of the wealthy in the United States as “job-creators.” The basis of wealth is ownership 
and the institution of private property. Veblen is critical of the institution of ownership or 
private property because it reinforces habits of jealousy and competition. He considers 
ownership to be a wasteful institution because the institution of ownership is not directly 
related to subsistence or industrial production. It is based instead on “pecuniary 
emulation” or the desire to have more than others.  
Ownership began and grew into a human institution on grounds unrelated to the  
subsistence minimum. The dominant incentive was from the outset the invidious 
distinction attaching to wealth, and, save temporarily and by exception no other 
motive has usurped the primacy at any later stage of development.89 
 
Veblen does not consider ownership to be directly useful to the industrial process in 
terms of production, only in terms of acquisition or pecuniary gain. “The motive that lies 
at the root of ownership is emulation.”90 The institution of ownership, the complex of 
habits and conventions that reinforce the norms of private property, is based upon human 
jealousy and the desire to compare oneself to others.  
Ownership also tends to divert precious resources to frivolous luxury goods that 
serve to display one’s status in society. Veblen famously observed that ownership often 
manifests itself in “conspicuous consumption” and even “conspicuous waste” rather than 
as a means to procure necessities. Therefore, the competition or struggle for wealth is not 
a struggle for survival, but a struggle for status. “Under modern conditions the struggle 
for subsistence has, in very appreciable degree, been transformed into a struggle to keep 
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up appearances.”91 Veblen argued that this struggle to emulate others and the 
consumption that results from this emulative motive requires much more labor than 
would be necessary to provide for subsistence of the community.92 The ownership of 
private property is not a means to procure subsistence but an institution based upon the 
human desire to have more than others. Wealth, in other words, is meant for “invidious 
distinction” rather than subsistence or consumption of useful goods. 
Classical economic theory sees ownership as a means to subsistence. There is an 
implicit assumption here that more wealth will lead to greater ease of subsistence, and 
this would represent progress. Such an approach would characterize “captains of 
industry” and wealthy people in general as drivers of progress. Veblen rejects this view. 
He argues that classical economists make the mistake of characterizing the competition 
for wealth as a “struggle for subsistence” in which the “end of acquisition and 
accumulation is conventionally held to be the consumption of the goods accumulated.”93 
Classical economists imply that ownership has a positive utility in regards to subsistence. 
In other words, an increase in wealth indicates an increase in consumable goods and 
therefore greater access to the necessities of life. To use Veblen’s own terminology, 
classical economists characterize ownership and wealth accumulation as a serviceable 
institution, which leads them to view captains of industry as forces of progress. 
Classical economists also assume that wealth will automatically be distributed in 
a fair and efficient way. They assume that wealth is a reward for those who contribute the 	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most to economic progress. Veblen refers to this as the “law of equivalency” or the 
“natural-economic law of equivalence and equity.”94 This assumes that the proportion of 
wealth that a person possesses is equivalent to their overall contribution to the economy 
in general. “In terms of serviceability, then, if not in terms of productive force, the 
individual agent . . . normally gets as much as he contributes and contributes as much as 
he gets.”95 But Veblen challenges this theory of distribution by drawing a distinction 
between enterprises that produce useful goods for the community as a whole from those 
that are concerned only with producing more wealth without promoting industrial 
production. 
Veblen draws a distinction between “industrial employments” that produce 
materially necessary goods and “pecuniary employments” that do not directly contribute 
to the industrial productive process. Industrial employments relate directly to material 
production rather than market exchange.  
Their proximate aim and effect is the shaping and guiding of material things and  
processes. Broadly, they may be said to be primarily occupied with the 
phenomena of material serviceability rather than with those of exchange value.96 
 
If the “law of equivalency” were to hold true, the individuals involved in these productive 
enterprises would earn a large portion of society’s wealth, but in reality wealth tends to 
accumulate in the hands of those who engage in pecuniary employments. 
Pecuniary employments have no direct relation to the production of goods. These 
employments, epitomized by “the modern captain of industry,” are “lucrative without 	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necessarily being serviceable to the community.”97 Distinguishing this type of economic 
activity from industrial production, Veblen refers to pecuniary employments as 
“business” to distinguish it from “industry.”98 The ultimate goal of business enterprises is 
pecuniary gain, not an increase in the material well being of the community. This is even 
true of the businessman who owns a productive industry. “His superintendence is a 
superintendence of the pecuniary affairs of the concern, rather than of the industrial 
plant.”99 The man of business, according to Veblen earns an “income” but never 
contributes to the “mechanical processes” or the “production of goods.”100 This does not 
mean that the capital investments of the businessman are inconsequential—application of 
capital to industrial production necessarily increases the output of consumable goods. The 
truly wasteful consequence of pecuniary enterprises taking precedence over industrial 
enterprises is that industry is directed towards the pecuniary ends of wealth accumulation 
rather than the industrial objective of producing useful goods. “Industry must be 
conducted to suit the business man in his quest for gain; which is not the same as saying 
that it must be conducted to suit the needs of the community at large.”101 In other words, 
the needs of the modern industrial community are, at best, indirectly satisfied by the 
captain of industry. 
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Similarly Veblen reassesses the serviceability of wealth in the form of capital to 
be invested. He distinguishes between capital that is pecuniary and capital that is 
industrial. Veblen defines pecuniary capital as capital that is employed mainly for 
financial gain rather than industrial production.102 Pecuniary capital may be used to fund 
industry in some circumstances, but this is merely an incidental effect. The end of 
pecuniary capital is profit, and it has “no immediate relation” to industrial production.103 
Industrial capital, by contrast, is capital that may “be turned to account, materially, for 
industrial effect.”104 Veblen argues “the function of industrial capital in the service of the 
community at large, stands in no necessary or consistent relation to the gainfulness of 
capital in the pecuniary respect.”105 Industrial capital is wealth put to good effect for the 
purpose of producing usable goods. It is clear that Veblen thinks capital could be useful 
in terms of industrial production, but industrial production is usually a secondary 
concern. He observes a considerable “disparity” of capital investment in which pecuniary 
capital made up the largest share of available capital and investment.106 Most of the 
capital that is invested, according to Veblen, is dedicated to pecuniary gain with very 
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little being devoted to industrial production. Furthermore, pecuniary capital need not 
contribute to the production of useful goods at all; whereas, industrial capital must 
operate under the “pecuniary exigencies” of the investor even when it is used “in the 
service of the community at large.”107 The investor does not always expect increased 
production as a result of investment, but the investor always expects to make a profit on 
the investment. Any increase in productivity is incidental to the capitalists’ quest for 
financial gain. 
According to Veblen’s criteria, institutions are serviceable to the extent that they 
contribute to the well being of the industrial community. But the ownership of wealth, in 
and of itself, is not related to industrial production. “Ownership directly touches the 
results of industry, and only indirectly the methods and processes of industry.”108 Most 
capital is employed for pecuniary purposes, which means that most wealth is not 
productive, and therefore, not serviceable. Indeed, Veblen considers the wealthy classes 
of society to stand in a “pecuniary relation” to industrial production because their relation 
to the process is one of “acquisition, not production; of exploitation, not of 
serviceability.”109 Seen from the standpoint of the entire community, even the so-called 
captains of industry are a hindrance to the material welfare of the community. “Their 
office is of a parasitic character, and their interest is to divert what substance they may to 
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their own use, and to retain what is under their hand.”110 Because the wealthy capitalists 
stand in a pecuniary relation to the process of industrial production, their activities are not 
directed at “serviceability” but “vendibility.”111 This means that the wealthy devote their 
resources primarily to the exchange of goods rather than the productive process. That is 
not to say that capital set to pecuniary purposes will never contribute to industrial 
production. Rather, the true purpose of pecuniary capital is to turn a profit, and any 
effects on production will be merely incidental from the standpoint of the wealthy 
investor. It is quite clear that Veblen would prefer an institutional structure in which 
capital was mostly, if not exclusively, devoted to increasing production. 
 In a direct challenge to classical economic doctrines, Veblen expends 
considerable effort to demonstrate that the creation of wealth is not necessarily 
progressive or useful. Of course, this skeptical view of wealth also implies a different 
appraisal of the people who hold that wealth. As previously mentioned, Veblen identifies 
the “law of equivalency” as a crucial assumption of classical economic theory. Classical 
economists take it for granted that wealth tended to accrue to the members of the 
community that were most productive, and, in this sense, the wealthy actually earn their 
wealth because of their value to the community. Similarly, Social Darwinists justified the 
unequal distribution of wealth as the consequence of success in a competitive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Ibid., 153. Veblen introduced this analysis with the qualification that “it is by 
no means here intended to deprecate the economic function of the propertied class or of 
the captains of industry.” This is a standard tactic in Veblen’s polemics in which he 
proclaimed objectivity from an economic standpoint and then proceeded to use 
incendiary terms like “parasitic” and “exploitation” to explain the economic function of 
those engaged in pecuniary enterprises.  
111 Veblen, “Industrial and Pecuniary Employments,” 220. 
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environment. But Veblen points out that the captains of industry are not especially adept 
in the competition for survival, but in their “fitness for acquisition.”112 Even this 
arrangement, in which those who are successful in pecuniary employments get a larger 
portion of a community’s wealth, could be justified on Veblen’s terms if the wealth were 
put to productive uses, but this is clearly not the case. The investment capital of the 
wealthy is not devoted to the process of production, but to financial gain.  
Furthermore, the wealthy squander their resources on “conspicuous consumption” 
and “conspicuous waste.”113 Veblen argued that the wealthy classes do not spend money 
in order to consume goods, but to display them. The goal of acquisition is not 
consumption but “invidious comparison” to others in which wasteful spending becomes 
fashionable. This means that the large concentrations of wealth that manifest themselves 
in the leisure class are not being used in service to the community. This also violates the 
“law of equivalency” because the people who possess this wealth are not productive, and 
their behavior is quite wasteful. In this way, Veblen has turned the classical theory of 
distribution on its head. He thinks that the unequal distribution of wealth, concentrated 
among the wealthy class, has no justification in terms of the productive value to the 
community. In fact, the concentration of wealth among the wealthy class can hinder 
progress by diverting resources to wasteful consumption. In his reassessment, the wealthy 
are not the motor of progress; they are the obstacle of progress.114 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class, 176. 
113 See Ibid., 57, 65-6, and 86. 
114 It is worth noting that this classical theory of distribution still has purchase in 
the American political discourse today. For example, a common refrain from the 
Republican camp in the 2012 election campaign was that the wealthy were “job creators,” 
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Environmental Immunity 
 
 Veblen’s model of economic institutions that continuously evolve is quite 
complex, but he does identify a reason that less serviceable institutions survive the 
evolutionary process. Although Veblen thinks institutions constantly evolve as they react 
to various stimuli, he does not argue that institutions will evolve progressively. Quite the 
contrary, he thinks that less serviceable institutions have a lasting effect because they 
tend to be removed from the perils of the economic environment. Habits of thought such 
as competition for acquisition, disdain for productive labor, and conspicuous 
consumption do not survive because they further the interest of the human community 
but because the proponents of these habits are sheltered from the harsh winds of the 
competitive economic environment. Institutions react and evolve according to stimuli 
present in the economy. Wasteful institutions are able to survive because they do not 
come into contact with these stimuli, and they do not have to adapt and become more 
serviceable.  
 Veblen’s model of economic life, although it is evolutionary, is not based upon a 
strict struggle for survival. This is partially due to the fact that industrial production is 
very efficient in producing necessary goods so that scarcity of production does not 
necessarily encourage people to form competitive habits. In contrast to Social Darwinists, 
Veblen does not see economic life as a struggle between competitive individuals for 
scarce resources. Rather, “the evolution of the social structure has been a process of 
natural selection of institutions” in which “changing institutions in their turn make for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and an increased tax burden on the wealthy would “penalize success” and hinder the 
productivity of the economy. 
	  	   213 
further selection of individuals endowed with the fittest temperament.”115 This means that 
the “efficient factors of selection” will be the institutions that make up the social 
environment rather than the brute facts of the physical environment.116  
 The complex of institutions that make up society can also have the curious effect 
of sheltering certain classes from the very pressures that would induce habits to change. 
For example, “the leisure class is in great measure sheltered from the stress of those 
economic exigencies which prevail in any modern, highly organized industrial 
community.”117 This means that the behavior of the leisure class is not conditioned by the 
need for industrial production; they have no incentive to make industrial production more 
efficient. According to Veblen, “the members of the wealthy class do not yield to the 
demand for innovation as readily as other men because they are not constrained to do 
so.”118 A modern industrial society will face new material realities that require a change 
in the institutions that interact with that environment. “An advance in the technical 
methods, in population, or in industrial organisation will require at least some of the 
members of the community to change their habits of life.”119 In other words, the 
interaction between society and the material environment will necessitate continual 
adaptation, but the wealthy are largely immune from this pressure to adapt.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class, 138. 
116 Ibid., 138. 
117 Ibid., 145. 
118 Ibid., 146. 
119 Ibid., 143. 
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 Such immunity from the industrial process allows for the maintenance of 
institutions that are objectively wasteful from the standpoint of furthering the collective 
interests of the community as a whole. Once a society reaches a certain stage these 
institutions can exert social pressures on habits and behavior that outweigh the objective 
facts of material necessity. Because of this, institutions can take on a life of their own and 
evolve independently of the struggle for survival. The methods of managing the industrial 
process, for example, are determined by pecuniary interests rather than industrial 
interests, according to Veblen. “The ground of survival [of any industrial endeavor] in the 
selective process is fitness for pecuniary gain, not fitness for serviceability at large.”120 
Unlike natural selection, which tends to directly select for survival based upon material 
necessities, Veblen’s theory of institutional selection tends to select for pecuniary gain, 
which is only indirectly related to the “material welfare of the community” and industrial 
production.121 
 Veblen’s description of institutional evolution in which whole sections of the 
population can be sheltered from the environment offers a new evolutionary mechanism 
by which to view economic life. Veblen’s evolutionary theory provides an explanation of 
how progress can be derailed and diverted even in an evolutionary scheme. His notion of 
evolution that is not necessarily, and most often is not, progressive stands in stark 
contrast to the Social Darwinist position that evolution or “survival of the fittest” in 
economic life is the motor of progress. Veblen sees no such natural trend in the direction 
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of progress. Instead, Veblen believes that “retrogression” to past habits is more likely 
than progress to new more serviceable institutions.  
 
Institutional Conservatism and the Role of the Economist 
 
 Veblen’s notion of progress is one in which institutions and habits evolve from a 
primitive form to meet the changing needs of society. “Social advance, especially seen 
from the point of view of economic theory, consists in a continued progressive approach 
to an approximately exact ‘adjustment of inner relation to outer relations.’”122 This 
involves “a change in men’s views as to what is good and right,” and such change will be 
“in the direction of divergence from the archaic position” of what is good and right to a 
habit of mind that is more suited to a changing economic reality.123 Ideally, one would 
observe a steady progression or evolution in the institutions of society in which they 
adapt to the realities of industrial production. But Veblen argues that the dominant 
tendency in an industrial society is for institutions to resist this change. “Retrogression, 
reapproach to a standpoint to which the race has long been habituated in the past, is 
easier.”124 Institutions tend to be more conservative than progressive in nature. 
 Institutions in general are conservative because they are habitual responses to 
recurring past situations. There is always a lag between a changing economic 
environment and a new set of institutions that are adapted to fit that environment. “This 
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process of selective adaptation can never catch up with the progressively changing 
situation in which the community finds itself at any given time.”125 Veblen argues that 
these habits of thought have a tenacity to resist change; he refers to this tenacity as 
“social inertia” or “psychological inertia.”126 He bases this conclusion on a rather 
pessimistic belief that  people will be reluctant to adopt new habits and practices due to 
the “bother of making the readjustment.127 This complacent attitude dominates even 
among the poor, and Veblen does not think the poor are motivated by some revolutionary 
zeal to change things in their favor. Even the people who have a material interest in 
changing the dominant institutions tend to be complacent.128 Veblen recognized that this 
“solidarity of human institutions” made it very difficult for a society to change its 
habitual ways of life.129 All things being equal, institutions tend to resist change.130 This 
is one reason that institutions have a conservative rather than a progressive character. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Ibid., 140 
126 Ibid., 141. 
127 Ibid., 148-9. 
128 Like Marx, Veblen believes that the dominant ideas of the wealthy class are 
internalized by the poor, and this in part explains their conservatism. But Veblen did not 
advocate revolutionary activity, and he considered socialism to be a very real danger. 
However, he argued the threat of socialism would remain present as long as the 
institution of private property remained in place. See, “Some Neglected Points in the 
Theory of Socialism,” 354-6. 
129 Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class, 149. 
130 Considering that Veblen considers institutions to be made up largely of habits, 
this is the equivalent of saying that “habits tend to resist change.” 
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 Because of this conservative nature of economic institutions, progress in 
institutional development will generally be slow, but Veblen notices yet another factor 
that contributes to this conservatism of institutions.  
 If any portion of society is sheltered from the action of the environment in any  
essential respect, that portion of the community, or that class, will adapt its views  
and its scheme of life more tardily to the altered general situation; it will in so far  
retard the process of social transformation.131 
As mentioned earlier, the wealthy classes do not feel the same pressures to adapt to 
changing economic circumstances, but Veblen argues that they will also actively resist 
change in the institutional structure of society. According to Veblen, “the leisure class 
has also a material interest in leaving things as they are.”132But the conservative 
influences of the leisure class are not solely based upon the material interests of the 
leisure class. There is also a cultural influence adopted by the leisure class in which 
innovation is seen as a trait of the poor while conservatism is seen as a mark of 
distinction and “respectability.”133 The leisure class has an enormous influence on the 
tastes and preferences of the society at large, and because of this, “the wealthier class 
comes to exert a retarding influence upon social development far in excess of that which 
the simple numerical strength of the class would assign it.”134 The wealthy class, it 
seems, has an undue influence on the culture to accompany an undue proportion of the 
wealth in relation to the whole community. The conservative views of the wealthy classes 
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tend to permeate society as a whole, and this transmission of conservative attitudes 
further impedes the process of social change. 
 The logical consequence of Veblen’s analysis is for a critical approach to 
economics especially the economics of laissez faire.  He describes a society dominated by 
wasteful institutions where the poor are arbitrarily denied access to the abundance of 
goods produced in the modern industrial community. Faced with such a reality, a laissez 
faire approach would amount to resignation in the face of institutions that are clearly a 
hindrance to the collective well being of the community. Considering the fact that 
institutions have a conservative nature, which is reinforced by the wealthy and supported 
by the lower classes, the only voice in favor of progress would be that of the economist. 
Veblen’s own jaundiced view of society is reflective of this critical approach to 
economics. 
 Veblen’s analysis serves as a justification for his new approach to economics. 
Embedded within his criticism of existing institutions is a justification for why such 
criticism is necessary. The abstract and normalizing approach of classical economics 
cannot account for institutions that are wasteful and counterproductive. This is the very 
reason that he calls for an evolutionary approach to economic life that is critical and 
realistic. The point upon which Veblen’s theory hinges is the mismatch between 
economic theory and the realities of the industrial world. He expends considerable effort 
to expose the foundation of classical economics because he believed it to be 
fundamentally ill-suited to the actual industrial economy. Under classical economic 
theory, the institutions that Veblen considered wasteful are explained away or normalized 
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because they do not comport to the animistic view of economic life as benign and 
progressive. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 In conclusion, Veblen’s intellectual efforts amount to a sustained, systematic, and 
profound critique of laissez faire. In the preceding discussion, I have shown that Veblen 
mounts this critique in three specific ways. First, he offers an alternative model of 
economic development that focuses on the vital importance of institutions in shaping 
economic life. He believes that economic life has a cultural and social aspect in which 
institutions explain changes in the economic process. His argument that institutions are 
the appropriate cite for economic investigation leads him into his second manner of 
critique, a theoretical criticism of classical economic theory. Veblen must explain why 
classical economics has overlooked the vital importance of institutions, and he does this 
by demonstrating that the foundational assumptions of classical economics make it 
impossible for the theory to account for a changing economic process that is shaped by 
institutional evolution. This effectively casts classical economists as defenders of the 
competitive market economy and apologists for the status quo. Finally, Veblen 
demonstrates that the economist has an ethical responsibility to challenge and criticize the 
dominant institutions in society rather than normalize them or explain them away. His 
Theory of the Leisure Class is an example of this approach. Veblen shows how numerous 
societal features are wasteful from an objective economic standpoint, and he also argues 
that institutions have a conservative nature that tends to resist change. This leaves the 
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economist, equipped with Veblen’s critical approach to institutional evolution, to explain 
why some institutions are problematic.  
 Veblen’s radical approach to human development, his identification of 
institutional influences, and his realization that classical economic theory could not 
account for institutional factors, imply a new role for the academic economist. Veblen 
introduced American economics to the sphere of social critique and in the process 
influenced “a generation of liberals and radicals who also saw the social good as basic, 
and who would have called anything that did not serve human life or human well-being 
on the whole, morally bad.”135Veblen provided a paradigm of social criticism based upon 
a sophisticated and novel economic theory. 
 Sophisticated though it may be, Veblen’s economic theory omits a crucial 
explanatory factor, politics. A charitable explanation of this oversight would be that 
Veblen has left political influences out of his developmental model for the sake of 
parsimony, but this would surely be out of character with his overall approach, which is 
anything but parsimonious. Regardless of his reasoning, Veblen’s model of economic 
development commits the same error that is committed by classical economists. He 
cannot account for political influences that shape economic life. Indeed, Veblen displays 
a disdain for political life as simply another leisure class profession. He characterizes 
government service as one of the many “predatory” professions that are exclusive to the 
leisure class along with hunting and other sports.136 For Veblen, the political system in 
the modern industrial community is only one wasteful occupation that results from 	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leisure. Rather than politics, Veblen constantly looks to cultural explanations for 
institutional change to such an extent that he has been labeled a “cultural determinist.”137 
Suffice it to say that Veblen includes numerous complex political factors in his 
explanation of culture. Governments, laws, and political activities are merely one aspect 
of a larger cultural structure that Veblen chooses to focus upon.  
 Veblen does not offer a specific solution to the pervasive waste present in the 
economy. He offers only a method for critically assessing that waste. But perhaps it is 
unfair to expect more from Veblen than criticism. The criticism that he mounts of the 
laissez faire system paves the way for his unmistakably political idea that human beings, 
in their most efficient economic relations, are cooperative. This idea amounts to a 
fundamental rejection of laissez faire. 
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CHAPTER 7 — HERBERT CROLY: THE LAISSEZ FAIRE TRADITION AND 
NATIONAL PURPOSE 
 
 
 
The sailors are quarrelling with one another about steering the ship, each 
of them is thinking that he should be the captain, even though he’s never 
learned the art of navigation, cannot point to anyone who taught it to him, 
or to a time when he learned it. Indeed they claim that it isn’t teachable 
and are ready to cut to pieces anyone who says that it is.  
        Plato, Republic 488b 
 
 
 Herbert Croly was one of the most influential political thinkers of the Progressive 
era, and his ideas were instrumental in shaping liberal thinking in the twentieth century.1 
He is most recognized for his synthesis of Jeffersonian individualism and Hamiltonian 
nationalism. By showing that a strong national government was not only compatible with 
America’s democratic future but essential for it, he laid the intellectual groundwork for 
liberal reforms such as Franklin Roosevelt’s “New Deal” and Lyndon Johnson’s “Great 
Society.” However, before he could construct this intellectual synthesis, he had to explain 
why the existing tradition of American political thinking was inadequate. His vision of 
reform would have to overcome what he saw as a traditional American commitment to 
laissez faire. 
 Croly’s criticism of laissez faire is distinctive because he situates laissez faire 
thinking firmly within the American political and historical tradition. This is not to say 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For an excellent appraisal of Croly’s influence on the reform movement, see 
Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, 188-207. Goldman notes that Croly’s Promise of 
American Life was especially influential. “The Promise has often been called one of the 
few genuinely important political studies written by an American in the early twentieth 
century.” Ibid., 192. 
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that he saw laissez faire as the only part of that tradition, but he did consider it to be a 
prominent feature. Veblen and Lloyd focused on classical economic theory as the 
intellectual foundation of laissez faire, and they treated the Social Darwinists of the late 
nineteenth century as the modern vessels for those earlier economic teachings. Croly 
makes very little mention of either economic theory or Social Darwinism because he 
thought laissez faire was deeply rooted in the unique historical experience of early 
America. This is the reason that his criticism of laissez faire is directed at political figures 
such as Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson rather than economic and social theorists 
such as Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer. 
  Although he is operating in the medium of political ideas, Croly devotes most of 
his attention to policy makers and political leaders. He thinks traditions of thought are 
influenced primarily by political experience and specific historical circumstances rather 
than intellectual arguments. The existence of the American wilderness, for example, did 
more to convince Americans of the benefits of individual self-interest than the teachings 
of classical political economy.2 Croly examined the ways in which American political life 
contributed to a tradition of laissez faire, and he attempted to rearrange the elements of 
that tradition into a specifically American vision for reform. He referred to his project as 
a “critical reconstruction” of American political ideas, and his preferred method was to 
synthesize ideas that were seemingly irreconcilable. His synthesis of Jefferson’s 
individualism and Hamilton’s nationalism is a testament to his creativity, but the really 
clever aspect of Croly’s thinking is his overall strategy for presenting his reformist vision 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As I will discuss, Croly largely adopted the “frontier thesis” of Frederick 
Jackson Turner, which associated the frontier with self-interest and individualism rather 
than interdependence and communalism. 
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to Americans. This strategy was based upon a synthesis of tradition and progress. In order 
to create a more progressive democratic society, Americans did not have to search for 
new ideas; they simply had to revisit and reinterpret their own political tradition. 
 My focus in this chapter is not Croly’s proposal for reform, but his criticism of 
laissez faire, which was a necessary first step for that reform proposal. I begin by 
explaining Croly’s interpretation of laissez faire in American thought and practice. He 
identifies a number of traditional beliefs that, taken together, have made Americans 
skeptical of an active national government. As economic circumstance changed, this 
laissez faire attitude, and the legal institutions that supported them, left Americans 
without a tradition of constructive governmental action in the public interest. After 
explicating his appraisal of the American laissez faire tradition, I consider the economic 
and political problems that the United States encountered as industrialization 
revolutionized American society. Croly believed the climate of harsh competition and 
economic inequality created class divisions in society, and the laissez faire reliance on 
individual self-interest offered no method of healing these divisions or uniting the 
community behind a common purpose. I conclude with a brief description of Croly’s 
attempt to construct an appropriate purpose for American political life. His belief that 
such a constructive purpose was necessary was the animating force behind his criticism 
of laissez faire. 
 
LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 
 
 Croly never uses the actual term “laissez faire” in his critical appraisal of 
American political ideas, but the tradition of thought that he criticizes conforms to laissez 
	  	   225	  
faire in all but name. He uses the phrase “policy of drift” as a synonym for the policy of 
laissez faire.3 The metaphor of “drift” aptly captures Croly’s criticism of laissez faire 
because he considers such a policy to be irresponsible and optimistic. A policy of laissez 
faire allows the ship of state, once constructed and set to sail, to drift without responsible 
oversight. This policy is irresponsible because the passengers aboard the ship do not take 
an active part in navigating. Unlike Plato, Croly thought the ship of state should be 
placed under democratic control. Similarly, a policy of laissez faire is optimistic because 
it assumes that ship will drift to its promised destination without encountering unexpected 
obstacles, which will require a change of heading or at least a revision of traditional 
navigational methods. He believes that American political thought contains a tradition of 
thinking that lends support to a laissez faire policy, and that tradition stands in the way of 
reform and a responsible democratic government. 
 Croly identifies four features of American political thought that support a policy 
of laissez faire. First, he identifies a tradition of optimism in which Americans expect the 
future to be an inevitable improvement on past conditions. What makes this optimism 
especially pernicious for Croly is that it characterizes progress as something that America 
is destined for without the need for purposeful guidance. In The Promise of American 
Life, Croly notes a divergence between expectations and reality. The “Promise” had 
always held the opportunity for economic prosperity and independence. However, “ugly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Walter Lippmann followed up on Croly’s notion of drift in his own Drift and 
Mastery (1914), which was published five years after Croly’s Promise of American Life 
(1909). Lippmann was quite impressed with Croly’s Promise of American Life, and he 
believed it had secured Croly’s stature as “the first important political philosopher who 
appeared in America in the twentieth century.” Quoted in Stettner, Shaping Modern 
Liberalism, 33. 
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obstacles” have emerged in the economic sphere, and the optimism characteristic of 
Americans will not be sufficient to overcome them.4 Second, Croly argues that this 
tradition of optimism is wedded to a strong sense of individualism. Americans tend to 
trust their hopeful destiny to the free play of individual interests with the assumption that 
such an arrangement will advance the public interest. Third, he argues that Americans 
have traditionally viewed the state in negative terms, meaning that its primary function is 
to protect individual rights and refrain from engaging in any positive social programs. 
Finally, the rigid legal structure of the Constitution prevents the democratic majority 
from assuming responsibility for the public welfare. Thus, it reinforces the negative 
conception of the state by giving more responsibility and authority to the legal system 
than to the citizens themselves.  
 Croly finds a hopeful, progressive disposition in the American political tradition, 
but he believes Americans have displayed a troubling tendency to treat progress as an 
inevitable result from a policy of laissez faire. He thinks real progress is something that 
has to be achieved by purposeful and responsible action. For this reason, he seeks to 
reorient the tradition of American optimism from “national destiny” to “national 
purpose.”5 
 
Optimism 
 
 Croly argues that optimism is a defining feature of the American psyche. To be an 
American is to believe that the future will be better than the past. “From the beginning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Croly, The Promise of American Life, 18. 
5 Ibid., 24. 
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Americans have been anticipating and projecting a better future. From the beginning, the 
Land of Democracy has been figured as the Land of Promise.”6 When he speaks of the 
“Promise” of American life, Croly is referring to the tradition of optimism that runs 
through American history. But this tradition of optimism has produced dubious results in 
American political life. Croly thinks the forward-looking tendency of Americans is 
amenable to a progressive, purposeful democracy, but he thinks this optimism has 
remained general and formless.  
They still believe that somehow and sometime something better will happen to 
good Americans than has happened to men in any other country; and this belief, 
vague innocent, and uninformed though it may be, is the expression of an 
essential constituent of our national ideal.7 
 
Croly wanted to anchor his own progressive reform program in the tradition of American 
life. By this clever tactic, Croly characterized his vision of progressive reform as a 
movement that embodied the American tradition because it conforms to “the imaginative 
projection of a better future” that has traditionally characterized Americans.8 “In 
cherishing the Promise of a better national future the American is fulfilling rather than 
imperiling the substance of the national tradition.”9 In so far as there is an identifiable 
tradition in the American psyche, Croly identifies that tradition as optimism and the 
belief in a better future. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid., 3. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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 Croly follows in the footsteps of J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur by attributing 
American optimism to the unique characteristics of America. Crèvecoeur described 
America to an audience of curious and somewhat envious Europeans as a land of 
abundant resources, ample opportunity, and new avenues for thinking.  
The American is a new man, who acts upon new principles; he must therefore 
entertain new ideas and form new opinions. From involuntary idleness, servile 
dependence, penury and useless labour, he has passed to toils of a very different 
nature, rewarded by ample subsistence. This is an American.10 
 
For Crèvecoeur, Americans had been freed from the constraints of the Europe, including 
the political tradition of monarchy as well as economic hardship due to overcrowding and 
limited availability of land and resources. Croly believes the favorable economic and 
political conditions noted by Crèvecoeur helped to establish the tradition of optimism in 
America. “The implication was, and still is, that by virtue of the more comfortable and 
less trammeled lives which Americans were enabled to lead, they would constitute a 
better society and would become in general a worthier set of men.”11 However, Croly 
argues that Americans came to focus much more on the economic opportunities than the 
political opportunities that Crèvecoeur described.  
 Throughout his writing, Croly refers to the abundance of available land that 
distinguished America from Europe. “The land was unoccupied, and its settlement 
offered an unprecedented area and abundance of economic opportunity.”12 Because of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Crèvecoeur, “What is an American?” 70.  
11 Croly, Promise of American Life, 12. 
12 Ibid., 8. One glaring fact of American history that Croly conveniently overlooks 
is that this land was occupied by Native Americans who were systematically displaced by 
military conquest. He makes no mention of this as he discusses the “unoccupied” lands of 
the frontier.  
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this abundance, America held out the promise of economic independence to any 
European who wanted to “enjoy the fruits of his own labour.”13 Croly argued that the 
population of Europe had outpaced resources to such an extent that the majority of the 
population had become dependent on the wealthy few. By contrast, “American citizens 
could earn a substantial share of the fruits of the country’s economic development.”14 The 
new American was able to master his own economic destiny by virtue of individual 
initiative, and this newfound mastery presented the promise of economic prosperity as a 
defining feature of American life. Croly notes that even his early twentieth-century 
contemporaries maintained this mostly economic vision of the American promise “as 
fundamentally a future in which economic prosperity will be still more abundant than it 
has yet been here or abroad.”15  
 According to Croly, Americans took it for granted that economic prosperity was a 
permanent feature of American life. They did not appreciate the degree to which their 
prosperity owed to the unique circumstances of a wide continent with large swaths of 
undeveloped land. “All the conditions of American life have tended to encourage an easy, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid., 9. Alexis de Tocqueville similarly credited the abundant space of the 
American continent for establishing a hopeful attitude among Americans. “The chief 
circumstance which has favored the establishment and the maintenance of a democratic 
republic in the United States, is the nature of the territory which the Americans inhabit. 
Their ancestors gave them the love of equality and freedom; but God himself gave them 
the means of remaining equal and free, by placing them upon a boundless continent.” 
Democracy in America, 371-372. 
14 Croly. Progressive Democracy, 58. 
15 Croly, The Promise of American Life, 10. 
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generous, and irresponsible optimism.”16 It is this type of optimism that Croly associates 
with laissez faire. Americans had come to believe that the prosperity to which they were 
accustomed would continue without the need to revise the economic methods and 
institutions that were in use. Croly argues that any attempts at reform will have to 
confront this “traditional American optimistic fatalism,” by which Americans have come 
to expect that economic prosperity results from the free play of individual interests.17 
“The fault in the vision of our national future. . . . consists . . . in the expectation that the 
familiar benefits will continue to accumulate automatically.”18 Such optimistic 
expectations make responsible government oversight seem unnecessary and even counter 
productive. 
 
Individualism 
 
 Croly believed that this “irresponsible optimism” contributed to and reinforced a 
strong sense of individualism in American thinking. Individuals in early America, 
especially those occupying the Western frontier, were able to apply their own talents in 
an environment where land and space were abundant. The frontier allowed Americans a 
wide berth of individual action, and because space was abundant there was little 
crowding. Croly argues that the frontier allowed individuals to pursue their own interests 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid., 7. Although he makes no mention of Frederick Jackson Turner’s “frontier 
thesis,” Croly clearly agrees that the frontier was instrumental in transforming the 
European settler into a self-sufficient American individual. He follows Turner in arguing 
that the experience of frontier life has contributed to the individualistic character of 
American citizens. See Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians, 50-52. 
17 Ibid., 21. 
18 Ibid., 17. 
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without experiencing the conflicts that were so prevalent in more densely populated 
areas. Due to these favorable circumstances, Americans had come to believe that a 
“beneficent result followed inevitably from the action of wholly selfish motives.”19 
Therefore, the economic optimism that characterized the frontier was not simply focused 
on ever increasing prosperity, but on the individual pursuit of self-interest as the means 
for securing that prosperity. 
 For Croly, Thomas Jefferson epitomized this optimistic individualism. “Jefferson 
was filled with a sincere, indiscriminate, and unlimited faith in the American people.”20 
Croly argues that such an optimistic viewpoint led Jefferson to a position of “extreme 
individualism.”21  
He conceived a democratic society to be composed of a collection of individuals, 
fundamentally alike in their abilities and deserts; and in organizing such a society, 
politically, the prime object was to provide for the greatest satisfaction of its 
individual members. . . . Its individual members needed merely to be protected 
against privileges and to be let alone, whereafter the native goodness of human 
nature would accomplish the perfect consummation.22 
 
Croly believes that this Jeffersonian tradition of individualism was carried on by Andrew 
Jackson and “Western Democrats” who occupied the frontier.23 Pioneers enjoyed a 
considerable degree of “individual independence,” but Croly maintains that this was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid., 22. 
20 Ibid., 42. 
21 Ibid., 43. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 52-3. Croly uses the phrases “Western Democrats,” “Western pioneer 
Democracy,” and “pioneer Democracy” to describe not only Jackson’s supporters, but 
also the Americans who embodied the individualistic character that Jackson represented.  
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mostly due to “temporary economic conditions” such as an open frontier.24 Nevertheless, 
they came to cherish this individual independence so much that they elevated it to the 
level of abstract principle. 
 Croly thought that extreme individualism and socialism were too doctrinaire and 
inflexible to form a practical basis for democracy. Individualism is an expression of “a 
rigid abstract and partial ideal” that is based upon a rationalistic approach to social 
knowledge, which characterized eighteenth century thinking.25 According to Croly, the 
American belief in a better future, while originally conceived as belief in a better society, 
became condensed into a narrow articulation of individual rights. He argues that this 
“ideal” of a better social future “has been obscured by a specific formulation of 
individual rights.”26 Croly tends to treat ideas such as individual rights as expressions of 
historical practices that communities come to accept as essential. Such was the case with 
the “Western Democrats” whose experience of individual independence led them to 
accept individualism as an ideal. For Croly, “this specific formulation of individual 
rights, while its immediate origin was historical, was reinforced by its identification with 
an abstract system of natural law.”27 Unlike Lloyd and Veblen, who both argued that the 
abstract focus of natural law exerted an independent influence on social beliefs and 
practices, Croly thinks these abstract and rigid ideas are used to support beliefs and 
practices that are already routine.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid., 63. 
25 Ibid., 315, and Progressive Democracy, 175. 
26 Ibid., 174. 
27 Ibid. 
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 Croly also points to economic theory as a body of knowledge based upon abstract 
principles that is used in support of individualistic practices. He argues that the nineteenth 
century ushered in a new attempt to identify the laws of social behavior, but “the new 
group of economic laws resulted in much the same practical policy as did the political 
and social rationalism of the eighteenth century.”28 These economic laws further 
discounted the interests of society, and increased the focus on individual interests. This 
individualistic focus resulted from “the assumption of earlier economists, who anticipated 
admirable social results from the enlightened selfishness of individuals.”29 Croly does not 
give a detailed description of economic theory as do so many other critics of laissez faire. 
He treats economic theory as an extension of an abstract, naturalistic approach to social 
knowledge, and the result is “a dogmatic economic determinism.”30 Nevertheless, he does 
appreciate the relationship between American optimism, individualism, economic theory, 
and laissez faire.  
In so far as the individual economic interest was really enlightened, social welfare 
could be trusted to its unrestricted action. Social progress resulted automatically 
from conformity to economic law.31 
 
According to Croly, the paradigm of abstract natural law and the economic laws that 
reflect this approach to social knowledge assume away the problems and conflicts that 
arise between individual interests and the interests of the public. “The foundation of both 
of them was an individualistic conception of society, which assumed an essential 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid., 175. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 176. 
31 Ibid. 
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automatic harmony between individual and social interests.”32 This assumption of 
“automatic” harmony which leads to social progress ultimately supports the laissez faire 
belief that the problems of society will take care of themselves without any popular 
oversight of individual economic practices. 
 Croly thinks this optimistic belief in individual independence as the guarantor of 
individual and social prosperity has evolved into “a species of vigorous, licensed, and 
purified selfishness.”33 The individualism of Jefferson was primarily based upon 
independence and self-sufficiency, but this soon gave way to a more acquisitive and 
destructive individualism. “The test of American national success was the comfort and 
prosperity of the individual; and the means to that end,—a system of unrestricted 
individual aggrandizement and collective irresponsibility.”34 Individuals developed a 
sense of entitlement in which they should be given free rein to pursue their own 
economic interests without interference from the government. Croly thinks this type of 
strictly economic individualism, where individual interest is associated solely with 
making money, actually impairs individual development. It leads to a type of conformity 
as individuals become wholly devoted to economic gain and fail to distinguish 
themselves in other ways.35 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid., 175. 
33 Croly, The Promise of American Life, 49. 
34 Ibid., 49-50. 
35 Ibid., 414-415. Once again, this tendency was identified by de Tocqueville. “As 
prosperity is the sole aim of exertion, it is excellently well attained; nature and men are 
turned to the best pecuniary advantage; and society is dexterously made to contribute to 
the welfare of each of its members, whist individual selfishness is the source of general 
happiness.” Democracy in America, 508. 
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 This narrow conception of individualism, according to Croly, led to an atomistic 
view of society. “It was inferred . . . that society resulted from the mere accretion or 
combination of individuals and that if individuals were to be socialized, the chief agency 
of socialization must be external restraint.”36 To the extent that there was some social 
ideal or norm for behavior it was one of “live-and-let-live.” “The underlying assumption 
of live-and-let-live is an ultimate individualism, which limits the power of one human 
being to help another.”37 This philosophy of live-and-let-live is the same form of “ethical 
individualism” put forth by the Physiocrats and articulated by Jefferson. The primary 
duty of the individual is to act out of self interest, and presumably this would 
automatically fulfill the interests of society. This ethic of live-and-let-live also produced a 
general opposition to any attempts to curtail individual activity in the name of social 
reform.  
In so far as the social interest was asserted against the individual, it necessarily  
assumed the form of imposing restraints on his actions; and thus the power 
whereby the government attempted to promote a specific social interest became 
known by the utterly perverted name of this police power.38 
 
The consequence of this individualism was ultimately a negative conception of 
government which advised placing maximum responsibility in the hands of the individual 
and limiting the responsibility of the government. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Croly, Progressive Democracy, 195. 
37 Ibid., 426. 
38 Ibid., 175. 
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Negative Conception of the State 
 
 Croly also identifies a tradition in American thought that supports a negative view 
of the state. According to this traditional view, any regulative action by the state threatens 
the freedom of the individual. “Such a conception derives from the early nineteenth 
century principles of an essential opposition between the state and the individual.”39 
Because of this perceived antagonism between the individual and the state, Americans 
have been reluctant to grant any responsibility to the government beyond protection of 
person and property. “The responsibilities of the government were negative; those of the 
individual were positive.”40 A negative conception of government fit nicely with the 
tradition of individualism, which emphasized the importance of minimizing government 
interference with individual actions. 
 Croly places most of the blame for this traditional conception of a negative state 
at the feet of Thomas Jefferson. He thinks the negative conception of the state is linked to 
Jefferson’s individualistic focus. 
It consents to use the machinery of government only for a negative or destructive 
object. Such must always be the case as long as it remains true to its fundamental 
principle. That principle defines the social interest merely in terms of an 
indiscriminate individualism—which is the one kind of individualism murderous 
to both the essential individual and the essential social interest.41 
 
Croly argues that Jefferson’s “conception of democracy” involved mainly eliminating 
“special privileges” so that individuals would have “equal opportunities” to pursue their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Croly, The Promise of American Life, 414. 
40 Ibid., 49. 
41 Ibid., 188-189. 
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own interests.42 Jefferson thought the government should play a role in ensuring an 
egalitarian society, but beyond that, “the motto of a democratic government should 
simply be ‘Hands Off.’”43 According to Croly, Jefferson’s negative conception of the 
state is also a reflection of his faith in ordinary people and individual responsibility. 
“There should be as little government as possible, because persistent governmental 
interference implied distrust in popular efficiency and good-will.”44 Croly is very critical 
of Jefferson, unfairly so in some instances, but he acknowledges that Jefferson did not 
promote individualism simply because he discounted the importance of the public 
interest. Rather, he argues that Jefferson assumed that the interest of the community 
would be best served if individuals were left alone. “Thus Jefferson sought an essentially 
equalitarian and even socialistic result by means of an essentially individualistic 
machinery.”45 
 Croly believes that this negative conception of the state really rose to the fore 
between 1825 and 1850—an era that Croly refers to as “the middle period.” He points to 
the fact that Jefferson, once President, did come to approve of some positive 
responsibilities by the federal government, but he still characterizes Jefferson’s governing 
philosophy as one of laissez faire. The next two generations came to rely on Jefferson’s 
example whereby “good government, particularly on the part of Federal officials, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Ibid., 43. The term “republic” or “republican” is conspicuously absent from 
Croly’s discussion of the Founding period. He characterizes Jefferson as a radical 
“democrat” as opposed to his more common characterization as an agrarian republican.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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consisted, apart from routine business, in letting things alone.”46 By Croly’s telling, 
Jacksonian Democrats won both the war of ideas and the battle for political control 
during this period. Whig leaders Henry Clay and Daniel Webster stood for a stronger 
central government, but this view was eclipsed by the “political dominance” of the 
Democratic Party.47 “The great organ of democracy was the partisan association of good 
Democrats, which was wrought chiefly for the purposes of negatively controlling the 
official government rather than for the purpose of using it, after possession had been 
obtained, for any positive purpose.”48 Croly argues that the Jacksonian Democrats 
actively thwarted the administrative activities of the federal government.  
Legislative action was submitted to a constantly increasing burden of specific and 
general restrictions. The exercise of the police power was made subject to the 
scrupulous supervision of the courts. The executive veto was strengthened. On the 
other hand, the executive authority itself was disintegrated by being distributed 
among a number of elected officials.49 
 
One particular institution that Jackson and his followers successfully dismantled was the 
National Bank, which helped to maintain a stable currency. The Bank was a visible and 
powerful entity in the American economic system, and Jackson successfully portrayed it 
as a source of favoritism and “special economic privileges.”50 Jacksonian Democrats 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ibid., 49. 
47 Croly, Progressive Democracy, 67. 
48 Ibid., 68. 
49 Ibid., 68-9. 
50 Ibid., 58. Hofstadter argues that the National Bank was indeed a powerful force 
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were so skeptical of positive government that they came to oppose any efficient 
administrative action on the part of the government. “Thus a negative do-nothing 
Democracy inevitably became inimical to the administrative aspects of government.”51 A 
government without administrative capabilities, would be less likely to interfere with 
individuals in pursuit of economic gain, a central concern of the “Western Democrats” 
that Jackson represented. 
 Croly also argues that Americans have traditionally opposed centralized political 
power because they saw it as an obstacle to their economic interests.  
What a desirable  political system meant to a substantial majority of the American 
citizens at the beginning of the nineteenth century was deliverance from 
interference in the cultivation of their own gardens and protection in enjoyment of 
the fruits. Both in its democratic and undemocratic aspects it was the expression 
of dominant local and individual economic interests.52 
 
The individualism of Americans is buttressed by a type of localism that opposes 
centralized political authority. This focus on local economic interests is another line of 
thinking that contributes to a negative conception of the state. Croly points to “the 
tradition of an individualist and provincial democracy” that resists “any change in the 
direction of increased centralization.”53 He admits that Americans are willing to allow a 
minimal degree of centralization as long as it does not threaten their individual interests. 
“They are accustomed to some measure of political centralization, to a larger measure of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
it was the only instrument in the United States that could affect the volume of credit.” 
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local government responsibility, to a still larger measure of individual economic 
freedom.”54 The general disposition of Americans, most particularly Jacksonian 
Democrats, was to trust themselves first, their local governments second, and the central 
government last, if at all. 
 Croly believes Jacksonian Democrats acted on this fear of centralized political 
authority during the “middle period” by weakening the administrative functions of the 
federal government and by relegating more responsibility to the state governments. “The 
Federal government was tamed by the local Democracy, if not entirely subdued.”55 
However, Croly thinks the state governments were also used primarily for negative 
purposes due to an inadequate institutional framework. He argues that the “state 
constitutions” place too many “restrictions” on the actions of legislators, preventing them 
from acting in the name of the public interest.56  
Local American legislative organization has courted failure. Both the system of  
representation and the functions of the representative body have been admirably 
calculated to debase the quality of the representatives and to nullify the value of 
their work.57 
 
Croly devoted considerable time to developing alternative ways to organize the 
institutional structure of state governments. In fact, the only academic paper that he 
published was a proposal for reorganizing state governments, which he presented to the 
American Political Science Association in 1912. In his proposal, he looked to instruments 
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of direct democracy such as the initiative and referendum to combat the rigid 
constitutional restrictions of the state governments.58 His fundamental criticism of the 
state governments is that they are administratively and legislatively inefficient and, 
therefore, incapable of engaging in positive action on behalf of the community. This 
criticism echoes Hamilton’s own criticism of the Articles of Confederation based upon its 
lack of a centralized political authority. 
 For Croly, a decentralized political structure with an excessive reliance on the 
state governments is inadequate for dealing with problems that are national in scope. 
“The state governments, either individually or by any practicable methods of cooperation, 
are not competent to deal effectively in the national interest.”59 For example, state 
governments cannot effectively regulate interstate commerce. In the absence of federal 
regulation, railroads and other large enterprises “took advantage of these legal conditions 
and political ideas to organize an industrial machinery which cannot be effectively 
reached by local statutes and officials.”60 As industry grew larger and expanded across 
state lines, state based control and oversight became increasingly impractical. Croly 
believes this development has worked in favor of business interests. “In the past the large 
corporations have, on the whole, rather preferred state to centralized regulation, because 
of the necessary inefficiency of the former.”61 Big business opposed centralized power 
because the limited reach of the state governments would allow them to effectively 	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escape regulative control. In short, under a system of state-based regulation, business was 
more likely to be left alone. 
 Croly generally believes that political ideas are rooted primarily in practice. The 
idea of the negative state was one that the American people came to accept based upon 
their experience with individual independence. Croly argues that the vision of a negative 
state manifested itself in a policy of laissez faire, which he refers to as the “policy of 
drift.” He employs the metaphor of the ship of state to indicate that the negative 
conception of the state leaves the ship without any specific heading, or even a purposeful 
navigator to avoid obstacles. Such a negative conception of the state “implied that society 
and individuals could be made better without actually planning the improvement or 
building up an organization for the purpose.”62 Croly considers the policy alternatives of 
active planning or of drift to constitute “the deepest lying difference between Hamilton 
and Jefferson.”63 “Jefferson’s policy was at bottom the old fatal policy of drift. . . . 
Hamilton’s policy was one of energetic and intelligent assertion of the national good.”64 
Jefferson’s policy of drift is based upon a combination of optimism, individualism, and 
the negative conception of the state. Croly tends to use Jefferson as a foil for his criticism 
of a laissez faire, and he uses Hamilton as a corrective to a hands-off approach that he 
attributes to Jefferson.  
 Croly argues that Jefferson’s policy of drift was the standard during the “middle 
period” when the Jacksonian Democrats were in power. During this period, the country 	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was “entirely possessed by a system of individual aggrandizement, national drift, and 
mental torpor.”65 This changed, however, as the Civil War necessitated an active use of 
the federal government on an unprecedented scale. The result of the Civil War was a 
federal government that was centralized and considerably more active in terms of 
national planning and economic oversight. By the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Croly believes American reformers were leading the way in challenging the policy of 
drift in favor of a more active supervision over economic activity.  
The reformers have come partly to realize that the Jeffersonian policy of drift 
must be abandoned. They no longer expect the American ship of state by virtue of 
its own righteous framework to sail away to a safe harbor in the Promised Land. 
They understand that there must be a vigorous and conscious assertion of the 
public as opposed to private and special interests, and that the American people 
must to a greater extent than they have in the past subordinate the latter to the 
former. They behave as if the American ship of state will hereafter require careful 
steering.66 
 
To extend Croly’s metaphor, he did not believe that the “American ship of state” was 
completely rudderless. Rather, he thought the ship builders—represented by the Framers 
of the Constitution—fixed the rudder in place because they did not trust the passengers to 
steer it. 
 
Legalism and the Constitution 
 
 Croly is also highly critical of the Constitution of the United States because he 
thinks its legal structure has supported the policy of drift and served the interests of the 
propertied class. This criticism is much more pronounced in Progressive Democracy than 	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in The Promise of American Life. When writing The Promise of American Life, Croly saw 
individualism as the primary obstacle to responsible political action, but in Progressive 
Democracy, he focused upon the rigidity of the Constitution and the numerous obstacles 
it created for popular expression.67 Progressive Democracy stands in stark contrast to The 
Promise of American Life in style of presentation. The former is clear, restrained and 
succinct; the latter convoluted, effusive, and meandering. Progressive Democracy is the 
work of a more careful and mature writer. 
 One of the cornerstones of laissez faire thinking is the belief that private property 
must be secure. Critics of laissez faire frequently seize on this issue and point out that 
property rights are far more beneficial to the wealthy than to the overall community. 
Croly argues that the Constitution was drafted in accordance with the interests of the 
wealthy minority, which sought legal protections for private property. He refers to 
Charles Beard whose Economic Interpretation of the Constitution reinforced his belief 
that “the Constitution was framed chiefly by owners of property and their 
representatives.”68 Croly has a somewhat simplistic view of the Federalists, who 
supported ratification of the Constitution, and the Anti-Federalists, who opposed 
ratification.69 He tends to reduce the competing sides to interest groups. “The interest 	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which lay behind Federalism was that of well-to-do citizens . . . and this interest aroused 
them to favor and seek some form of political organization that was capable of protecting 
their property and promoting its interest.”70 According to Croly, the Federalists supported 
a strong central government because they saw it as the best guarantor of private property. 
“The Federalists sought to surround private property, freedom of contract, and personal 
liberty with an impregnable legal fortress.”71 Croly believes this “legal fortress” was 
designed to prevent a democratic majority from placing restrictions on property rights.  
 Croly believes that, in addition to constructing legal protections for property 
rights, the Constitution was drafted for the purpose of limiting popular sovereignty and 
democratic expression. He argues that the Framers associated popular sovereignty with 
“discontent and revolution,” which made them reluctant to create avenues for popular 
expression.72 Croly considers the Constitution to be a legal expression of the belief that 
“a political system based on unrestricted popular sovereignty resulted inevitably in an 
alternation between mob rule and mob violence and martial law.”73 He believes this fear 
of majoritarian tyranny led to a legal framework that divided and limited the interests of 
the majority. One example of this framework is Madison’s system of representation. “The 
particular function of representation by law in the traditional American system was to tie 
the hands of the majority and to reduce it to insignificance in the management of public 
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affairs.”74 Curiously, Croly makes no mention of Madison’s Federalist No. 10, where he 
clearly states that the purpose of representation is to protect minority rights, particularly 
property rights, from a majority faction consisting of those without property.75 Croly 
believes the Constitution effectively deprived the majority of democratic responsibility 
for their own political community. “It did not provide a sound and candid method of 
making popular political responsibility real and effective.”76 In his reform efforts, Croly 
formulated proposals for ballot initiatives and referenda to create avenues for democratic 
expression. Ultimately, he believed the public should have greater sovereign power and 
more responsibility than had been afforded to them in the Constitutional system. 
 Croly believes the Constitution was designed according to the belief that a strong 
legal framework was necessary to divert responsibility from the people to the legal 
system. “It was an organization of obstacles and precautions—based at bottom on a 
profound suspicion of human nature.”77 He argues that the Framers avoided the perils of 
both authoritarianism and democratic despotism by establishing a paternalistic legal 
system. The Constitution established the law itself as the ultimate authority in the United 
States. Croly refers to this rigid legal system as “legalism,” but he is also given to more 
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inflammatory descriptions such as: “monarchy of the Law,” or “worship of the Word.”78 
He considers the United States legal system to be paternalistic in nature. Social 
Darwinists were quick to characterize social legislation as paternalistic because its effect 
was to prevent people from making their own choices and accepting the consequences. 
Croly effectively reverses this relationship by looking at paternalism from the perspective 
of the community rather than the individual. He sees social legislation as a form of 
democratic expression, but he believes the Constitution effectively deprived the people of 
the ability to implement such reforms out of fear of democratic control. 
 Croly views the system of “legalism” as inflexible and undemocratic. He thinks it 
reinforces the negative conception of the state because it prevents the majority from using 
the government for any positive functions.  
The domination of the Law came to mean in practice a system in which the  
discretionary discriminating purposive action of the human will in politics, 
whether collective or individual, was suspect and should be reduced to the lowest 
practicable terms. The active government was divided, weakened, confined and 
deprived of integrity and effective responsibility.79 
 
Croly presents his vision of progressive democracy as way of restoring this democratic 
responsibility so that the people can use the government to actively deal with problems 
that could not have been foreseen by the Framers of the Constitution. Progressive 
democracy must favor “decisive action” over “obedience to rules.”80 Legalism ensures 
that this “obedience to rules” takes precedence over active democratic control, and thus 
ensures that the government will primarily serve a negative protective function.  	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 The primary reason that Croly sees the Constitution as undemocratic is that he 
believes governing and political authority are fundamentally about responsibility. He did 
not support democracy primarily because it lends itself to positive use of the government, 
but because it gives the people responsibility for their own political future. John Adams 
famously favored “an empire of laws,” but Croly favors precisely the opposite. “A 
thoroughly representative government is essentially government by men rather than 
Law.”81 True democracy, for Croly, involves placing political responsibility in the hands 
of the majority. Under a system of legalism, the law controls the government, but under a 
democracy, the people control the government and the government controls the law. For 
this reason, Croly concludes that “democracy and legalism are incompatible.”82 
 Croly believes that the difficulty of amending the Constitution serves as evidence 
of its legalistic and undemocratic nature.  
The machinery of amendment provided by the Constitution did more than 
anything else to emancipate that instrument from popular control. Its revision 
required such an emphatic preponderance of approving public opinion that no 
proposed amendment could be carried by any one political group.83   
 
He believes the Framers had created protections for individual rights and private 
property, and they reinforced these protections by making the Constitution practically 
“unmodifiable.”84 Croly supported efforts to reform the amendment process as he came 
to believe that the difficulty in amending the Constitution created a serious obstacle to the 
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progressive democratic reform he supported.85 “Difficult as it may be to escape from the 
legal framework defined in the Constitution, that body of law in theory remains an 
instrument which was made for the people and which if necessary can and will be 
modified.”86  
 Croly noticed that the most conservative voices in American politics displayed the 
most ardent support for the Constitution. He saw the main obstacle to the Progressive 
movement as “constitutional conservatism,” which favored a “negative do-nothing 
government” that was meant to “work harmoniously with an inaccessible and autocratic 
body of Law.”87 Conservatives relied on the Constitution to oppose Progressive attempts 
to increase democratic control of the government and to use it for more active and 
positive purposes. Croly argues that this conservative disposition reflects the fear of 
popular sovereignty expressed by the Framers. The fear of majoritarian tyranny and 
popular despotism is “a mere political bogie, born of the hallucinations of men who 
confuse the haunted castle of feudalism and monarchism for the well-lighted mansion of 
the American democracy.”88 Nevertheless, Croly believes this fear of popular sovereignty 
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“forms the major premise upon which contemporary American constitutional 
conservatism rests.”89  
 Croly also recognized a tendency among conservatives to revere the Constitution 
as a source of principled wisdom rather than a practical framework for government. It is 
worth noting that this remains a prevalent feature of American conservatism a full 
century after Croly recognized it. He believes constitutional conservatism amounts to 
“superstitious worship of the Constitution.”90 Croly argues that the Constitution was 
based upon a legalistic sense of “social righteousness” that constitutional conservatives 
came to cherish as a timeless ideal.91 “In framing the traditional political system the 
Fathers believed they could guarantee the righteous expression of the popular will by a 
permanent definition of the fundamental principles of right.”92 Croly believes his 
conservative opponents have internalized the principled righteousness of the Framers and 
imbued the Constitution with a “peculiarly sacred character.”93  
Thus the peculiar justification of our traditional constitutional government does 
not consist in its past and present serviceability or in its nice adaptation to our 
special political needs and customs, but rather in its quality of embodying the 
permanent principles of righteous and reasonable political action.94 
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This belief that the Constitution is justified based on permanent principles leads 
conservatives to support a rigid legal structure that reinforces the individual right to 
property and a negative conception of the state. 
 By the time he wrote Progressive Democracy, Croly had come to view the 
Constitution as the legal instantiation of the individualism and optimism that he criticized 
in The Promise of American Life. He viewed the Constitution as the institutional 
expression of propertied interests with protections against democratic control. He also 
thought it reflected the irresponsible optimism which featured so prevalently in the 
American political tradition. The Framers may have been pessimistic about human 
nature, an attitude that distinguishes them from Jefferson, but they were optimistic about 
the future of the political structure due to their confidence in the political principles upon 
which the Constitution was based.  
 
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND THE PROBLEM OF DRIFT 
 
 Croly believes the rigid legalistic structure of the US government left the 
American ship of state drifting in a hostile sea of economic change. The American 
economy underwent a dramatic change in the middle of the nineteenth century as 
industrialization eclipsed agriculture as the basis of economic productivity. “An industrial 
community, which was, comparatively speaking, well-organized and well-furnished with 
machinery, was taking the place of the agricultural community of 1830-1840, which was 
incoherent and scattered.”95 Croly notices two parallel developments that contributed to 	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this change. First, the material abundance and open spaces of the frontier began to 
diminish as the population increased. The favorable economic conditions of America, 
particularly the available land touted by Crèvecoeur, proved to be temporary as “the 
virgin wilderness” eventually “disappeared.”96 As the available land on the Western 
frontier became increasingly scarce, Americans found fewer opportunities for 
employment in agriculture and began to seek employment in industry. Thus the 
workforce itself changed in character as the number of independent farmers decreased 
giving way to a growing population of “wage-earners.”  
 The second development that contributed to the shift from an agrarian to an 
industrial economy was the rapid increase in industrial activity and efficiency following 
the Civil War. Croly argues that after the Civil War, Americans turned their attentions 
from political matters and started to focus more exclusively on business. 
A lively, even frenzied, outburst of industrial, commercial, and speculative 
activity followed hard upon the restoration of peace. This activity and its effects 
have been the most important fact in American life during the forty years which 
have supervened; and it has assumed very different characteristics from those 
which it has assumed previous to the war.97  
 
According to Croly, the government took an active role in promoting private enterprise, 
which led to unprecedented prosperity. “Wealth was created and accumulated more 
quickly than ever before. The public domain was appropriated at an accelerated rate. 
Industries multiplied throughout the east and the middle west.”98 However, this 
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prosperity was not put to public use. The wealth that was created in the process of 
industrialization was accumulated by a small minority of Americans. 
 This process of economic change presented Americans with a host of new 
problems, but the tradition of laissez faire in American politics offered no ready solution. 
The result was a cacophony of business activity in a market of severe and unchecked 
competition. “The absorption of Americans in business affairs, and the free hand which 
the structures and ideals of American life granted them, had made business competition a 
fierce and merciless affair.”99 Croly argues that this harsh competitive market also made 
people less economically secure than they had been previously as “the fluid nature of 
American economic conditions made success very precarious.”100 Success was indeed 
precarious during this period, and Croly worried that the massive economic inequality 
that resulted would prevent Americans from uniting behind a constructive social purpose. 
Economic inequality threatened to turn the United States into a collection of special 
interests and class interests rather than a united democratic community. 
 Croly noticed that the post-Civil War United States economy had heightened the 
stakes of economic competition. The successful saw greater rewards, and the 
unsuccessful saw greater misery than they had before the War. This reality conflicted 
with the tradition of optimism and individualism that Croly identified in American 
thought. Americans had entertained the hopeful belief that the free play of individual self-
interest would produce a “beneficent result,” but instead, it produced “a morally and 
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socially undesirable distribution of wealth.”101 Due to favorable economic conditions 
before the Civil War, Americans expected economic prosperity to continue 
“automatically” by virtue of a negative state that protected individual property rights.102 
These hopeful expectations were confronted with a grim reality as the benefits of that 
prosperity accrued in very few hands. “Concentration of wealth,” Croly argues, “is the 
inevitable outcome of the chaotic individualism of our political and economic 
organization.”103 The concentration of wealth and glaring economic inequality that 
resulted from a traditional policy of laissez faire was the most serious economic and 
social problem facing the country. 
 The concentration of wealth in America coincided with a process of combination 
in industry as corporations grew larger and more efficient. Croly applauded this increased 
efficiency, and he thought industrial combinations should be preserved due to their 
efficiency rather than divided into smaller, less efficient enterprises. His objection was 
that the owners of these industrial combinations were receiving a degree of remuneration 
that far outweighed the benefit that they provided to the community. He acknowledges 
that J.P. Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, and other so-called captains of industry “have in the 
course of their business careers contributed enormously to American economic 
efficiency,” but ultimately, “they have been overpaid for their services.”104 Croly is not in 
favor of an equal distribution of wealth, and he argues that there should be room for 	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individual economic distinction, but he believes individuals should not be allowed to earn 
a share of the community’s wealth that outweighs the benefits provided to the community 
in terms of efficiency. However, this is precisely what happened as the government, 
following a policy of laissez faire, allowed capitalists to “appropriate an unusually large 
share of the fruits of American economic development.”105 The resulting inequality 
established a class of wealthy individuals who were detached from the overall 
community. 
 The other side of this economic inequality was, of course, widespread poverty as 
a corresponding class of working poor struggled for economic security. For Croly, the 
true significance of poverty in America is that it signifies a loss of independence. He 
identified independence and self-reliance as a feature of the traditional American pioneer 
outlook.  
For many years millions of Americans of much the same pattern were rewarded 
for their democratic virtue in an approximately similar manner. Of course some 
people were poor, and some were rich; but there was no class of the very rich, and 
the poverty of the poor was generally their own fault. Opportunity knocked at the 
door of every man, and the poor man of to-day was the prosperous householder of 
to-morrow. For a long time American social and economic conditions were not 
merely fluid, but consistent and homogeneous, and the vision of the pioneer was 
fulfilled.106 
 
Croly characterized the pioneer as the American everyman, and he was fundamentally an 
individual possessed of diverse talents. However, the growing industrial economy 
required individuals with specialized skills necessary for industrial production. The 
nature of labor itself changed from primarily agricultural and unskilled to industrial and 	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specialized. Moreover, industrial wage laborers were more dependent upon their 
employers because their specialized skills had a narrow application. The “economic 
opportunities” of the pioneer farmer, on the other hand, “consisted chiefly in the 
appropriation and improvement of uncultivated land,” which afforded ample 
independence to an individual with the diverse skills suited to the task.107 
 Croly draws a distinction between “wage-earners” and “property owners,” and he 
believes the ranks of the former have grown more quickly than the ranks of the latter.108 
He is concerned that wage-earners do not have the economic independence that was 
formerly enjoyed by the pioneer farmer. “The truth is that the wage-system in its existing 
form creates a class of essential economic dependents.”109 The wage-earner owns no 
property and can only earn a living by selling his or her labor to those who own property.  
Their employer is literally their master. He supplies the opportunity of work,  
determines its conditions to a large extent, and is responsible for its success or 
failure. They are often free to change their employer, but a new employer is only 
a new master.110 
 
Wage-earners are wholly dependent upon property owners for work, and as a 
consequence, individual initiative is no longer a sufficient condition for economic 
security. Because of this change from independence to dependence the individual right of 
private property took on a new character. “With the advent of comparative economic and 
social maturity, the exercise of certain legal rights became substantially an exercise of 
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privilege; and if equality of opportunity was to be maintained, it could not be done by 
virtue of non-interference.”111 
 
The Social Problem: Divisions in Society 
 
 Croly’s criticism of concentrated wealth and economic inequality does not hinge 
on fairness or equity, but on social solidarity. Croly believes that the essential condition 
for a progressive democracy is a cohesive community with a definite purpose. Economic 
inequality effectively divides the community along class lines and interests and thereby 
prevents the social solidarity that he deems essential for a well-functioning democracy. 
Reformers of the nineteenth century had drawn attention to the “social problem,” which 
referred to “the problem of poverty” with a focus on the misery of the poor.112 Croly 
argued that the existence of widespread poverty posed a more serious problem for the 
overall community. “The grave inequalities of wealth are merely the most dangerous and 
distressing expression of fundamental differences among the members of society of 
interest and of intellectual and moral standards.”113 Economic inequality divides the 
community into classes with different outlooks. Therefore, the fundamental nature of the 
social problem is “preventing such divisions from dissolving the society into which they 
enter—of keeping such a highly differentiated society fundamentally sound and 
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whole.”114 For Croly, the social problem is not strictly about addressing poverty, it is 
about addressing class divisions in society.115 
 Croly argues that the laissez faire approach to economic activity has allowed the 
wealthy a measure of power that is fundamentally at odds with democracy. “The great 
freedom which the individual property-owner has enjoyed . . . . has tended to create a 
powerful but limited class whose chief object is to hold and increase the power which 
they have gained.”116 Croly believes that the existence of this class “has presented the 
American democracy with the most difficult and radical of its problems.”117 The sheer 
power of this new economic class has given them a privileged position in society that 
resembles the social gradations of an aristocracy rather than the egalitarianism of a 
democracy. “Gross inequalities in wealth, wholly divorced from economic efficiency on 
the part of the rich, as effectively loosen the social bond as do gross inequalities of 
political and social standing.”118 This “aristocracy of money,” according to Croly, is no 
better suited for a democratic society than an aristocracy of social and political 
distinction.119 
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  To make matters worse, this “aristocracy of money” did not distinguish itself by 
using its wealth responsibly. Croly believes that the wealthy show little restraint as they 
engage in “ostentatious waste and conspicuous leisure.”120 Employing Veblen’s 
terminology, Croly echoes his argument that the wealthy have developed extravagant 
practices that are contrary to the interests of the overall community. Such extravagance is 
exacerbated by the practice of inheritance. Croly believes that inherited wealth results in 
“the creation of a class of economic parasites” who have contributed nothing to economic 
production but enjoy a degree of comfort unimaginable to the working poor.121 Once 
again, Croly’s focus is not strictly upon the fairness of the existing distribution of wealth, 
but upon how such a distribution divides society along class lines. “The inheritance of 
vast fortunes . . . . breed[s] class envy on the one side and class contempt on the other; 
and the community is . . . divided irredeemably by differences of interest and outlook.”122 
As Veblen so effectively argued, the extremely wealthy are detached from the actual 
process of production and the vicissitudes of economic competition. They live in a 
cloistered world of leisure and comfort that effectively separates them from the majority 
of the community.  
 The extravagance of the wealthy also leads to popular resentment among the labor 
force as they come to realize that the economic system works primarily for the benefit of 
those who own property. “A system which had intended to scatter the benefits of special 	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economic privileges over the whole surface of society, had resulted in piling up of those 
benefits on certain limited areas.”123 Workers came to realize that the economic system 
was not equitable, so they began to focus increasingly on their own class interests by 
forming labor associations. Croly’s opinion of labor unions changed considerably in the 
short time between the publication of The Promise of American Life in 1909 and 
Progressive Democracy in 1914. In the earlier work, his evaluation of labor unions 
bordered on contempt. He referred to the union member as a “militant,” “a bad citizen,” 
and even “an inhuman animal” due to his supposed fanatical devotion to his union and 
his willingness to express that devotion in the most drastic ways.124 However, in 
Progressive Democracy, he treats organized labor as an understandable response to the 
abuses perpetrated by property owners, and he entertains the hope that some forward 
thinking labor movements can pave the way for “industrial self-government” by 
workers.125 Nevertheless, Croly believes that unions reflect and reinforce the class 
consciousness of the working poor and form an obstacle to social solidarity. Even as he 
came to accept organized labor as a form of necessary self-defense for the labor force, he 
still considered it to be a reflection of class interest instead of public interest. Unions 
came to represent “a restricted and interested program, which converted work into a kind 
of class property.”126 Croly ultimately believes that labor organizations are a mirror 
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image of wealthy property owners in that they are primarily focused on securing their 
own particular interest rather than the public interest. 
 Overall, Croly believes that these economic challenges and class divisions 
revealed the inadequacies of the traditional American outlook.  
The traditional American theory was that the individual should have a free hand . . 
. . whereof the result would be a happy combination of individual prosperity and 
public weal. But this expectation, as we have seen, has proven erroneous. . . . The 
plain fact is that the individual in freely and energetically pursuing his own 
private purposes has not been the inevitable public benefactor assumed by the 
traditional American interpretation of democracy.127  
 
The “promise” of prosperity and independence that Americans had come to accept was 
based upon the assumption of harmony between individual interests and public interests. 
Croly argues that the favorable economic conditions in early America allowed 
individuals to pursue their own interests without any major conflict with the public 
interest. These conditions led Americans to accept “an individualistic conception of 
society, which assumed an essentially automatic harmony between individual and social 
interests.”128 However, new economic conditions such as industrialization and the closing 
of the frontier revealed that a laissez faire economic policy resulted in conflict rather than 
harmony. “These underlying social and economic conditions are themselves changing, in 
such a wise that hereafter the ideal Promise, instead of being automatically fulfilled, may 
be automatically stifled.”129 
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Political Challenges   
 
 The radical change in economic conditions following the Civil War also revealed 
flaws and inadequacies in the political system and in the tradition of thinking that 
supported it. Croly described the traditional political outlook of Americans as optimistic, 
individualistic, and legalistic with an implicit belief that the public good would be best 
secured if individuals were given a free hand and afforded legal protections for their 
pursuit and ownership of private property. However, the government largely abandoned 
its minimalist, laissez faire policy after the Civil War for a more decidedly pro-business 
policy.  But Croly argued that this very shift to active support of business was a 
predictable consequence of the prevailing tradition of laissez faire thinking.  
 Croly thought that the laissez faire approach to governing, in which the 
government assumed a primarily negative role of protecting property, left the community 
with no way to effectively adjudicate between competing public and private interests. 
The negative state equates the “social interest” with “indiscriminate individualism,” 
which was originally designed to eliminate privilege and favoritism.130 However, the 
result of this was economic inequality as the wealthy were allowed to enhance their 
position absent government intervention. Croly believes that the focus on equal 
protection of property rights, embodied in the conception of the negative state, was meant 
to be “indiscriminate,” but in reality, this practice has led to “discriminations 
advantageous to a minority.”131 He considers an indiscriminate government to actually 
represent discrimination in favor of private interests due to the absence of any advocate 	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for the public interest. “A well-governed state will use its power to promote edifying and 
desirable discriminations.”132 By acting in accordance with intelligent discrimination 
between private interests and the interest of the public, Croly believes that the American 
political community can move beyond the tradition of “optimistic fatalism” and the 
practice of non-interference in favor of a more responsible and active policy. “The 
practice of non-interference . . . means merely that the nation is willing to accept the 
results of natural selection instead of preferring to substitute the results of artificial 
selection.”133 For Croly, the inability or unwillingness of the government to violate the 
strictures of non-interference amounts to surrendering the responsibility of governing to 
private interests and to depriving the public of any political responsibility at all. 
 The laissez faire policy of non-interference effectively meant that any 
responsibility for economic matters would be left in the hands of private individuals, but 
Croly thought a vibrant democratic government was based upon the community assuming 
greater responsibility in government. The power of concentrated wealth formed an 
obstacle to a responsible democracy, as the wealthy began to break from the traditional 
American belief in the harmony of individual and public interests. Croly describes this 
new type of businessman as follows: 
He was still reflected in the mirror of his own mind as a patriotic and public-
spirited citizen; but at the same time his ambition was to conquer, and he did not 
scruple to sacrifice both law and the public weal to his own prosperity. All 
unknowingly he began to testify to a growing and a decisive division between the 
two primary interests of American life,—between the interest of the individual 
business man and the interest of the body politic; and he became a living 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid., 190-191. 
	  	   264	  
refutation of the amiable theories of the Jacksonian Democrat that the two must 
substantially coincide.134 
 
In the era of industrialization, businesses were no longer content to be “let alone” and 
actively sought assistance from the government to advance their own private interests 
with little to no concern for the public interests. The “industrial leader . . . . saw an 
opportunity to turn to his own account the individualistic ‘freedom’ of American politics 
and industry.”135 It is important to note that, according to Croly’s telling, business 
interests were not advocating a policy of laissez faire, but one of an activist government 
that would support business interests. Free market capitalism was being replaced by 
crony capitalism. Nevertheless, it was a tradition of laissez faire in American political 
thought that allowed this development. Business leaders, then as now, used the language 
of laissez faire rhetorically and ideologically to justify or legitimize a system of active 
government assistance to large enterprises. Croly believes that the wealthy were “enabled 
by the character of our political traditions to obtain an amount of power which the 
originators of those political ideas never anticipated.”136  
 The practice of non-interference had allowed private interests to gain 
unprecedented power in the form of wealth, but they were also able to gain sway over 
governmental institutions, which began to actively support business interests. This 
transformation began soon after the Civil War as “Republicans had converted the earlier 
negative policy of emancipating economic production into a positive policy of 	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comprehensive stimulation.”137 By way of example, Croly argues that politicians and 
land developers joined forces to appropriate the remaining unoccupied land of the 
western frontier. He describes an “alliance” between politicians and developers that was 
forged “for the sake of occupying as much fertile territory as possible . . . and of dividing 
the fruits of that occupation.”138 As the government assisted in rapid appropriation of the 
remaining wilderness into fewer private hands, it became complicit in eliminating an 
essential condition for the American Promise—the wide open spaces on the Western 
frontier where the independent farmer could find economic security by virtue of his 
individual efforts. 
 Croly believes that this alliance between business and government deprives the 
public of any effective responsibility for economic developments, and this has serious 
implications for the future of the American democracy. For Croly, any form of 
government is defined, not by whose interests are promoted and protected, but by who 
has political responsibility. His criticism of the Constitution was based upon his belief 
that its legalistic structure did not allow any vehicle for popular democratic expression.139 
As he notes frequently, the Constitution established a government that protected equal 
rights in the name of giving individuals freedom to presumably control their own destiny. 
According to Croly, “Individual freedom is important, but more important still is the 
freedom of the whole people to dispose of its own destiny.”140 Similarly, the “vicious 	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cycle of private interests” that characterized the latter half of the nineteenth century 
placed political responsibility in the hands of private business interests and their allies in 
government and left little room for popular democratic responsibility.141 This is the true 
significance of laissez faire thinking for Croly. By assuming that the free play of private 
interests will ensure the public interest, the traditional optimistic American political 
theory supports a policy that “deprives the whole people of that ultimate responsibility 
for their own welfare, without which democracy is meaningless.”142 
 
REFORM: RECONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN PROMISE 
 
 Croly’s primary focus as a reformer and a critic was the tradition of political ideas 
that I have outlined above—a tradition that is best described as laissez faire. In presenting 
a vision of reform, he was primarily concerned with establishing an alternative set of 
ideas that would supplant this laissez faire tradition. David K. Nichols attributes Croly’s 
lasting influence to the fact that he “was less concerned with specific reforms than he was 
with establishing an intellectual context for reform.”143 He did believe that political and 
legal institutions needed to be updated to create a more democratic community, but he 
fundamentally believed that lasting reform would have to be based upon ideas rather than 
institutions. 
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Croly criticized the tradition of individualism in American political thought 
primarily because he thought it characterized individual interests as standing opposed to 
the interests of society. Like most of his contemporary reformers, he rejected the 
atomistic conception of society, with its exclusive focus on individuals, in favor of a 
more communalist focus. In The Promise of American Life, Croly treated individualism 
as the primary obstacle to the cohesive democratic community that he favored, but he had 
not developed a clear alternative to the atomistic view of society. He focused instead on 
rediscovering and reconstructing a sense of national purpose, which he attributed to 
Hamilton, and the implication was that such purpose would lead Americans away from 
the atomistic individualism that developed during the “middle period.”144 However, when 
he approached the subject in Progressive Democracy, his thinking about the relationship 
between the individual and society revealed a degree of nuance and specificity that was 
not present in his earlier work.  
 Croly presents a vision of society and the individual, which relies heavily on the 
philosophical teachings of pragmatism, especially those of John Dewey. He abandons 
fixed concepts such as “individual” and “society” in terms of a process-oriented 
description of human relations.  
Society is the process of socializing. Individuality is the process of 
individualizing. Neither of these processes is a matter of monotonous repetition. 
Both of them are consummations and fulfillments, which carry with them the risk 
of failure as well as the chance for success.145 
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Croly thinks that an individualistic outlook misconstrues the way in which these 
“processes” relate to each other. “Individuals and societies are not natural facts. They are 
wilful [sic] processes—moral creations.”146 Because the “individual” and “society” are 
ongoing experimental processes, they do not lend themselves to abstract naturalistic laws. 
Instead, Croly believes that “moral or social knowledge” is a type of continuous learning 
that emanates from these processes and can never arrive at a fixed and permanent 
understanding of human relations.147 The “process of socializing” involves acquiring and 
implementing “practical knowledge” to make the process of social life more fulfilling.148  
 Croly argues that the failure to understand the true nature of individual and social 
processes leads social thinkers to treat the two as antagonistic. “If both or one can be 
conceived as finished products, the result is a tendency either to sacrifice the individual to 
society or society to the individual.”149 The proper way to characterize the relationship 
between the individual and society is one of “interdependence;” otherwise, there is a 
tendency to treat one as dependent upon the other and to value the needs of one at the 
expense of the other.150 The tendency in American political thought has been to sacrifice 
the interests of society to those of the individual, or to assume that individual interests 
will create an automatic harmony with the public interest. Croly’s view is that “society is 
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not merely a result of the harmony or conflict of individual interests or wills. It is an end 
in itself, as is the individual, and correlative with the individual.”151  
 By depicting the relationship between the individual and society as 
interdependent, Croly is presenting what he sees as a workable compromise, but he is 
careful to point out that this relationship of interdependence must be complimented with 
a positive direction or purpose. It is purpose that transforms a mere group of individuals 
into a society. 
Men and women become associated together for the accomplishing of an 
infinitely large number and various number of purposes, and each of these 
different associations constitutes a society, whose reality is determined by the 
tenacity and the scope of the purposes which have prompted the association.152 
 
Purpose is the force that guides the process of socialization, and in pursuing a specific 
purpose, communities learn by doing. They develop practical knowledge as they come to 
“seek some form of mutual accommodation and adjustment” and “acquire joint 
responsibilities.”153 As the process of socialization goes on, “a social ideal gradually 
emerges,” and “society comes to be conceived as a whole, with certain permanent 
interests and needs.”154 Croly thought that a “social ideal” was especially important in a 
democratic community where the people have the ultimate responsibility for their well-
being and future. He believed the future of American democracy depended upon the 
ability to restore a social ideal that was lost. 
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An American Social Ideal 
 
 Croly believed that any meaningful reform in American political institutions and 
practices would have to rely upon a clearly defined national purpose. His criticism of the 
American tradition of laissez faire thinking was based upon what he saw as the idealistic 
belief that social progress would automatically result from individual freedom. He saw it 
as his duty to help transform the “American national destiny into a national purpose,” and 
he noticed that reformers were starting to welcome this change.155  
Now the tendency is to conceive the social welfare, not as an end which cannot be 
left to the happy harmonizing of individual interests, but as an end which must be 
consciously willed by society and efficiently realized. Society, that is, has become 
a moral ideal, not independent of the individual but supplementary to him, an 
ideal that must be pursued less by regulating individual excesses than by active 
conscious encouragement of socializing tendencies.156 
 
The challenge would be to find a national purpose that would fit into the tradition of 
American political thought.  
Croly believes that the purpose of any “national association” is particular to each 
nation and based upon their “interests, institutions, and traditions.”157 The United States 
is unique in this respect because “the American nation is committed to a purpose which is 
not merely of historical manufacture.”158 European nations, for example, are wedded to 
historical traditions of nationality, but Americans had severed themselves from these 
traditional affiliations in the name of a future oriented purpose. “[The American Nation] 
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is committed to the realization of the democratic ideal; and if its Promise is to be 
fulfilled, it must be prepared to follow whithersoever that ideal may lead.”159 The central 
problem with the American political tradition, according to Croly, was that Americans 
adopted the mindset of laissez faire and assumed that an individualistic, legalistic, and 
decentralized political organization would be the best way to secure the democratic ideal.  
 Croly, by contrast, wanted to construct a coherent national purpose that would 
serve as a guide for the American democracy. His strategy for achieving this was a 
“critical reconstruction of American political ideas” to give a more affirmative and 
specific formulation of the American “Promise.”160 The most important source of 
political ideas for his reconstruction was Alexander Hamilton. It was Hamilton who 
exhibited a belief that the nation itself must have a definite purpose, and that the 
government must have the necessary means to pursue that purpose. 
 Croly does not conceal his admiration for Hamilton, and he freely admits that his 
“own preferences are on the side of Hamilton rather than of Jefferson.”161 Fundamentally, 
he believes that Hamilton espouses two very important ideas. First, Hamilton realized 
that the nation existed for a purpose and that there was a national interest that extended 
beyond simply preserving the existing government. “The central government is to be 
used, not merely to maintain the Constitution, but to promote the national interest and to 
consolidate the national organization.” 162 Second, Hamilton knew that this national 	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purpose would not emerge spontaneously and would have to be nurtured and advanced 
by a “positive policy.”163 Croly believed that a national purpose and an active 
government were mutually reinforcing, and this is the reason that he admires Hamilton’s 
approach to government. “Hamilton’s policy was one of energetic and intelligent 
assertion of the national good.”164 Croly thought that Hamilton’s active policy in support 
of the national interest represented an alternative to Jeffersonian individualism and the 
aimless democracy it represented. Hamilton had shown Americans that the community 
could be unified in the active pursuit of a national purpose. 
 The fundamental flaw in Hamilton’s approach, according to Croly, was that he 
identified and supported the wrong purpose. Although he understood the importance of  
political ideas as they relate to a national purpose, Hamilton was so fearful of popular 
upheaval that “he did not seek a sufficiently broad, popular basis for the realization of 
those ideas.”165 Instead, he entrusted the national interests to “the interested motives of a 
minority of well-to-do citizens.”166 Hamilton viewed the national interests as separate 
from and even opposed to democratic expression, and this led him to identify the interests 
of the wealthy with the overall national interest. “He conceived the Constitution and the 
Union as a valley of peace and plenty which had to be fortified against the marauders by 
the heavy ramparts of borrowed money and the big guns of propertied interest.”167 By 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Ibid., 40. 
164 Ibid., 45. 
165 Ibid., 40. 
166 Ibid., 41. 
167 Ibid. 
	  	   273	  
forging an alliance between propertied interests and the national interest, Hamilton stoked 
resentment among the democratic majority who could not identify with his national 
program. “He failed to understand that the permanent support of the American national 
organization could not be found in anything less than the whole American democracy.”168 
Croly argues that the true value of a national purpose is its ability to unite the community 
behind a common ideal, but Hamilton’s national program only alienated the majority of 
Americans from this national ideal because they saw him as a spokesman for special 
interests. 
 Croly looked to Jefferson as a corrective to Hamilton’s anti-democratic 
nationalism. Jefferson’s faith in the ability of people to govern themselves marks a 
democratic contrast to Hamilton’s somewhat elitist conception of national purpose. In 
short, Jefferson had faith in the people, and Hamilton had faith in the national 
government. Croly wanted to unite these two ideals so that the democratic majority could 
actualize their sovereign will through positive policy. By adding Hamilton’s idea of 
positive government action in pursuit of a national purpose, the Jeffersonian “democracy 
of indiscriminate individualism” would be imbued with “a sense of joint responsibility 
for the success of their political and social ideal.”169 Croly admits that this union of 
Jefferson’s democracy and Hamilton’s nationalism will “necessarily do more harm to the 
Jeffersonian group of political ideas than it will to Hamilton.”170 The primary reason for 
this is that he thinks Jefferson’s individualism has had a more dominant presence in the 	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American political tradition; therefore, the reintroduction of Hamilton’s nationalism will 
have a more noticeable impact.  
[The United States] must become, that is, a democracy devoted to the welfare of 
the whole people by means of a conscious labor of individual and social 
improvement; and this is precisely the sort of democracy which demands for its 
realization the aid of the Hamiltonian nationalistic organization and principle.171 
 
Croly also believes that Hamilton’s idea of a positive government organized for the 
purpose of promoting the national interest would provide the people with political 
experience and education as long as there is an avenue for democratic participation. Like 
Aristotle, Croly thinks politics is something people learn by doing.  
 Croly believes that the Jeffersonian vision of democracy has a stupefying effect 
on the people. It requires very little from them in terms of political responsibility, so they 
focus on individual interests as the legalistic political system allows the community to 
drift without purpose or direction. But Croly thought that such a purpose was something 
that the community acquired through practice by engaging in purposeful political action; 
it was not simply an abstract ideal that could be imposed from without. In The Promise of 
American Life, he recommends an “educational theory of democracy” in which the 
people engage in a series of “constructive experiments” to gain practical experience.172 
Interestingly, his proposal is very similar to Jefferson’s own proposal for “ward 
republics,” which was intended to give all citizens “a part in the administration of public 
affairs.”173 Croly’s focus is not on what these “experiments” achieve, but what they teach 	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the people about democratic responsibility and national purpose. “The fundamental 
process of American education consists and must continue to consist precisely in the risks 
and experiments which the American nation will make in the service of its national 
ideal.”174 His reform was aimed at replacing the negative “do-nothing democracy,” which 
he attributes to Jefferson, into an educative do-something democracy. 
 
Positive Responsible Government and Political Education 
 
 The foregoing discussion demonstrates that Croly believed that the tradition of 
laissez faire thinking has prevented the United States from engaging in positive 
democratic reform. 
Reform is both meaningless and powerless unless the Jeffersonian principle of 
non-interference is abandoned. The experience of the last generation plainly 
shows that the American economic and social system cannot be allowed to take 
care of itself, and the automatic harmony of the individual and the public interest, 
which is the essence of the Jeffersonian democratic creed, has proven to be an 
illusion. Interference with the natural course of individual popular action there 
must be in the public interest; and such interference must at least be sufficient to 
accomplish its purpose.175 
 
Croly was not interested in formulating permanent political reforms; after all, he 
criticized the Framers of the Constitution for attempting to establish a permanent and 
inflexible framework. He thought that citizens are influenced by and learn from their 
political institutions. If these institutions leave them to their own individual pursuits, they 
will learn very little by way of public participation. On the other hand, if these 
institutions demand more of citizens and afford them more responsibility, they will be 	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required to revise their traditional exclusive focus on individual interests and embrace a 
sense of mutual dependence and public responsibility.  
 Croly thinks that the tradition of individualism and the legalistic Constitutional 
system have effectively deprived the majority of Americans of political responsibility. 
The Framers of the Constitution placed legal safeguards against “popular despotism” 
which resulted in a system where sovereign power resided in a body of law that mostly 
catered to propertied interests. But Croly argued that the only legitimate type of 
sovereignty in a democracy is popular sovereignty. “There is point of fact no logical 
escape from popular Sovereignty—once the theory of divinely appointed Sovereignty is 
rejected.”176 Given that political responsibility must reside with someone, democracy can 
mean nothing less than giving the public the responsibility of governing even though they 
may use that responsibility in unanticipated ways. “The fallibility of human nature being 
what it is, the practical application of this theory will have its grave dangers; but these 
dangers are only evaded and postponed by a failure to place ultimate political 
responsibility where it belongs.”177 Croly was willing to accept any potential “dangers” 
that would result from greater democratic responsibility in exchange for the educative 
benefits of democratic participation. 
 Croly believed that the democratic community would secure the public interest by 
engaging in responsible oversight over social and economic affairs. In this sense, popular 
sovereignty was the antidote to the attitude of “live-and-let-live” and “the policy of drift.” 
He admits that the experimental attempts to assert the public interest may commit 	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“serious and perhaps enduring mistakes,” but similar mistakes have been made in the 
name of the laissez faire tradition to the extent that “inaction and irresponsibility are more 
costly and dangerous than intelligent and responsible interference.”178  
 The reason that Croly favors action over inaction and positive responsibility over 
obedience to rules is that he believes that there is no such thing as an impartial or 
indiscriminate government. The American legal system, which aimed for impartiality by 
protecting property rights, resulted in class divisions and a certain degree of economic 
privilege among the wealthy. This shows that “the practice of non-interference is just as 
selective as the practice of state interference.”179 Croly also challenges the belief that the 
legal system prevents discrimination because it represents a predetermined system of 
discrimination in favor of property owners. “Even if enjoyed with some equality in the 
beginning, they do not continue to be enjoyed equally enjoyed, but make towards 
discriminations advantageous to a minority.”180 This is precisely what Croly means by 
the policy of drift. As circumstances change, institutions and practices that were fair and 
equitable become sources of privilege and class division. To combat the policy of drift, 
the government must be able to engage in “responsible discriminations” so that no class 
or interest group gains too much power or influence.181  
 Croly believed that the central government was the best vehicle for responsible 
democratic government. “The modern national state is at bottom the most intelligent and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Ibid., 190. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid., 195. 
181 Ibid. 
	  	   278	  
successful attempt which has yet been made to create a comparatively stable, efficient, 
and responsible type of political association.”182 He considers the federal government to 
be the best hope for unifying the community behind a common purpose. He developed a 
number of specific reform proposals to address various political and economic problems, 
but they were all based on his belief that purposeful political action educates and unites 
the community.  
An organization of the executive and legislative powers, which will  give 
increased energy to both of them and which is adjusted to their cooperation both 
one with another and with a sufficient measure of direct government, is what is 
needed and must be contrived. The new organization will be intended first, last 
and always to promote political education.183  
 
It is worth noting that Croly did not believe that a permanent organizational structure 
would establish a democratic system once and for all. Rather, he thought democratic 
expression must be embodied in temporary and experimental programs, whose primary 
function is educational. Participatory democracy, Croly believed, would teach citizens 
that they could contribute to political reform in the name of the public interest. It would 
also foster a greater sense of inclusiveness and cohesiveness among the community as 
they took active control of the ship of state and substituted intelligent collective 
navigation for the “hands-off” approach and the policy of drift. 
 One of Croly’s most important contributions to American political thought is his 
argument that a strong, efficient, and centralized government is not a hindrance to 
democracy, but a necessary complement. “A strong government with an affirmative 
policy and effective popular control are supplementary rather than hostile to each 	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other.”184 A democratic community needs a strong active government to create 
meaningful avenues for responsible democratic action. It gives the citizens effective 
responsibility and serves as an educational institution that allows them to take a more 
active role in promoting the public interest. Similarly, a strong and efficient national 
government must be based upon democratic support, or it threatens to create divisions in 
society, and the government becomes beholden to special interests.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In Croly we have an example of a thinker who was influential despite, not 
because of, his style of presentation. He has a penchant for baffling metaphors and 
puzzling sentence construction. He also has an abominable tendency to refer to thinkers 
and intellectual traditions indirectly rather than to identify specific thinkers or theories. 
He is less interested in accuracy of interpretation and more interested in fitting them into 
his overall assessment of the American Promise or tradition. This approach is most 
evident in his somewhat careless treatment of Jefferson. He depicts Jefferson as an 
indiscriminate egalitarian who was averse to any type of individual distinction. He 
devotes considerable effort in The Promise of American Life to the argument that 
Jefferson’s focus on equal rights produces a society of mediocre individuals who reject 
any type of individual expertise and are focused solely on economic gain. This argument 
completely overlooks Jefferson’s belief in a “natural aristocracy” of distinguished 
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individuals and the necessity of civic virtue, which is formed by public participation.185 
Had he not been so quick to reject Jefferson as a spokesman for irresponsible 
individualism, Croly might have found a similarity between Jefferson’s devotion to 
political education and his own belief in an educational democracy. Moreover, 
Jefferson’s support of experiments in local self-government, most noticeably his ward 
system, as a means of political education is very similar to Croly’s belief that 
experimental programs were necessary for democratic education.  
 Croly also overemphasizes, or at least simplifies, the tradition of individualism in 
American political thought due to his excessive focus on Andrew Jackson and the pioneer 
way of life. Reading his description of the “middle period,” one could be forgiven for 
believing that the whole of American political life took place on the Western frontier and 
that nearly all Americans accepted the rugged individualism of Jackson’s Democrats. The 
tradition of individualism that he identified is rural and agrarian, but it was ultimately the 
urban industrialists who turned this individualistic system to their advantage. True to his 
Hamiltonian inclinations, he tends to associate industrial development with the national 
interest, while simultaneously associating agricultural pursuits with self-interest.  
 Despite his shortcomings, Croly’s criticism of laissez faire as a defining feature of 
the American political tradition shows how various elements of American life, such as 
traditions, institutions, and practices have contributed to a laissez faire outlook. The result 
was a legalistic political system and a “policy of drift.” Croly saw reform as the antidote 
to the drift, and he sought to convince Americans that they should take an active part in 	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navigating. Plato famously used the metaphor of the ship of state to make the case that 
philosophical expertise was preferable to democratic control. He worried that the sailors 
were oblivious to the science of navigation and took to “crowding around the shipowner, 
begging him and doing everything possible to get him to turn the rudder over to them.”186 
Croly saw his challenge as a matter of identifying a destination and then convincing the 
people to take the rudder themselves. 
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CHAPTER 8 — CONCLUSION: A NEW GILDED AGE? 
 
Having considered this debate over laissez faire in American thought that took 
place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, one question becomes apparent. 
Why were writers of such wildly different viewpoints, such as Carnegie and Lloyd, 
preoccupied with the doctrine of laissez faire at a time when the government was actively 
assisting enterprises. One reason for this is that defenders of laissez faire in the late 
nineteenth century presented it mostly as a doctrine that opposed social legislation or 
assistance to the poor. Laissez faire was originally concerned with trade policy and 
commerce, but Spencer, Sumner, and Carnegie turned it into a justification for economic 
inequality by applying the logic of laissez faire to social legislation. Sumner is the only 
one of these three thinkers to consider the possible negative consequences of 
concentrated wealth. He worried that wealthy corporations would effectively influence 
the political system to secure government favors for their own enterprises. This 
development is not only a violation of laissez faire, but it is also an artificial attempt to 
influence the social order—the very same criticism he directed at socialism.  
 Lloyd, Veblen, and Croly similarly treated laissez faire as if it were the prevailing 
economic policy during the Gilded Age. However, for each of these thinkers, laissez faire 
stood for something more than simply a policy of hands-off government. For Lloyd, 
laissez faire was a source of moral corruption that reinforced selfish habits and unethical 
business practices. Veblen thought that laissez faire represented a tendency among 
economists to accept uncritically norms and practices that are detrimental to the interest 
of the industrial community. For Croly, laissez faire represented a tradition of 
	  	   283	  
individualism in America, as well as a tradition of “hands-off,” “do-nothing” 
government, which gives the people no effective sovereign responsibility. They all 
realized that the reasoning and rhetoric of laissez faire exerts an influence on American 
thinking even if the government is not following a strict policy of laissez faire.  
 Of all the thinkers presented in this dissertation, Sumner has the clearest and most 
accurate appreciation for what laissez faire actually represents. Lloyd, Croly, and Veblen 
all tended to use the concept of laissez faire as a general representation of the set of ideas 
that they found problematic. They all believed that the advent of an industrial economy in 
the United States required a change in ideas. Lloyd focused on changing the moral 
outlook of Americans; Veblen focused upon economic institutions that he saw as 
obstacles to progress; Croly focused on reconstructing our political tradition and 
identifying a national purpose.  
 In America today, we face a similar situation. The federal government actively 
assists large corporations through tax loopholes, tax credits, direct subsidies, and, in some 
cases, tariffs on imports. At the same time, business leaders and free market advocates 
call for smaller government and less regulation while extolling the virtues of self-help 
and personal responsibility to undermine social programs. Economic observers as diverse 
as Niall Ferguson and Robert Reich argue that the United States is witnessing a “new 
Gilded Age” in which nearly all of the rewards of economic growth accrue to the wealthy 
while wages remain stagnant.1 A policy of laissez faire, rather than the current policy of 
state-assisted capitalism, would have no effective way of assuaging this inequality. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Robert Reich, “Mitt Romney and the New Gilded Age,” The Nation, July16/23, 
2012;  Niall Ferguson, “Wall Street’s New Gilded Age,” Newsweek, vol. 154, no. 12, 
September 21, 2009. 
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Furthermore, there is new evidence showing that this disparity between wages and profits 
will continue to increase. Thomas Piketty’s magisterial Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century presents a very persuasive case that, over the course of history, returns on 
investments have grown in value much more quickly than growth in wages.2 To use 
Veblen’s terminology, those engaged in “pecuniary employment” earn much greater 
rewards than those engaged in productive “industrial employment.” Picketty argues that 
the disparity between income earned from investment and income earned from labor is 
reaching levels that have not obtained since the late nineteenth century.3 Like Lloyd, he 
worries that increasing concentration of wealth posed a threat to democracy in the form 
violent revolution due to rampant poverty.  
 If we are living in a “new Gilded Age,” we would be well-advised to revisit the 
debate over laissez faire that arose during the original Gilded Age. Spencer and Sumner 
present a meritocratic view of economic success based upon free competition, and their 
vehement opposition to social legislation is repeated today—albeit, in less Darwinian 
language—in calls to cut government spending, especially assistance to the poor. We 
may ask, as Lloyd did, whether the doctrine of laissez faire encourages selfish 
individualism and whether this is influence is detrimental to the American community. 
We may follow Veblen in questioning whether the wealthy actually contribute to material 
production as we witness the rise of increasingly sophisticated financial instruments, 
hedge funds, and venture capital firms—all of which seek profit even at the cost of 
disrupting production. We may also revisit Croly’s criticism of laissez faire and ask 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Picketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. 
3 Ibid., 164-198. 
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whether individualism and pursuit of economic prosperity distract us from, what he sees 
as our national purpose—the establishment of a progressive democratic society in which 
the people have an active role in determining the best ways to use the institutions of 
government to advance the interest of the community. Regardless, the debate over laissez 
faire rages on. I hope this dissertation has provided some insight into how this debate 
characterized American political thought at an earlier juncture so that we can better 
understand how the contemporary debate relates to the history of political thought in the 
United States. 
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